18. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Allen) and the Jordanian Ambassador (Rifa’i), Department of State, Washington, January 28, 19561
SUBJECT
- Political Problems of Jordan
Ambassador Rifa’i, who had just returned to the U.S. after a period of consultation in Jordan, suggested that it might be useful to consider the reasons behind the recent disturbances in Jordan. Mr. Rifa’i had seen the second wave of demonstrations, and held the same views on them as his brother, the Jordan Prime Minister. Mr. Allen said his preliminary impression was that while the rioters had been excited by Cairo radio and exploited by the Communists, the reasons for the demonstration could basically be ascribed to Arab nationalism and “unity”. He would appreciate the Ambassador’s comment on this thesis.
Mr. Rifa’i opened by expressing the regret of his Government over the damages inflicted on American property and installations in Jordan. The Jordan Government hoped that the U.S. Government would realize that the situation was unusual and beyond Jordan’s control. At the moment of the riots no Jordan Government had been formed. Therefore, he hoped that the Secretary and the Department would not think that no adequate precautions had been taken. Jordan had hesitated to use force to quell the demonstrators, preferring to avoid the resulting heavy loss of life. They had tried to keep the demonstrations peaceful. While this effort had failed and there had been damage, it was still felt that the choice of methods had been the better one. The riots had not been directed solely at U.S. institutions, Jordan Government property was also damaged. This [Page 24] meant that Communist elements had played a major role. The Government had uncovered a plot to burn the central part of Amman. Furthermore, the British Bank in Amman had been attacked and a British officer of the Arab Legion killed. There might be justification, however, in saying that the mob violence was directed primarily at U.S. interests. Mr. Rifa’i acknowledged that Communism had grown in Jordan and said that if blame had to be placed on the Jordan Government it might be based on the fact that the Government had shown lack of vigor in combatting Communism.
Another element had been the bitterness of the Palestine refugees who held the U.S. responsible for their destiny. Mr. Rifa’i wished to assure the U.S. that the present Jordan Government valued highly U.S. friendship, counted on the U.S. and wanted to work with the U.S.
Mr. Rifa’i stated that British claims that elements in Jordan had been “bribed” by outside parties was untrue. Not a single revolver had been distributed by Saudi Arabia or Egypt. Not a single Saudi dollar or Egyptian dinar had been distributed to mob elements in Jordan. What had been given was the usual gifts which King Saud is accustomed to distribute to top level people in Jordan. King Saud could not buy mob violence in Jordan. If he could, then why didn’t Iraq or Britain try to buy domestic tranquillity? Britain has experience in distributing money in Jordan.
The conclusion of all this was serious. It would be strange if Britain felt that she could continue in Jordan using her traditional methods. Mr. Allen felt that Britain may have learned some things from the recent violence in Jordan. Mr. Rifa’i said the British were living in the past. Mr. Allen said that perhaps the British felt they had made a mistake in Jordan. Mr. Rifa’i said there was no proof they had dropped the idea of bringing Jordan into the Baghdad Pact. This would mean inviting excitement in Amman. Had the present Jordan Government not been formed, no other constitutional Government could have been formed. The British had suggested to the King that he put Jordan under military rule and suspend the constitution. This would have created the possibility for the takeover by an extremist government with the future and attitude of Jordan in doubt. The present government had taken responsibility out of a sense of duty to the country and the throne and to prevent military rule. This government had wide support. Mr. Rifa’i did not know whether Britain was satisfied. If the present Government resigned, things would be dangerous in Jordan. This would be the last moderate government.
Mr. Allen asked if there were any danger of the Government’s resigning. Mr. Rifa’i replied that it was having difficulties in carrying out its duties. Every day the Government was being told that certain [Page 25] people in Jordan should be arrested for conspiracy. The British were doing this only to create doubts in the King. There were false reports as to the mission of the Saudi troops stationed south of Aqaba. “They” brought Yunis Bahri to wage radio propaganda against the ESS powers. Jordan did not wish to harm her relations with these countries. Mr. Allen asked who had brought Yunis Bahri to Jordan. Mr. Rifa’i replied that it had been the British, working through the King. How could a government hope to work smoothly and softly if their radio station was sending out aggressive speeches? The Prime Minister had threatened to resign over this. These British efforts prevented the stabilization of the situation.
Mr. Allen asked on a purely unofficial basis whether, if disturbances recurred, Jordan would prefer assistance from Iraqi or British troops in maintaining order. Mr. Rifa’i said that his government accepted neither. The Prime Minister had rejected British forces. During the troubles, elements in the northern part of Jordan had declared their accession to Syria. There had been talk on the West Bank of setting up an independent Arab republic. The Iraqis, Saudis, and Israelis had all been prepared to dismember Jordan. The situation had been saved now and this was very important. We knew that the U.S. had had no finger in the pie. Prime Minister Eden should be told that the British should not add new problems to the situation to stir things up. The time was not healthy. There should be no activity regarding the Baghdad Pact, an Arab-Israel settlement, or the Johnston Plan at this time. Such efforts would undoubtedly fail and order would again have to be restored. The Johnston Plan should be permitted to rest for the time being.
Mr. Allen asked whether the U.S. should not publicly announce that we were dropping the Johnston Plan. Mr. Rifa’i recalled that the Arab League Committee had left the matter open. The U.S. dropping the Plan would give Israel a pretext to start work on the Jordan River. Mr. Allen asked whether it would be useful if the British announced that they would bring no pressure on Jordan to join the Baghdad Pact and the U.S. announced it would not use pressure for the Johnston Plan. Mr. Rifa’i thought this might be helpful. Mr. Allen replied that Israel would probably start digging at Jisr Banat Ya’qub. Mr. Rifa’i thought this would mean war; Egypt would be bound to come in and he did not know what would happen to Jordan.
Mr. Rifa’i said that he hoped British thought would change. The British should realize that it was no longer easy to carry out their plans. Jordan wanted friendly relations with the U.S. as well as the British. Britain must “take it easy” with Jordan. Mr. Allen harked back to the possibility of Jordan’s dismemberment by other Arab states and said that the irony was that if the various Arab armies [Page 26] had entered Jordan, they all would have done it in the name of Arab unity…. Mr. Rifa’i said that the Saudis had assured his government that their forces were near Aqaba in answer to Ben Gurion’s threat to force the Straits of Tiran.
Mr. Allen said he could assure Mr. Rifa’i that our Government felt that every effort should be made to avoid bringing up difficult problems to the Jordan Government and people. Mr. Allen had taken this line with Mr. Shuckburgh and had made the point in his briefing of the President, preparatory to his talks with Eden. Mr. Rifa’i was gratified to hear this.2
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 785.00/1–2856. Confidential. Drafted by Bergus.↩
- On January 28, in a telephone conversation with Secretary Dulles, Allen referred to his meeting with the Jordanian Ambassador. According to the memorandum of the conversation, Allen noted that the Ambassador requested that nothing be done “to rock the boat”. (Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Telephone Conversations)↩