83. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State1
1501. Bonn for USDel. Inform Richards. Until few days ago I had not been sanguine about future prospects of Jordan or of this area. The enunciation of the American doctrine by the President, the splendid record of Ambassador Richards visits to country after country, and success of King Hussein in beating back leftist attempts on his country and throne give rise to hopes. When the White House plainly announced support of Jordan, the Sixth Fleet was sent to the Eastern Mediterranean and the US gave $10 million in aid the tide appeared stemmed here. The question was whether we were to stand and await more blows or move forward to realignment of forces in Near East. Then yesterday Samir Rifai Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister and backbone of the government called me for long conference at his home. What he said appeared to provide us with significant opportunity for constructive moves, and I therefore submit a fairly full summary of his remarks.
Samir Pasha stated information available shows no doubt Jordan crisis engineered from abroad and involved Egypt, Syria, and Russia. Cabinet crisis only one manifestation of larger design to overthrow [Page 123] King, disrupt loyal elements and make country Communist puppet. Chief reasons for failure of plan due miscalculations that King could not form viable Cabinet and army so divided as be rendered ineffective. King was supported by troops and Cabinet formed.
He said initial success of King’s stand and new government very encouraging and believes they can carry on. Samir estimates 50 percent containment disruptive elements due choice of measures adopted and very prompt announcements. Other 50 percent is action thereunder.
Hussein believes and present government follows him in conviction Communist activities Jordan must be crushed. This in Samir’s opinion a battle for survival. He added that unmasking forces at work during crisis here already causing reassessments in Arab world. He hoped and believed that active opposition to Communist authority would next occur in Syria and matter one of timing. In this respect Jordan occupies key position and if Jordan can carry on with the necessary outside assistance and with the developing understanding in sister states whole position in Middle East could be changed… .
Samir made point that one of first steps to break up Syrian intrigue in Jordan is removal Syrian army. It could simply be asked to leave but this would raise question over present Saudi troops which HKJ wished remain here. Syrians could be handled indirectly and his plan is do this by requesting presence Iraqi troops under treaty 1947 and station them in Mafraq. Wishes do this before British evacuation Mafraq air base May 31 when Jordan troops will occupy. He mentioned May 15 as possible date to request Iraqis. In doing this he hoped accomplish following: (a) bring Iraq into Jordan picture, (b) overcome Egyptian Syrian claims defense Jordan their problem, (c) threaten Syrian designs and warn her with forces near frontier, (d) cause withdrawal Syrian troops. Samir also said he plans put Iraqi representative on joint command in Jordan.
Samir stated that in respect Communist activities Jordan now following same lines as US. It has he said virtually adhered to American doctrine. He pointed out with conviction that Jordan had become fulcrum for upshoting [uprooting?] influence Egypt and Syria and in fact bring about a change in internal orientation of latter. He mentioned importance new alignments in Arab world which begin with Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Jordan. He was frank to point out Jordan could not play a desirable role without considerable assistance; in fact she would not be able to maintain present position without help. He said he felt necessary be straightforward and frank in their position and details of kind of help needed and of most use.
First and immediate was he obliged tell UK that HKJ unable pay Jordan dinars 700,000 due May 1. British had granted one month [Page 124] delay but Jordan was up against it. He inquired if US could give funds this purpose or somehow have British payment covered for example in UK debt to US. I replied saw no possibility of this but would report matter and perhaps friendly representations to UK not to press for payment could be made. He hoped for early news as HKJ in very awkward position. (Believe he not unmindful of what would happen to exchange value of dinar if payment repudiated.)
Second problem, he said, is bad financial situation of government. Budget of Nabulsi government being studied now but first indications are it not a true budget. He fears shortfall of income which will be aggravated by both manner payment Egyptian-Syrian Army subsidies and likelihood little will be forthcoming. So far Saud has made available Jordan dinars 2,500,000 and other nothing. The $10 million aid would, he said, be most helpful to government. I pointed out it could not be used for armed forces and examination of use of money necessary. He will instruct Ministers Finance and Economy discuss question with Nelson USOM/Jordan tomorrow. Also wishes review Point IV aid to give greatest immediate impact and employment. I agree this necessary.
Third problem, Samir stated, is army. Need there has become more apparent and more important. Loyalty of army was all-important and needs be rewarded somehow and position restored to that prior pay and allowance cuts by Nuwwar for which they do not have the money. This army, previously crack force in area largely because of superior training and esprit, now suffering because its arms and equipment second grade or obsolete. This especially marked in view recent Egyptian-Syrian acquisitions from Soviet bloc and Iraq from United States and United Kingdom. Even Saudis better equipped. Considerable importance attached this point by King and government and Samir hoped means could be found envisage substantial equipping army. I told Samir there were some statutory conditions such as agreements, training missions, etc., which had stopped others in area in past. To my surprise he promptly replied this no cause preoccupation since Jordan, having decided on anti-Communist line and cast the die, was prepared take necessary steps.
Re equipment for army he said military had prepared request which he said was patently large and read some items. I remarked it very large but when occasion permitted some discussions on technical military level would undoubtedly result in adequate revision. He gave me original handwritten list asking if I had someone of confidence to translate and return.
Comment and recommendations: A unique opportunity is given the United States to encourage realignment of forces in Near East. It is possible to foresee the countering of Communist activity in Arab [Page 125] world, the shifting of alignments in Syria, close cooperation of Iraq, Jordan and Saudi Arabia, the negation of Nasser’s influence and protection of Persian Gulf militarily. With a little rosy tinted optimism one can speculate on so quieting things that eventual settlement of the Palestine problem may be possible.
If we are to take the opportunity of using Jordan as a lever for these desirable purposes the fulcrum will have to be further and prompt American assistance. It may come fairly high but compared to the issues at stake would be cheap. No recommendation of individual types of assistance or amounts of aid are made herein. The important thing, it seems to me, is the course of action. If we desire to assure Western orientation of area we need to move in unhesitantly here. We must not delude ourselves that this can be accomplished by economic assistance alone. Direct or indirect military aid will also be necessary. Such military aid could even pave the way for eventual Jordanian adherence to the Baghdad Pact, although at this time breathing the thought aloud would be counter-productive.
I strongly recommend a bold American approach, since we alone have any chance of success. This can be accomplished through diplomatic channels. It can be made somewhat more dramatic by the despatch of a few qualified and authorized persons to Amman. It can be made even more dramatic if we decide on aid by inviting King Hussein or Foreign Minister Rifai to the United States and handing them a package. I urge the latter.2
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 685.00/5–357. Secret; Priority; Noforn. Repeated priority to Rabat and Tripoli, and to Baghdad, Beirut, Bonn, Cairo, Damascus, and Jidda; passed to the Departments of the Army and the Air Force.↩
- Mallory forwarded a more detailed account of his meeting with Rifa’i in despatch 279 from Amman, May 3. (Ibid., 785.00/5–357) On May 6, the Embassy in Beirut, commenting on telegram 1501 from Amman, noted: “We can add all information from reliable sources here clearly give every indication that if King Hussein and his present line fail, repercussions on pro-Western policy of Lebanon would be dangerous and could be disastrous.” (Telegram 2653 from Beirut; ibid., 685.00/5–657)↩