156. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at the United Nations1

121. Re Oman. You may convey following to UKDel (Urtel 1902):

1.
Notwithstanding US usual attitude favoring discussion of questions in SC and in spite of very real difficulties for us, US has decided will not support inscription of Oman item on SC agenda. US had concluded no constructive purpose would be served by SC consideration Oman situation. On contrary, believe probable result would be acrimonious and fruitless debate to detriment Free World and benefit Soviets and Arab extremists. We feel discussion this matter would force friendly Arab states into public alignment with Egypt and Syria, damaging to US and UK relationships in area.
2.
US plan is to abstain in vote on inscription. We realize this position open to some criticism since abstention, procedurally, will have same effect as negative vote and will be portrayed as such by our critics. However after carefully considering alternatives we believe such course would minimize danger to stability of area and our interests there and at same time enable us cooperate with UK in heading off inscription.
3.
We feel that initiative in lining up votes on inscription should rest with British and we do not propose announce now our position. However should British and USUN feel it necessary have selected delegates informed US plans abstain in order obtain necessary support to keep matter off agenda you are authorized discreetly inform those delegates. In effort minimize adverse publicity in ME we are anxious have this handled with utmost discretion.
4.
Re timing we do not wish influence decision on convening SC. We would feel Tuesday August 20 entirely acceptable, but would also be prepared agree to earlier date if generally desired.

FYI In reaching decision on inscription Dept has weighed unfavorable British reaction that would result from our affirmative vote, on one hand, against probable Arab reaction resulting from abstention which equivalent to negative vote, on other. We believe we would lose more from first course than from second. As matter of [Page 238] fact there seems to be lack of enthusiasm on part certain Arab governments in taking issue to Council. This probably stems from realization Council debate would primarily serve purposes of those bent on embarrassing West regardless of effect on fellow Arabs. We recognize complex legal issues involved. However we are convinced SC would not be able deal with legal issues in manner helpful to our overall interests in area. We fully understand UK would prefer US negative vote but believe UK will realize need for US take position more likely minimize harm to our relations with friendly Arab governments while accomplishing immediate objective of heading off inscription.

Herter
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 786E.00/8–1257. Confidential. Drafted by Cargo, DePalma, and Gamon; and approved by Murphy. Repeated to London.
  2. On August 12, the Mission at the United Nations informed the Department that Crosthwaite had inquired about U.S. reaction in the event the Arabs requested inscription of the Oman item on the agenda of the Security Council. According to the Mission, Crosthwaite indicated that the British would favor steps to prevent inscription. (Telegram 190; ibid.)