Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Near East: Jordan-Yemen, Volume XIII

45. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State¹

Amman, November 22, 1956—1 p.m.

528. Discussion with King Hussein (Embtel 520²) apparently bore some fruit. General Nuwwar CGS came to see me last evening ostensible reason that in spite unanimous vote in Parliament King had decided HKJ would not recognize Russia and Red China and they wanted me to know this. He said after November 20 audience King had spoken to him of aid from United States and Nuwwar had then told King of his discussions with ARMA and me (Embtel 487³). While they felt a break with United Kingdom was inevitable they judged present crisis was not time to act and as mentioned in Deptel 590⁴ go from frying pan to fire. Hence they will wait awhile and Nuwwar said in fact he will tell British Chargé they do not plan abrogate treaty at present. He twice mentioned fear of possibility United Kingdom giving more favorable attitude to Israel. Nuwwar went on to say they did not wish accept Russian aid either indirectly through Syria or directly and likewise not wishing an interregnum financial limbo thought best to wait United States attitude and work something out. They much prefer United States assistance. During course of a long conversation I extracted from him their idea, for moment at least, was not break with United Kingdom for period up to 6 months. The two young men are changeable and impressionable. They apparently have been plowed down as result developments but delay of 6 months may prove wishful thinking unless Suez and Sinai are cleared up or unless King suspends constitution and rules with military junta or both. It will not be long before public opinion could again be in mood where clarion call from Cairo could send anti-British mobs in streets as forceful as those in anti-Baghdad Pact demonstration in December 1955.

Re Deptel 599⁵ the question of the source and timing of aid for Jordan will be determined by two factors: Speed of withdrawal of British French and Israeli forces from Egypt and Gaza and the rate of progress toward settlement Palestine problem. If there is speedy withdrawal and real progress toward settlement problem will be less acute and British may enjoy period of grace.

Failing these developments United States aid must be immediately available else popular demand will probably force issue to point where it will be too late for aid from any Western source.

Re short term impact on Jordan attitude should British subsidy and treaty arrangements be terminated and United States assume burden we can expect little more than to retain our present improved position. The passing of the English ogre removes the buffer of comparison and the Communists, extremists and others who now belabor them would turn on US. It would be no victory for the Soviets to have British replaced by Americans. One could expect them to build up an attack. Such attack could be avoided or tempered by the public approbation of Gamel Nasser. Could this be arranged, and it is almost necessary, the Communist and extremists teeth would be drawn for some time to come. Favorable impact would also be possible if Hussein could claim change in source of subsidy as victory over the English comparable to ousting of Glubb.

Re longer term effects on HKJ the relationships with United States and west generally should improve but with respect other countries would be only reflection of favorable attitude to United States. In the foreseeable future any mending of the attitude towards Britain and France can only occur if these countries follow United States lead in moves favorable to Arabs.

The question of attitude towards United States and West both short and long term is based on national acts, the subsidy being secondary. For the moment we are well regarded for 3 reasons:

• First we supported the Arab cause, not as effectively in local eyes as did Russians but we did come through.
• Second, we look good in comparison to others because they despise the French, hate English, somewhat fear unknown Russians, dislike Iraqis and hero worship Nasser.
• Third, Nasser gave his approval of our actions. It is what we do in a positive way that counts if we are to keep the Russians out. The day of the status quo is over.

Re question of channel for aid Embassy believes should be direct United States to Jordan. Efforts to channel it otherwise, for example through Iraq, would either meet refusal or such grudging acceptance as to destroy its usefulness. The Iraqis are now in great disrepute in Jordan. Iraq aid would be looked upon as English or English maneuver. Were it to become known as American aid through Iraq it would still be branded as English and fail its purpose. Moreover quite apart from more purely Jordanian reactions it would be subject to attack of Egypt, Syria and left fringe generally. Thus Embassy can state unequivocally that it would be better to do nothing than to try to do it through Iraq at this time.

Manner of direct assistance is likely best provided by increasing United States aid to meet current combined United States and British levels—about $40 million. Funds for support Arab army should be so earmarked but offered as direct budgetary support without strings except for time factor and appropriate controls governing type and source of material purchased. Presence of a MAAG training group would be as distasteful to HKJ as to Israel. Suggest combined United States and United Kingdom economic and technical assistance programs be administered accordance normal ICA procedures but decisions respect continuation British financed economic aid programs such as Aqaba port and desert road be based on review for suitability and soundness as individual projects. The whole matter can probably be handled with ICA staff here at its full authorized level plus 1 or 2 financial controllers.

I wish to emphasize that financial assistance to Jordan by the United States as well as the money we have been putting into refugee upkeep or through UNRWA is a losing game unless we are determined not only to terminate present crisis in a matter of days but also to promptly seek settlement of Palestine problem for which mood has now improved.

Mallory

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/11–2256. Top Secret; Priority. Repeated to Baghdad and London.
2. Not printed. (Ibid., 684A.86/11–2056)
3. See footnote 3, Document 42.
4. Document 43.
5. In telegram 599 to Amman, November 20, the Department solicited additional comments and recomendations from the Embassy on Hussein’s recent approach to the United States for aid and on the political effects of a possible U.S. decision to furnish budgetary aid to Jordan in the event the United Kingdom ended its subsidy. The Department also sought the Embassy’s views on how direct assistance might be implemented. (Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/11–1756)