82. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, May 2, 19571
SUBJECT
- Jordan Crisis; Israel-United States Relations
PARTICIPANTS
- Mr. Abba Eban, Ambassador of Israel
- Mr. Reuven Shiloah, Minister, Israel Embassy
- The Acting Secretary
- NEA—William M. Rountree
- NE—Richard B. Parker
Ambassador Eban called at our request.2 Mr. Herter said that we wished to make several comments regarding Mrs. Meir’s remarks [Page 119] to Ambassador Lawson on April 26, and that we planned to send a summary of our comments to Ambassador Lawson for discussion with Mrs. Meir (see Department’s telegram No. 1025 of May 2 to Tel Aviv3).
Mr. Herter noted that we felt that we had made abundantly clear to the states of the Near East the fact that United States foreign policy embraced the preservation of the State of Israel. We were prepared to reaffirm this to those states should we feel that the situation required it. We hoped to continue our consultations with Israel on problems affecting the Near East. We felt that the present crisis in Jordan was a most serious matter and believed that the successful assertion of the King’s authority could mark a turning point for the better in the entire picture of relations between the Arab states and the West. This would be very much in Israel’s interest. Therefore, we thought Israel should make every effort to contribute to a situation which would be helpful….
Mr. Herter continued that … we had no evidence that Iraq was desirous of posing a threat to Israel. Similarly, we did not think the Saudi troops now in Jordan posed a threat to Israel and considered them primarily as a stabilizing influence in the internal security situation.
Mr. Herter reiterated our belief, previously expressed by the Secretary on April 19, in the need to move forward quietly in the Straits of Tiran if Israel’s objective was, as we believed it was, the strengthening of Israel’s economy rather than domestic political victories. Highly publicized transit of an Israel ship through the Straits at this time, when the situation in Jordan was still critical, could have an adverse effect on King Hussein’s efforts as well as on the area situation generally.
Mr. Herter continued that we appreciated Israel’s deep concern over developments of such importance to her and we hoped that we could work together toward solutions of the many problems of the Near East.
Mr. Eban replied that Israel considered recent American statements regarding the independence and integrity of Jordan as extremely prudent and would like to feel that the Arab states would see this policy as applying not merely to Jordan but to all the states of the area, including Israel. Mr. Shiloah added that while Israel herself had no doubts as to United States policy in this regard, it was important that the Arabs also have no illusions. Mr. Herter noted that the statements made were quotations from language used in the Joint Resolution on the President’s Middle East proposals. Mr. [Page 120] Eban noted that, as far as Israel was concerned, the occasion for reiterating United States policy regarding the preservation of Israel arose every day.
Mr. Eban continued that, as a historical note, he wished to point out that the current crisis in Jordan was due to the machinations of what might be called the Nabulsi–Rimawi–Nasser coalition. It was precisely the appearance of this coalition following the elections of last October which had been one of the important factors causing Israel’s concern for her future safety. He also had two reflections to pass on as to why Hussein had been able to assert his independence. One was that the legend of Nasser’s military invincibility had been largely destroyed by the Israelis. The other was that Egypt had no territorial contiguity with Jordan….
Mr. Eban continued that the question now facing the world was what Nasser’s riposte would be following Hussein’s assertion of independence. It could be either within Jordan or elsewhere. There appeared to be little Nasser could do outside Jordan. The Suez Canal was already nationalized and it would be dangerous to attempt anything on his frontier with Israel. He would probably seek to work something within Jordan, perhaps a counter coup or an assassination. We should keep our fingers crossed.
Mr. Herter noted that they were crossed already.
Mr. Shiloah said that he and Mr. Eban had been much reassured by Mr. Herter’s statements but wished to point out that unless Israel was sure that the Saudis and Iraqis were fully aware of United States attitudes toward Israel, Israel would continue to be uneasy whenever there were any movements of such troops within Jordan. We would have to expect the Israelis to appear at such times to ask that the Saudis and Iraqis be reminded that there was a limit. Mr. Eban noted that there was considerable difference between the East Bank and West Bank. Mr. Shiloah said that Israel was not expecting or asking for any United States action or statement at this time, but merely wished to emphasize that Israel was most sensitive about troop movements within Jordan.
