70. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, April 24, 1957, 3:32 p.m.1
SUBJECT
- Developments in Jordan
PARTICIPANTS
- Mr. Abba Eban, Ambassador of Israel
- Mr. Reuven Shiloah, Minister, Embassy of Israel
- The Secretary
- NEA—William M. Rountree
- NE—Donald C. Bergus
The Secretary said that he had asked Mr. Eban to come in because he wished to say a word, probably unnecessary, about developments in Jordan.
Developments in Jordan were moving rapidly toward a climax. It appeared that King Hussein would persist in a strong line to defend himself against what had been openly exposed as Egyptian and Syrian intrigue…. Israel action could be one thing which would unite the Arabs. At present Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Lebanon were supporting Hussein. The Secretary thought that if Hussein won it would have great significance and mark the beginning of a trend away from the extreme nationalistic views expounded by Nasser and others and which were, to some extent at least, Communist inspired. The U.S. wanted to give Hussein a fair chance. We wanted to tell the Israelis our thoughts with respect to his efforts, …. There might be deliberate provocation of Israel by anti-Hussein forces.
Mr. Eban said he would convey this urgently to his Government. There appeared to be no great divergence from what he had said in his previous meeting with the Secretary, i.e., that Nasser viewed developments in Jordan as a setback and would attempt a counterstroke. Israel had thought for a while that Nasser would be content with pro-Egyptian elements sharing control in Jordan; now it appeared that he wanted the whole thing. Although the major assault had been against Khalidi, it was clear that it was aimed at the King. Israel’s policy had been to avoid anything that played into Nasser’s hands.
[Page 105]The Secretary said that if the King stood firm and should be physically threatened by Syria (he did not think Egypt was in a position to intervene physically) or if steps were taken that represented a challenge to the Middle East Doctrine, the U.S. would respond very strongly.
Mr. Eban said that the Israelis felt that the advent of the Richards Mission was having an effect in Jordan similar to that created by the Templer Mission. It would be wise to eliminate this factor from discussion in Jordan. He wished to advise us that this was not the time for a Richards visit to Jordan. The Secretary said he hoped Mr. Eban would not hesitate to make suggestions. We had not made a final decision regarding a Richards visit to Jordan and were weighing the factors involved.
Mr. Eban inquired whether the U.S. was near a position of defining a Soviet-controlled Government, in the terms of the Middle East Doctrine. The Secretary said we were approaching such a position. This question was more conspicuous with regard to Syria.
Mr. Eban pointed out that Cairo Radio was broadcasting in Hebrew reports that many Iraqi troops were entering Jordan. Egypt wished to embroil Israel.
The Secretary said that our guess was that the loyal troops in Jordan might have to be moved to the West Bank where there was the greatest danger. If this were done and the Syrians took advantage of the exposure of the East Bank, then the Iraqis might come in. Mr. Eban observed that if the Syrians entered with Jordan consent, that was one thing. If they entered without Jordan consent, that would be a violation of the United Nations Charter. Mr. Rountree felt that the likelihood of Syrian troops remaining in Jordan was small.
Mr. Eban said that he appreciated this information and counsel. He hoped the public would not be given the impression that Israel had been warned by the U.S. The Secretary agreed. He felt that this was part of the general policy of consulting with respect to this area which we had indicated during the February talks we would try to embark upon. He welcomed Israel’s counsel. This was a mutual operation. We were not warning Israel. Our own forward thinking might involve action on our part if the Middle East Doctrine were challenged. He hoped that no policy on Israel’s part would lead to conflict with the U.S.
Mr. Shiloah said his Government was aware of the need for caution. The Secretary had referred to the Middle East Doctrine. If the U.S. decided to act under it, it would be useful if Israel were prepared. The Secretary did not think that such action on our part would be necessary. Developments were moving in such a way, however, that we were thinking of it as a possibility. There was [Page 106] increasing evidence of Communist inspiration behind the anti-Hussein campaign.
It was agreed that the press be told that Mr. Eban’s visit had been a follow-up of his previous call on the Secretary and that there had been a routine discussion of matters of common interest.
- Source: Department of State, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199. Secret. Drafted by Bergus on April 25. The meeting concluded at 3:53 p.m. The time of the meeting is taken from Dulles’ Appointment Book. (Princeton University Library, Dulles Papers) In telegram 999 to Tel Aviv, April 24, the Department forwarded the substance of Dulles’ meeting with Eban. The Department instructed the Ambassador to see the Israeli Prime Minister as soon as possible to review the conversation and to emphasize the points made by the Secretary. (Department of State, Central Files, 684A.85/4–2457)↩