122. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State1
1880.Nasser told me this morning he would not accept meeting with Israelis at “high level”. He would accept meeting based upon Burns’ recent message (Jerusalem’s 171 to Cairo)2 but only with Lt. Col. Gohar representing Egypt. Gohar was his most qualified man and he would give him authority to commit Government of Egypt. Israelis could not dictate whom he must choose to put in position of such responsibility and he would not let Ben Gurion’s attempt to do so at point of gun succeed. He and whole Arab world familiar with tactics of Israelis over past several years to attempt shoot their way into such talks. He would not place himself in eyes of his army, Egypt and Arab world in light of having been forced to accept such talks by threat of force. He furthermore would not allow Israelis who believe this best tactic dealing with Arabs to be able to propagandize to his humiliation that their tactics had succeeded.
Used every argument I could think of to cause him to change his mind. Pointed out apparent concessions made by Israel in latest Burns message. Consequences of Egypt’s refusal, however strongly he might feel on these matters, were certain not to be in Egypt’s advantage. Regardless of instructions I might be given, I could not have used more forceful language in trying to convince him he must meet stipulation of “General” officer. Do not believe I succeeded. While to me his logic unassailable and feelings perhaps can be forgiven, greatly fear consequences of such a reply from Egypt. If it proves anything it should be one more evidence that Israeli tactics of dealing with Arabs are not correct and lead to greater intransigence on Arab side.
If Egypt’s answer to Burns is along expected lines my first thought is that we should at least try persuade Israelis to cooperate in meeting with designated representative of Egyptian Government regardless of rank. Realize this may be impossible present situation in Israel, but it seems to me that there enough logic in Egypt’s position to cause effort to be made. I see no possibility of convincing Nasser that Israeli position is not merely irrelevant attempt to gain political advantage at his expense. Furthermore, while Israeli position [Page 237] may be politically understandable from their domestic viewpoint, do not believe it can be sustained as essential to success of talks.3
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/6–955. Secret;Niact. Received at 6:52 p.m. Repeated priority to Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, London, Paris, Beirut, Amman, Baghdad, Jidda, Ankara, and USUN.↩
- See footnote 2, Document 119.↩
- The Embassy in Cairo reported on June 10 that Lieutenant Colonel Gohar had been instructed to deliver the following message to General Burns: 1) Egypt was willing to conduct high-level talks with Israel to consider Burns’ four proposals regarding steps to preserve security around the Gaza Strip and to examine Egypt’s proposal for the establishment of a neutral zone along the demarcation line, and 2) the ranking Egyptian representative at these sessions was to be Lieutenant Colonel Gohar. (Telegram 1889 from Cairo; Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/ 6–1055)↩