Mr. Eban said that Israel appreciated the importance of events in Jordan and would continue to cooperate in this regard. He said that one weapon Nasser might use against Hussein was a recrudescence of Jordan-based fedayeen activity. He had done this in the past and could do it again. While Israel was pleased at the prospect of a turning point in Arab-Western relations as mentioned by Mr. Herter, as a short term goal it would settle for a peaceful border. Mr. Herter and Mr. Rountree both replied that we were quite sure King Hussein felt the same way.
Mr. Eban said that his Government had decided to keep the next ship arrival at Eilath completely quiet if possible. If, in spite of [Page 121] precautions, the news of the ship’s arrival leaked out, the arrival would be treated as a purely routine matter not deserving comment. There were two reasons for this. One was “the American reason”. The other was that the Iranians had requested the Israelis to keep such arrivals quiet for fear of jeopardizing the oil supply. Also, Israel hoped to establish a variegated flag pattern, sending through Norwegian, Dutch, Liberian and other flag vessels rather than concentrating on United States flag vessels.
Mr. Herter expressed appreciation of the information conveyed by Mr. Eban and, recalling a past conversation, said that at some future date he would like to discuss in detail the Palestine refugee problem. It was agreed that this would be done following the Secretary’s return from Bonn.4
With regard to Suez, Mr. Eban remarked that he had not expected much out of the Security Council deliberations on the subject, but that his Government was concerned at the crystallization of the boycott, which took two forms: discrimination against Israel flag vessels and discrimination against foreign flag vessels carrying cargo for Israel. He would like to discuss with us soon methods by which Israel could assert its rights peacefully yet fruitfully. He understood the United States position to be that the best method would be concentration on cargoes rather than on vessels and he would have some detailed questions to discuss at a later date.
Mr. Eban noted that Israel’s economic position was a cause of great concern. Because of events in Egypt and Europe, the flow of immigration was expected to rise to a level of 100,000 persons per year for the next two years or so and this had already created serious problems. All sources of assistance, official and otherwise, were influenced by the attitudes of the American Government and he would also wish to discuss this in detail later. Mr. Herter said that, in all candor, he must say that any action the Department could now take was most limited by doubts as to how Congress would act on the budget.
Mr. Shiloah raised the question of certain items of a civilian nature, such as trucks, which appeared on the Munitions List for bureaucratic reasons and which were therefore being denied to Israel by the United States. Mr. Rountree noted that the November 2 resolution of the General Assembly was still in effect. Mr. Shiloah said that he was surprised that all the restrictions imposed under the resolution had not been lifted automatically following the Israel withdrawal. Some relief could perhaps be obtained through reclassification to allow purely civilian items to pass, even though they [Page 122] appeared on the Munitions List. These were items which certainly could not be considered as contravening the resolution and which were in fact obtainable from Europe. Mr. Rountree noted that the restrictions were still very much in force as far as shipments to Egypt were concerned and that lifting them for Israel would mean lifting them for Egypt.
Mr. Eban noted that the Secretary, while in Bonn, had spoken to von Brentano about German-Israel relations. His Government thought it would be most helpful if the Secretary could also speak in the same manner and with the same words to Chancellor Adenauer. Mr. Herter replied that, as he recalled the Secretary’s schedule and the plan of the NATO meetings, he did not think this would be possible.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 785.00/5–257. Secret. Drafted on May 3 by Parker.↩
- In a memorandum to Secretary Dulles on April 27, Rountree informed the Secretary of the contents of telegram 1257 (Document 79), noted that Ambassador Lawson had speculated that Ben Gurion tended to use Meir, given Meir’s use of strong language, as a “trial balloon”, and recommended that the U.S. response to Meir’s remarks be made by either Dulles or Herter to Eban with a report of the conversation telegraphed to Tel Aviv for presentation to Meir by Lawson. Dulles initialed his approval of the recommendation. (Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 582, Memos to the Secretary thru S/S 1957)↩
- Telegram 1025 forwarded the substance of the May 2 conversation and instructed Lawson to convey Herter’s comments to Meir. (Ibid., Central Files, 611.84A/5–257)↩
- Dulles arrived in Bonn on May 1 to attend the Ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council.↩