Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Near East: Jordan-Yemen, Volume XIII

157. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Murphy) and the British Ambassador (Caccia), Department of State, Washington, August 15, 1957¹

Washington , August 15, 1957

Ambassador Caccia called at his request. He said he had no instructions from his Government but that he had just noted the Arab request for an urgent meeting of the UN Security Council to consider “the armed aggression by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland against the independent sovereignty and the territorial integrity of the Imamate of Oman.”

Caccia said that he had heard just this morning from the U.S. Delegation in the U.N. that the United States might be taking the position that it would merely abstain in the vote in the Security Council.² He asserted that if we did that our action would be misinterpreted by the public in Great Britain and that the result would be extremely harmful to Anglo-American relations. He said that inevitably there would be popular opinion expressed that after all the United States is governed by selfish oil interests and that the indignation against the United States which resulted from our attitude in Suez would be revived and perhaps intensified. He said with some emotion that he could not emphasize adequately how strongly he felt and that he was certain his Government would reflect the same feeling. I suggested that would depend in part on how the U.K. Government presented the problem to its public.

Caccia inquired when the Secretary would return and whether the Secretary was informed of this position. I told Caccia that the Secretary had not been informed but that he would be back in Washington according to the present schedule on Monday.³ Caccia said that he would urgently request permission to discuss the matter with the Secretary and wondered whether this would be possible. I said that I was certain that the Secretary would be glad to see him at the earliest convenient moment and that I hoped that this would be possible on Monday.

I explained to Caccia that this question had received very thoughtful consideration in the Department during the Secretary’s absence; that while we did not pretend to have all the facts, perhaps, regarding the developments in Oman and have not had access even to the text of the treaty or other arrangements which existed between the United Kingdom and the Sultan, we had thought that the British purpose would be well served by our abstention. Caccia agreed that the British purpose is to exclude the item from the Security Council agenda. He agreed also that our abstention would undoubtedly bring about that result. His argument was based solely on the interpretation which might be given to the U.S. position by the British public. He agreed that those who had knowledge of the procedures involved would understand our position. I said that I was a bit surprised that what amounted to practical cooperation by the United States in achieving the British objective in this instance should be developed as harmful to Anglo-U.S. relations.

I referred to our general policy regarding liberality of discussion of problems of this nature in the Security Council, mentioning that, of course, there were exceptions. These would concern items such as, for example, the case of Guatemala. I suggested that Sir Harold might recall the position we had taken at that time—that that case was appropriate for regional action rather than discussion immediately in the Security Council. Yet we had had the greatest difficulty with his Government in agreeing to our point of view and in fact the British had been unwilling to vote with us on that issue but had reluctantly abstained. Sir Harold argued vehemently that the cases were quite different because Guatemala is an independent state, whereas the Imamate of Oman could claim only the vaguest tribal autonomy. I suggested that the Arabs were charging aggression and asserting that Oman has a legal right to independence. Obviously if we abstained on such an issue we would be subject to considerable Arab criticism. This risk we were willing to take in the interest of Anglo-American relations. British failure to credit us with what is practical cooperation would be the source of regret.

I told Caccia we would inform him promptly regarding an appointment with the Secretary.⁴

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 641.86E/8–1557. Secret. Drafted by Murphy.

2. On August 15, the Mission at the United Nations informed the Department that Crosthwaite was notified of the U.S. decision to abstain on the matter of the inscription of Oman. The Mission also reported Crosthwaite’s strong reaction against the Department’s decision, noting its own view that abstention was “unlikely to carry much weight” with the Arabs. (Telegram 218; ibid., 786E.00/8–1557) On August 16, forwarding the draft of a letter to Macmillan which contained a paragraph on Oman, Eisenhower wrote to Herter: “I invite your particular attention to the paragraph on Oman. I saw in some staff notes that we were going to ‘abstain’ if this matter were brought up in the Security Council. I am not so sure that that is the attitude we should take, and if this is really our intention I should like to hear the reasons therefore [sic].” (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Dulles–Herter Series) The paragraphs on Oman of the President’s draft letter to the Prime Minister read as follows:

   “While this has been going on, I have tried to follow, as closely as possible, your operations in Oman. I know that it was a difficult decision for you to make to enter that affair, since your motives were bound to be deliberately misinterpreted in every corner of the earth where unfriendly people would have an interest in so doing.

   “Needless to say, I hope that the situation so develops as to preserve your position and that Britain does not inherit additional ill will in the region as a result. I must say that under the circumstances I do not see that you could have acted in any way other than you did.” (The full text of the President’s draft letter is in Department of State, Central Files, 786E.00/8–1657.)

3. August 19.
4. See Document 161.