Office of the Historian

43. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan1

Washington, November 18, 1956—2:20 p.m.

590. Embtel 503.2 Matter raised with you by King is obviously of such serious consequences that immediate substantive reply not possible. Pending results consideration by USG you should continue your efforts persuade King take no precipitate action, pointing out dangers to Jordan of jumping from frying pan into fire. Emphasize that US working hard through UN to restore peace to Near East and to bring about withdrawal of all foreign forces from Egypt. Once this accomplished situation should be more stable and pressure for [Page 62] Jordanian break with UK should lessen somewhat. Add that as soon as present crisis dealt with US envisages major effort through UN to resolve basic underlying issues of Palestine and Suez. Chances of success this effort will be much greater if Arab states and Israel, recognizing increased danger to their security and independence resulting from present crisis, will adopt more flexible attitude than in past toward solution these long-standing issues.3

Hoover
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/11–1756. Top Secret; Priority. Drafted by Rockwell and approved by Rountree who signed for Hoover.↩
  2. Telegram 503 from Amman, November 17, reported a conversation in which Mallory was told that the severing of Jordan’s relations with the United Kingdom was under consideration and that if that should happen, Jordan would need financial assistance, possibly from the Soviet Union or other Arab states but preferably from the United States. Mallory had replied that the United States had not envisaged supplanting the United Kingdom, that U.S. military assistance granted to other countries had been provided under mutual defense assistance agreements and only for purposes of defense, and that budgetary assistance to the general income of a country was not customary and might not be possible. He also reported a Jordanian perception that a move by President Eisenhower for an overall settlement of Middle East problems would have an electrifying effect. (Ibid.)↩
  3. On November 18, the Department conveyed to the Embassy in London a summary of telegram 503 from Amman and directed the Embassy in London to ascertain from the Foreign Office what were British plans in the event Jordan broke with the United Kingdom and provided the Soviet Union with an opportunity to, “step in”. The telegram noted: “Occurs to Department that Iraq might play useful role, especially if outside assistance provided for this purpose.” (Telegram 3583; Ibid., 684A.86/11–1856) On November 19, the Embassy in London informed the Department that the Foreign Office was anxious over the situation in Jordan but had no idea as to what it might do in the event of a break. According to the British, Hussein was in favor of a break, while Nuwwar and most politicians in Jordan were opposed. The Foreign Office considered the possibility of Iraqi aid “uncertain” as a result of Nuri’s domestic problems and the prospect of an Israeli response to Iraq’s intervention. According to the Embassy, the Foreign Office representative inquired about the possibility of U.S. aid. The Embassy responded that while it had no information on this matter, it doubted whether the United States could furnish assistance comparable to the British subsidy. (Telegram 2811; Ibid., 684A.86/11–1956)↩