117. Memorandum From the Secretary of State to the Under Secretary of State (Hoover)1

I spent Sunday afternoon2 sitting on Dick Richards’ porch in South Carolina to put down a possible move in the Near East situation. As suggested, this would constitute a memorandum along the lines of the attached which presumably would be transmitted by the US and the UK jointly (although the US could do it alone) to the Governments of Israel and the neighboring Arab States, i.e., Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon. It would presumably be made public shortly after transmittal.

This memorandum was dictated purely from memory as I did not have before me any of the Alpha or other relevant papers and no doubt needs a good deal of technical perfecting. However, this will serve to illustrate my idea of a possible approach which we can consider and accept or reject, or accept with modifications as may seem wise.

I would like to have your thoughts on this paper for our meeting on Alpha which I understand has been set up for Wednesday afternoon at 4 p.m.3

JFD
[Page 223]

Attachment

DRAFT MEMORANDUM

I.

The United States and the United Kingdom believe that the time has come to explore the possibilities of promoting conditions of peace and prosperity in Israel and the neighboring Arab countries. In that area the opportunities of the people are tragically shrunken by the aftermath of the hostilities of 19474 (?).5 The large-scale fighting of that year was brought to a close by armistices negotiated under the auspices of the United Nations. But there is no genuine peace and armed clashes are a frequent occurrence. The lines as defined by the armistices are in many respects artificial. They sometimes unnaturally separate homes and villages from their appurtenant gardens and wells. They deny direct land contact from Egypt with other Arab States. Water rights are ill-defined and legal uncertainties under the armistices prevent the maximum development of precious water in those arid lands. Economic relations between Israel and neighboring states are negligible and Israel has only uncertain use of the Suez Canal. The Arab refugees, numbering some 600,000(?), are still living in refugee settlements of the most primitive character and their lives depend precariously upon charity. No adequate compensation has been made for the homes and possessions of which the refugees have been deprived in Israel.

Jerusalem, containing the Holy places of three great religions, each of which teaches love, is a vortex of hatred; and pilgrims from all over the world are denied adequate access to the places they revere.

But over and above all this there is fear that relations will further deteriorate. The Arabs fear lest Israel seek violently to expand at their expense. The Israelis fear that the Arabs will gradually marshal superior forces to be used eventually to drive them into the sea. This fear hangs like a pall over the Arab and Israeli people. It leads to military preparations which drain the already poor economies of the countries concerned.

The fear on both sides is so great that other countries which would aid both Israel and the neighboring Arab States find it difficult to do so without attracting the animosity of those whom they would befriend in a spirit of impartiality. Thus, an area of vast cultural and strategic value is so weakened by strains and stresses [Page 224] between its component parts that it could readily fall prey to aggression from without.

Surely it lies within the capacity of the statesmanship, within and without the area concerned, to better this situation.

The United States and the United Kingdom see possibilities of a happier condition. This condition we outline in the hope that its manifest advantages to all concerned will come to be appreciated and bring about the concurrent efforts needed for its achievement.

II.

1.

The boundaries as fixed by the armistices should be rectified and as so rectified accepted as permanent. This recommendation would not appreciably alter the usable area of Israel or impair its strategic or economic assets. It would do away with local causes of frictions which have no adequate justification.

In addition to local adjustments, Egypt should have sovereignty over a triangular portion of the Negeb area as is appropriate to assure it direct territorial contact with Saudi Arabia or with Jordan. This Egyptian triangle would be selected from land without agricultural or mineral value and presently unsettled. There is ample land in the Negeb which meets these specifications.

Since, however, Israel should also have contact with the port of_________,6 there will inevitably be a point of Egypt and Israel crossing at the Eastern apex of the Egyptian triangle. There, the sovereignty of one will have to be in terms of an overpass and the sovereignty of the other in terms of an underpass.

2.
The permanent boundaries between Israel and the Arab States should be internationally guaranteed, preferably under United Nations auspices, so that neither the Arabs nor the Israelis need henceforth fear a forcible change of boundary at their expense and so that both Arabs and Israelis may henceforth devote their efforts to causes more productive than preparations for possible war against each other.
3.
Funds should be provided by Israel to permit the resettlement of the Arab refugees, chiefly in Arab territory. These funds will represent just compensation by Israel for the properties of Arabs which have been taken, so far without such compensation.
4.

Resettlement is not merely a question of money but of creating additional permanent means of livelihood. This, in turn, requires more irrigated land. A first step in this direction would be the “Johnson” plan which already has been negotiated to a point of near acceptability to all the parties concerned.

[Page 225]

The compensation fund above referred to should be primarily used, and should be supplemented, to make up the funds required to develop additional water for the irrigation of land in those countries which contribute to the solution here envisioned.

5.
The portion of Jerusalem which principally contains the Holy places should be vested in an international body which will be an organ of the United Nations. It will maintain the Holy places and guarantee equal access to pilgrims of Jewish, Moslem and Christian faiths.
6.
The Suez Canal will be open to Israeli flag traffic on the same terms as the traffic of other nations, as called for by the United Nations Security Council Resolution of________, 1954.7

III.

In the event that Israel and any one or more of her Arab neighbors desire to proceed on the basis of the foregoing principles, insofar as applicable to them, the United States and the United Kingdom would be willing to contribute to bring about the acceptance and implementation of these principles. They would:

1.
Lend their good offices to facilitate a direct exchange of views between the parties concerned or an exchange of views through themselves or other acceptable intermediaries.
2.
Join in giving firm guarantees of the new permanent boundaries as against future changes by force.
3.
Advance to the State of Israel funds to assist in making compensation to the refugees for the property taken, and thus facilitate their permanent resettlement.
4.
Make financial advances to Israel and to participating Arab States directly or through the United Nations, so as to permit water development which will increase the arable land of participating nations of the area.

The measures enumerated in Points 2 to 4, inclusive, depend upon parliamentary approvals which would be sought.

IV.

The program here outlined will serve, and will strengthen, each of the Near East nations individually; and the aggregate result will be to end a threat to world peace. The processes will deprive no nation of any rights, since renunciation of force in international relations is already required by the Charter of the United Nations.

The Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom would be pleased to receive in due course any observations from the [Page 226] governments concerned on the point of view set forth in this memorandum.

  1. Source: Department of State,S/SNEA Files: Lot 61 D 417, Alpha Volume 4. Top Secret. Addressed also to Murphy,Jernegan, and Russell.
  2. June 5.
  3. This meeting took place on June 8; see Document 120.
  4. Hostilities in Palestine began in May 1948.
  5. This and subsequent question marks appear in the source text.
  6. Dulles failed to indicate the port in question.
  7. Reference is to the U.N. Security Council resolution adopted on September 1, 1951.