79. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State1
1257. Reference: Deptel 999;2 Embtel 1251.3 I saw Golda Meir in her Jerusalem residence for hour’s consultation this evening on basis Secretary’s conversation with Eban. She told me she had only brief “flash” from latter who reported Secretary as saying Hussein was doing well but more trouble could be expected. Secretary hoped King could keep free of problems other than his troubles with Arabs ….
She listened intently to my reiteration points Secretary made, interrupting only twice—to ask me to repeat my paraphrase of his remarks regarding possible implementation American Doctrine against Syrian intervention, and possibility of Syrians attacking exposed East Bank if Hussein were obliged to move loyal troops west of river (respectively paragraphs 2 and 3 Deptel 999). On the [Page 116] former point, she asked me if this meant USG would act if Syria moved against Jordan. I replied this would depend on interpretation of Doctrine under conditions existing at time. It seemed apparent to me she is convinced we would take action. Later in conversation, she said Hussein’s “remarkable” survival thus far traces largely to USG’s support for him against Syrian threat.
She went further, I thought, than GOI has before, either in our conversations this month (Embtel 12304) or in October 1956, to indicate understanding of USG interest in unfettered Iraqi hand if required by Syrian developments, but said she thought our démarche to GOI should be matched by similar representations, not only to Iraqis but also to Saudis. She felt that US should be obtaining and transmitting assurances (a) from Iraqis that any penetration by their forces of Jordanian territory was not intended as and would not constitute threat to Israel, (b) from Saudis that their troops were not and would not be in Jordan to threaten Israel and (c) also from Saudis, that regardless of their public statements they did not intend to interfere with movement of vessels through Tiran Straits or Aqaba Gulf. Furthermore, USG should assume certain responsibilities in connection with these assurances and not serve merely as post office.
She recalled that last time we discussed it (Embtel 1230), “I told you that both Jordan and Iraq can be assured we have no intention of taking steps if our security is not involved. I can repeat that assurance. However, we are wondering when Secretary consults with us as to Jordan and Iraqi requirements whether he is at same time talking with them on Israel’s very real interests. We certainly hope Iraqis will win any encounter with Syrians but what happens to us if Syrians move in from north and Saudis take a hand? We think you should make clear to Hussein and his friends that USG has another interest in ME—that is, integrity and survival of Israel.”
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.85/4–2657. Secret; Niact. Repeated niact to Amman.↩
- See footnote 1, Document 70.↩
- On April 25, Lawson informed the Department that he had arranged an appointment with Foreign Minister Meir as the Prime Minister was in the Negev. The Ambassador added that he would seek to arrange a meeting with Ben Gurion if the Department thought it necessary. Lawson noted, however, that two visits to the Prime Minister’s desert retreat within a week might raise “public and press speculations”. (Telegram 1251 from Tel Aviv; Department of State, Central Files, 684A.85/4–2557) Later that day the Department notified the Embassy that the appointment with Meir would be satisfactory. (Telegram 1001 to Tel Aviv; ibid.)↩
- See footnote 3, Document 64.↩