Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1955, Volume XIV

120. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, June 8, 1955¹

Washington Russell, June 8, 1955

SUBJECT

• Steps to Launch Alpha

PARTICIPANTS

• The Secretary
• The Under Secretary
• Assistant Secretary Allen
• Mr. Raymond A. Hare, Director-General of the Foreign Service
• Mr. Francis H. Russell
• Mr. Robert L. Burns, S/S-RO

Mr.Russell gave a review of recent developments bearing on Alpha. He said the Israel Ambassador to London had informed the Foreign Office that Israel was discontinuing its efforts to obtain a security guarantee from the UK and was going to concentrate on getting it from the US.² Ambassador Eban had just informed Mr.Allen that the Israel Government desires immediate discussions with the Department on a security treaty, with simultaneous talks confined to the issues of refugee compensation and the Arab blockade.³

With respect to the Secretary’s memo of June 6⁴ proposing memoranda setting forth the general principles of the Alpha proposals to Israel and the Arab states, to be made public shortly thereafter, Mr.Russell said that our Missions in Cairo, Amman and Beirut, in response to a Department telegram sent May 28⁵ suggesting a US–UK announcement of settlement proposals, had given their opinion that such a step would hurt Alpha prospects. The British had also expressed their opposition to such a step until secret negotiations had been fully tried.⁶

Mr.Russell suggested as steps to advance Alpha: Departmental approval of the Alpha summary (memo to the Secretary of May 18⁷); authorization for Byroade to offer US financial help on the High Aswan Dam; a telegram to Byroade instructing him to raise Alpha with Nasser within the next few weeks; preparing Mallory and Heath to broach Alpha to the Jordanian and Lebanese Governments in the event that Nasser refused cooperation (possibly linking area defense steps with Alpha as suggested in Mr.Russell’s memo to the Secretary of June 2⁸); and the preparation of a public statement on Alpha which would be ready for use in the event all of the above efforts failed. Mr.Russell said that such a schedule would give Eric Johnston another month within which to make a final effort to negotiate agreement on the Jordan Valley Plan.

The Secretary cautioned against revealing any of the details of the Alpha plan to Nasser or any of the other governments. He said that any approach should be only in the form of suggesting the general principles on which a settlement might be based. Any mention of specific amounts—such as the amount of compensation to be paid to the refugees, or the amount of economic aid that would be forthcoming as a result of a settlement—would be unwise, as any figure which might be mentioned would be regarded by the parties only as a starting point for bargaining. Mr.Russell said that the figures contained in the Alpha documents were regarded by both the British and us as our concept of final figures, and that any early negotiations would have to take that into account.

The Secretary went on to say that he believed a public statement of Alpha, either in the form of memoranda to the interested governments or a speech which he might give, would be preferable to secret negotiations. He said he believed the prospects of success through secret negotiations were slight; the result of pursuing them further might be either a long delay through waiting for the proper moment to arrive or a turn-down. If any success is to be achieved it must be this year, as the whole subject of Israel-Arab relations will be a political football in 1956. This would undo the improvement in our relations with most of the states in the area during the past two years. If we approach the states through secret negotiations and are turned down, any subsequent public enunciation of Alpha would be regarded by them as an effort to coerce them into doing something which they had already refused to do. On the other hand, a public statement of Alpha objectives and principles must appeal to the good judgment of all concerned. There might be immediate negative responses but both Israel and Arab public opinion would, on second thought, realize that there were great advantages to both sides. World opinion, too, should rally to its support.

There was some discussion about the probable grounds that would be advanced by Israelis or Arabs for refusing the plan. The Secretary said that he felt that the objections were so weak that they could be overcome. The Secretary pointed out that there had been an initial negative reaction in the case of Trieste but that a settlement was eventually achieved. Mr.Hare said that the Arabs would be nonplussed at first but that certain points in the Alpha plan would have obvious attraction for them. The Secretary said that the situation in the area is deteriorating and that it is difficult to see how the parties could feel there was any alternative to an Alpha approach.

Mr.Russell suggested that the possible disadvantage of initial secret negotiations which the Secretary had mentioned, i.e., that it would make difficult a subsequent public statement if they had previously expressed their opposition, might be overcome by our saying in our confidential presentation that we were planning on presenting our proposals publicly but wished first to have their reaction and, hopefully, their cooperation. Mr.Allen said that he felt there were disadvantages to starting off with a public statement. For example, it would harden Israel and American Jewish opinion against any border alterations. The Secretary replied that any public proposals on borders should be a general statement of principles, such as the suggestion of triangles with over- and under-passes, leaving it to the parties to negotiate their location and size.

The Secretary reiterated that he did not think there was any chance of secret negotiations bringing any positive result within the present year. If the Department does not have an established position on the Israel-Arab issue by the end of this year, both political parties will take extreme positions in the elections, which would result in the loss of the Arab world to the West.

Mr.Allen suggested that we might first seek a settlement between Israel and Lebanon. The Under Secretary said that there is not time at our disposal for the snowballing effect which we would hope such an approach might produce. Mr.Hare pointed out that such an approach would require us to make a “client state” of Lebanon, since she would become immediately the object of political and economic pressures by the other Arab states.

The Secretary asked that a draft public statement of the Alpha proposals be prepared⁹ which he would discuss with Macmillan in New York next week. He asked that Byroade be instructed to defer any approach to Nasser.¹⁰

1. Source: Department of State,S/S–NEA Files: Lot 61 D 417, Alpha Volume 4. Top Secret; Alpha; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Russell on June 9.
2. The British Embassy provided Russell with this information on June 6. (Memorandum from Russell to Allen and Jernegan, June 6;ibid.,NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Alpha—Memos, etc., beginning after 2d London Talks—Apr. 26–June 30, ’55)
3. Memorandum of conversation, by Bergus, June 8, not printed. (Ibid., Central Files, 684A.86/6–855)
4. Attached to Document 117.
5. Document 109.
6. See footnote 3, Document 109.
7. Attached to Document 106.
8. Document 110.
9. On June 15,Russell sent the Secretary, under cover of a memorandum, a draft public statement on Alpha which he could use in his discussions with Macmillan. (Department of State,S/S–NEA Files: Lot 61 D 417, Alpha Volume 4)
10. Byroade was so instructed on June 9 in telegram 2133 to Cairo, not printed. (Ibid., Central Files, 684A.86/6–855)Byroade did not receive the message, however, until after he saw Nasser the morning of June 9 and discussed Alpha with him.Byroade commented: “It very clear from discussion that followed that in present state of tension at Gaza cannot expect serious talks regarding Alpha. He [Nasser] agreed to value of planning better future relations even under present circumstances, but unwilling proceed at present.” (Telegram 1878 from Cairo, June 9;ibid., 684A.86/ 6–955) See alsoinfra and Document 122.Russell informed the Secretary of these developments in a memorandum dated June 7. (Ibid.,NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Alpha—Memos, etc., beginning after 2d London Talks—Apr. 26–June 30, ’55)