16. Memorandum of a Conversation, White House, Washington, January 30, 1956, 2:15 p.m.1

ETW MC–1

PARTICIPANTS

  • US
    • The Secretary
    • Under Secretary Hoover
    • Ambassador Aldrich
    • Mr. Merchant
    • Mr. Mac Arthur
    • Mr. Bowie
    • Mr. Allen
    • Mr. Rountree
    • Mr. Hogerty
    • Mr. Cottman
  • UK
    • Prime Minister Eden
    • Foreign Secretary Lloyd
    • Ambassador Makins
    • Sir Harold Caccia
    • Sir Leslie Rowan
    • Mr. Evelyn Shuckburgh
    • Mr. Ian Samuel
    • Mr. Willie Morris

[Here follows discussion of press arrangements during Eden’s visit; the draft of a declaration to be issued at the conclusion of the talks; European integration; the Arab-Israeli conflict; the Baghdad Pact, Iran, and Iraq; and Syria (see Document 321).]

Jordan

The Secretary asked for the British views on the situation in Jordan.

Mr. Lloyd said it might be well to view the situation in retrospect; to consider whether it had been an error to send Templer to Jordan. He thought that, in balance, it had been just as well that Templer had gone and we had found out what the situation in Jordan really was. The strength of the opposition had been revealed, as had Egyptian intrigue and propaganda and the uses to which Saudi money was being put. It had been difficult to restore order and to keep the country under control. The event had proved the Government to be extremely weak and unable to employ effectively the Jordan Army. There were, however, still elements sympathetic and hopeful that Jordan eventually could adhere to the Baghdad Pact. The King certainly had no reason the [to] like the Saudis, and was still very friendly to the British and to the idea of joining the Pact. There was a great deal of repair work to be done; one of the greatest problems resulted from the Palestinian Arabs having been [Page 21] stirred up by the communists. The important things were to restore and maintain stability, to build up the prestige of the King, to point out the importance of the alliance with the British, to cope with Saudi bribery and intrigue, and generally to help in every way possible. The fact was, however, that high Government officials were being bribed by the Saudis and the British could not be certain what would happen. He observed Nuri had not done all he could to strengthen the ties between Iraq and Jordan, and thought it important that he do more.

Mr. Eden remarked that, with regard to the Palestinian refugees in Jordan, anything which took their eyes off of going back to Israel would be opposed by them. Here, he said, the Saudis had a fertile field for agitation.

The Secretary stated it was hard to find Arab leaders willing to come out on our side, for many Arabs often interpreted this as working with Israel; and no Arab leaders could afford to be regarded as pro-Israel. This made it extremely difficult to get their help in dealing with the communist problem.

Mr. Shuckburgh thought the Iraqi might do a great deal in Syria, as well as the Turks. Many Syrians sympathized more with the Iraqi than they did with the Turks.

Mr. Lloyd commented Iraqi activity in Syria raised the Hashemite problem, which was particularly alarming to Saudi Arabia and caused strong Saudi resentment having nothing to do with other issues such as the communists.

Mr. Eden expressed the view we must decide later, not during this trip, where we should go in relation to Egypt, and what our attitude toward Nasser should be.

The group then recessed for a few minutes pending the arrival of the President.

  1. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 62 D 181, CF 648. Secret. Drafted on February 7; no other drafting information is on the source text. The conversation concluded at 4 p.m. and took place during Eden’s visit to Washington, January 30–February 3.