Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1955, Volume XIV

110. Memorandum From Francis H. Russell to the Secretary of State¹

Washington,June 2, 1955.

SUBJ

• Next Steps to Advance Alpha Settlement

The following are recommended as steps to be taken during the next few weeks to launch the Alpha program:

1. A telegram to Byroade saying the time is growing short in which Alpha must be launched if it is to make significant progress during the present year; urge him to proceed as rapidly as possible in discussions with Fawzi and, if occasion offers, with Nasser; authorize him to refer to the possibility of US aid on the High Aswan Dam, in the context of Alpha settlement, bearing in mind that the ultimate figure might be around $100 million although no specific commitments should be made; say that if it appears that, at the end of three or four weeks, no early progress with the Government of Egypt is likely, we intend to approach the Jordanian and Lebanese Governments.

2. Send copies of Alpha summaries to Ambassadors Mallory and Heath; say we have been hoping that the Egyptians would cooperate in launching Alpha but this appears unlikely at the present time, and we are giving serious thought to possible approaches to Jordan and Lebanon.

3. If, at the end of three or four weeks, no favorable response has been obtained from the Egyptian Government, instruct our ambassadors to approach the Jordanian and—if Jordan’s response warranted—the Lebanese Government. The inducements which we would advance to Jordan are set forth in the attached Tab A. The inducements to Lebanon are set forth in the attached Tab B.

4. The built-in inducements in Alpha, however, will probably not be enough to secure Jordanian and Lebanese cooperation. Both countries have evinced some interest in adhering to the Turk-Iraq pact: Lebanon in connection with arms aid; Jordan in connection with possible substitution for the present Anglo-Jordanian treaty of [or] one similar to the new Anglo-Iraq treaty. Our existing policy contemplated delaying Jordanian and Lebanese adherence to the Turk-Iraq treaty until after Alpha implementation. It might be possible to secure Jordanian and Lebanese cooperation in Alpha by linking the two developments. This would mean that:

(a) Alpha would be raised with Jordan and Lebanon simultaneously with discussion of their possible adherence to the Turk-Iraq treaty and attendant benefits to each therefrom. We would make clear we could not support such adherence in the absence of an Alpha settlement.

(b) If, in the context of Alpha, developments point toward Jordan–Lebanon adherence to the Turk-Iraq pact, the US and the UK should plan to hold discussions with the Israel Government about its participation in area defense (confined to use of Israel bases, harbor facilities, and protection of Israel Government territory and waters).

(c) The US–UK would bring pressure upon Iraq not to interfere with Jordanian and Lebanese cooperation in Alpha, pointing out the advantages to Iraq from Jordanian-Lebanese adherence to the Turk-Iraq pact, which the US–UK could then support.

5. An effort should be made to induce the Israel Government, pending the above, to refrain from acts (e.g., increased border activity, or publication of an Israel Government plan for settlement) that would hurt Alpha.

Tab A

JORDAN: INDUCEMENTS AND PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS IN SECURING COOPERATION²

1. The status quo in the Near East is not in Jordan’s interest. Her economy can never be properly developed in the present situation. All Jordan’s neighbor states contain elements which entertain notions as to Jordan’s future which do not coincide with Jordan’s interests. . . .

2. Jordan is bearing a heavier burden as a result of the Palestine hostilities than any other Arab state. The largest share of the sporadic hostilities falls upon Jordan, and it is her trade and communications with the outside world which have been the most thoroughly damaged. Jordan therefore has the most to gain from a resolution of the Palestine issue. It is time for Jordan to look to her own interests and to select a course of action which will benefit her the most. The US and the UK could then cooperate with Jordan in persuading other Arab states of the necessity of Jordan’s participating in a just and equitable settlement of the controversy. Past experience has shown that Jordan’s leaving the initiative to other Arab states is fruitless and dangerous.

3. In the type of settlement which we have in mind, Jordan will receive a good portion of what she has demanded. There will be provisions for territorial adjustments, repatriation of some refugees, rehabilitation of the rest, and arrangements for compensation. The US would likewise be prepared to support Jordan in obtaining facilities through Israel for communicating with other Arab states and the outside world. . . . Jordan is already aware of our active support of the proposition that she must have her full share of the waters of the entire Jordan–Yarmuk system.

4. We fully appreciate that any settlement at all, no matter how just and equitable, would arouse considerable opposition among certain extreme elements in Jordan’s population and create a serious internal security situation. To this end we would be prepared to consult with the Jordanians on ways in which we can be of assistance in dealing with this problem during the transition period. We would also be prepared to speak to Israel in the strongest terms of the necessity for a tranquil border situation.

Tab B

LEBANON: INDUCEMENTS AND PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS IN SECURING COOPERATION

1. The Lebanese are most anxious to receive military aid from the US, desiring it primarily for internal security and prestige, and as a sign of the recognition by the US of the importance of Lebanon. The cost to the US would be perhaps $5 to $10 million.

2. The Lebanese would like to receive economic aid on a much larger scale than at present (in FY 1954 they received $6 million economic assistance; the figure for FY 1955 will be much smaller). The Lebanese would like us to finance a significant portion of the Litani River development project, and they would like large-scale help, for instance, with their road program. An offer of some $10 million for these or similar purposes, over and above our “normal” technical assistance and economic aid, would be a genuine inducement.

3. Like the other Arab states, Lebanon fears that Israel, unless held in check, may some day attempt to expand at Lebanon’s expense. The Lebanese fear that Israel some day may attempt by force to establish control over the waters of the Litani River for the benefit of Israel. A Western security guarantee of Lebanon against the possibility of an attack by Israel would remove these fears. A “SEATO-type” guarantee⁴ of Lebanon’s borders against Israel aggression (and vice versa), conditional upon a Lebanon-Israel peace settlement, would thus constitute an effective inducement.

4. A basic fear in the dominant Christian element in Lebanon is that some day the country may lose its separate identity through absorption into the neighboring Moslem states, particularly Syria. An offer by the Western powers to help maintain somehow the integrity of Lebanon as a separate entity would be most welcome to the dominant Christian element. If the other inducements turn out to be sufficient to persuade Lebanon to undertake a settlement, consideration might be given to the possibility of US-UK-French offers to take steps to maintain Lebanese independence should it be threatened from any quarter. This could take the form of confidential explanations to the Lebanese that the US (or the three powers) will agree to interpret the Tripartite Declaration of May 1950 as specifically guaranteeing the integrity of Lebanon. For example, we might offer—conditional on a Lebanon-Israel settlement—to take action “both within and outside the UN” if the integrity of Lebanon is threatened . . . .

1. Source: Department of State,NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Alpha—Memos, etc., beginning after 2nd London Talks—Apr. 26–June 30, ’55. Top Secret; Alpha, Limited Distribution. Addressed also to Hoover and Murphy. The source text is not dated but bears a drafting date of June 2. The source text bears Allen’s and Jernegan’s initials, indicating their concurrence, and a notation that Dulles saw it on June 2. A marginal notation by Hoover reads as follows: “Noted:Hoover. Recommend for discussion with the Secretary.”

   An attached memorandum dated June 2 from Russell to Hoover and Murphy states that since Byroade had informed the Department on May 30 that there was little prospect of securing Nasser’s cooperation at an early date in launching Alpha (telegram 1806 from Cairo;ibid., Central Files, 684A.86/5–3055), it seemed desirable “to move more expeditiously than we had anticipated in working through Jordan and Lebanon.”

2. Drafted by Russell on June 1.
4. Reference is to the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty signed at Manila, September 8, 1954.