Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Near East: Jordan-Yemen, Volume XIII

64. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan¹

Washington, April 15, 1957—4:56 p.m.

1315. FYI we desire give most effective support possible to King Hussein in his efforts maintain sovereign independence and territorial integrity Jordan. We believe US supporting action at this stage must be taken in ways avoid giving substance to false charges Hussein is acting at instigation USG. We are consulting closely with British on Jordan but feel same considerations apply to them as to US as regards open identification with Hussein. Iraq and Saudi Arabia would seem best sources assistance. End FYI.

Individual missions requested take following action on urgent basis:

a. Embassy Amman in its discretion should get word orally to King that we applaud courage and determination he is showing in efforts resist machinations those who would destroy Jordan. While we are sure King would agree that in present delicate situation US should avoid action which could be misinterpreted or exploited by King’s enemies, it is our hope that Richards Mission can visit Amman for fruitful discussions as soon as King feels that appropriate moment has arrived. As for King’s request for assistance in light of reported Israel troop movements, all information available to USG indicates there no evidence of unusual Israel military activity. We have cautioned Israelis against precipitate action. We feel it essential in these critical days that King work closely with Saudis and Iraqis.

b. Embassy Jidda should orally inform King Saud (if possible privately) of steps US taking. We hope Saud will render every assistance to Hussein and work closely and effectively with Iraqis. Presence of Damaluji in Riyadh should facilitate Saudi-Iraqi cooperation. We note Iraqis have determined render all possible assistance to Hussein. We feel that Saudi-Iraqi support of Hussein can well be crucial element in determining future of Jordan. Meanwhile … we have no indication of unusual Israeli military activity. We hope that time will quickly arrive when it would be appropriate for Richards to proceed to Amman for fruitful discussions. We express our sincere appreciation for efforts Saud has made and is making assist King Hussein in struggle against elements who pose threat not only to Jordan but to entire area. We would hope visit of Prince Fahad to Jordan could be expedited so that constructive influence of Saudi Arabia in Jordan could be strengthened.

c. Embassy Baghdad should advise Iraqis generally of steps we taking with Hussein Saud is. We hope Iraqis will take advantage visit of Damaluji to Riyadh to strengthen cooperation with Saudis and with Hussein. Believe Saudi-Iraqi cooperation on this problem augurs well for advancement interests both countries in handling other area problems. We speaking to Israelis along lines suggested by Bashayan in Baghdad’s 1710.² … and our information so far indicates no unusual Israel military activity.

d. Embassy Tel Aviv should seek early opportunity to make following points to Israel PriMin: 1) US closely following developments in Jordan and believes success of Hussein’s present efforts of vital importance to NE generally including Israel. 2) Hussein has already expressed concern at reports of unusual Israel troop movements near border; we have advised him that we had no information of such activity; we reinforce, however, our hope expressed earlier that Israel will take no action which could exacerbate situation or hinder Hussein’s efforts to strengthen his position. 3) Iraq Government has advised us that they are strengthening military contingents at H–3 in Iraqi territory. Iraqis have asked that we inform Israel Government that this action being taken solely in interest stabilizing situation in Jordan and not with view to changing status quo of Jordan. This assurance applies equally to any further action Government of Iraq might find it necessary take. Specifically GOI in any plan of action will respect independence of Jordan. 4) USG looks with favor upon this precautionary move on part Iraq. Numbers of Iraqi troops involved and Iraqi assurances make it abundantly clear they pose no threat to Israel. While USG hopes that Hussein will be able to maintain order with his own security forces and that Syrian troops will withdraw or remain quiescent, feel Hussein should be in position invoke assistance from Iraq, if necessary, under Iraq–Jordan Treaty of 1947. We fully aware Israel’s views on general question entry of Iraq troops into Jordan as expressed in US–Israel conversations of October 1956 but feel now as we did then that it to interest all concerned that status quo be maintained in Jordan and that if situation develops to point where Iraqi assistance to Hussein is required, Israel should not oppose it. We accordingly urge Israel continue maintain calm and take no precipitate action.³

Herter

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 685.00/4–1557. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Bergus; cleared with Herter; and approved by Rountree who signed for Herter. Also sent priority to Baghdad, Jidda, and Tel Aviv; repeated priority to Addis Ababa (for Richards), Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, London, Paris, and USUN.
2. In telegram 1710 from Baghdad, April 15, Gallman informed the Department that Iraqi Foreign Minister Bashayan had suggested that the United States inform Israel that any Iraqi troop movements near the Jordanian-Iraqi border were prompted by an interest in stabilizing the situation in Jordan and not changing the status quo. (Ibid., 120.1580/4–1557)
3. On April 18, Lawson informed the Department that he had conveyed the points outlined in telegram 971 to Ben Gurion. According to the Ambassador, the only remark the Prime Minister made “of possible significance” was his reaction to the prospect that Iraq would increase its military strength at H–3. The Prime Minister queried, “How close to Jordan River will they propose to come?” (Telegram 1226 from Tel Aviv, April 18; ibid., 685.00/4–1857) On April 20, Lawson took up the points contained in telegram 971 with Foreign Minister Meir. According to the Ambassador, Meir noted that Israel had no intention of intervening as long as the status of Jordan remained unchanged. (Telegram 1230 from Tel Aviv, April 19; ibid., 685.00/4–1957)