Office of the Historian

44. Telegram From the Embassy in Iraq to the Department of State1

Baghdad, November 19, 1956—1 p.m.

882. Deptel 845.2 We understand from local Central Bank authority Iraqi reserves approximated dinars 152 million as of September. We estimate this provides adequate reserve to support current projects undertaken by development program. However uncertainty as to when pipelines and pumping stations can be repaired [Page 63] and lack of confidence in ability Syrian Government insure smooth operation when facilities restored will undoubtedly make Iraqis reluctant draw against this reserve for non-development purposes except for compelling reasons.

In assessing desirability providing Jordan with assistance of [garble] current UK subsidy Nuri will probably be motivated by:

1.
His desire that such help be coordinated with US assistance programs (see Embtel 346 September 13 and preceding messages) and his conviction that apart from USSR only country able supply heavy arms is US (see Embtel 446 October 154). In this connection he would probably expect US assurance that we would be prepared help supply Jordan’s military requirements.
2.
The degree to which he believes Iraqi influence will be paramount in Jordan after assistance has been granted. I do not believe he would be prepared to offer a large grant without clear assurances on this point.
3.
The extent to which Iraq in the event her financial position should deteriorate to point where current development program were threatened could expect to receive substantial assistance. Nuri would probably expect to have assurances from us on this point. Specifically he would expect in contingency mentioned above US economic assistance policy. I doubt if he would find it politically desirable request UK assistance.

In event Jordan should take action terminating UK connection Nuri will likely lose no time in approaching US to request that we fill gap. In order forestall this development and anticipate possible Soviet maneuver I believe we should be prepared take initiative at appropriate time and make forceful case for Iraq’s assumption this burden. If Department’s assessment of problem indicates political desirability Iraq’s assuming responsibility Jordan assistance request I be authorized make this approach equipped with compelling arguments and in position deal with questions raised in (1) and (3) above.

Gallman
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/11–1956. Top Secret; Priority. Repeated to London and Amman.↩
  2. In telegram 845 to Baghdad, November 18, the Department solicited the Embassy’s estimate of the role which the Iraqis might play in the event that Jordan broke relations with the United Kingdom. The Department added that the political and economic implications of possible “indirect assistance” to the Iraqis should be taken into consideration. The Embassy was instructed not to approach the Iraqi Government. (Ibid., 684A.86/11–1856)↩
  3. Telegram 346 from Baghdad, September 1, informed the Department that Nuri al-Said had expressed the hope that difficulties in U.S. assistance to Jordan could be worked out at the earliest possible date. (Ibid., 785.5–MSP/9–156)↩
  4. See footnote 2, Document 35.↩