17. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State1
385. HKJ Ambassador Rifai should arrive Washington today. Have discussed his impressions and soundings while here and find [Page 22] we in general agreement on changes which have occurred in basic forces. He hopes see Secretary and Assistant Secretary Allen shortly after return. As brother of Prime Minister his government sources excellent, with outside contacts more restricted.
Prime Minister and Ambassador, with both of whom I have talked twice in recent days, are convinced of deep change in temper and opinion of body politic. Prime Minister stated this so significant as to require change in British thinking and approach and he calling in UK Ambassador Duke in next day or two for frank discussion. Prime Minister claims British appear unable adjust traditionalist thinking to new circumstances, fail realize changes and believe through some propaganda efforts waiting and patience all will turn out well. It has been clear to this Embassy for over a month that British are dissimulating concern with stiff upper lip.
At same time clear that scapegoats are being sought and while this in part may explain Prime Minister’s attitude certainly does not cover all his conviction. The natural and easy scapegoat here is British especially General Glubb. Unfortunately it has also been hinted that some quarters in London explain British setbacks by blaming Glubb which could entrain dangerous developments. For my part British here especially Embassy appear unable perceive changes and real dangers and if they report what they apparently estimate situation to be then Shuckburgh and Foreign Office may be misled. We see situation as follows: (1) The man of the street and the refugees have for the first time flexed their political muscles and found them strong; (2) unless already popular, courses of action involving foreign countries can no longer be undertaken by mere negotiation with King and Prime Minister. Prior preparation of public mind and broad appeal are required. (It is on this point that British will find major difficulty in comprehension and adoption); (3) barring prompt Palestine settlement present Cabinet if not the last is next to last chance for moderate government. It is to be doubted that Abol Huda could or would come back; (4) Cabinet changes in foreseeable future due internal disturbances or death of Samir Rifai (who has serious heart condition) could only result in governments successively pushed to left. Only alternative is martial law under King which could not last long without complete paralysis; (5) redressment of public thinking towards confidence in Jordan Government and in concepts of law and order would be lengthy; (6) British influence is low and there are no foreseeable means except settlement Palestine problem which can re-establish it in part. Efforts of British adopt firm measures or to strengthen their position by bringing in more troops are likely to be counter-productive; (7) any consideration adherence Baghdad Pact must be postponed indefinitely; (8) any proposal settlement Palestine problem must be complete [Page 23] and without aspects of being a palliative. Attempts push Jordan Valley Plan again before proposing Palestine settlement is inviting difficulties and further setbacks.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 785.00/1–2656. Confidential. Repeated to Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, London, Ankara, Tehran, and Tel Aviv.↩