Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Near East: Jordan-Yemen, Volume XIII

161. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, August 19, 1957¹

Washington, August 19, 1957

SUBJECT

• Oman

PARTICIPANTS

• Sir Harold Caccia, British Ambassador
• The Secretary
• Deputy Undersecretary Robert Murphy

Ambassador Caccia called on the Secretary at his request for a discussion of the position regarding the Arab request for Security Council consideration of the events in Oman. The conversation opened with a brief reference to the events in Syria, Caccia saying that these events are as disagreeable to the United States as they are to the United Kingdom. The Secretary replied that having just returned to Washington last evening he had not yet caught up with the developments either in Syria or Oman, as he had been absorbed in the Mutual Security program and had spent the morning testifying in the Senate. He said he was having a meeting later today to consider the situation in Syria. The Secretary thought that in the light of present trends the United Kingdom and the United States ought to work out a concerted program with reference to the countries in the Middle East area. Caccia referred to conversations which Malik has been having with the U.K. Ambassador in Beirut in which Malik has expressed great concern regarding the developments in Syria. The Secretary thought that in a general sense we ought to be thinking in terms of some cordon sanitaire around Syria. He said this represents a vague thought, as he had not yet been briefed on the position. Caccia referred to the series of contacts between Syria and the USSR and the question of what might be done under the general heading of covert operations. He admitted the United Kingdom is weak on assets. The Secretary mentioned that we had been hopeful at least as an off-chance that some favorable development might occur at the time of the recent Syrian elections. This had not quite come off. Caccia referred to the British impression that the Iraqis are not quite the same without Nuri. According to Nuri, Iraq erred in connection with the Arab proposal concerning Oman in not having put the question as to what the boundaries or what the alleged State of Oman might be. However, that seems now to have been overcome by events. Caccia referred to the message from Selwyn Lloyd to the Secretary,² which placed emphasis on Anglo-American relations and also stressed … our thought to get the Sultan and Saud together …. The Secretary said that he had not had much opportunity to study this question but that after consultation with the staff today, he felt that the conclusions seemed pretty well jelled. He said that he had accepted the conclusion that we should abstain in connection with the inscription of the item of Oman on the Agenda of the Security Council. He said that it would be very difficult for the United States to vote against inscription. He recalled that when the Soviet Union proposed the inscription of the item concerning United States “aggression” in Taiwan that the United States voted in favor of the inscription. Occasionally, of course, for exceptional reasons like Morocco, we might vote against the inscription of a given item.

Caccia referred to Mr. Macmillan’s message to the President, which pointed out that it would be a tragedy to Anglo-American relations if we did not stand together on this item and in that connection he referred to the improvement in Anglo-American relations which was developed at the Bermuda meeting. He also emphasized that the procedural aspect of getting the “Potentates” together in Arabia would be slender indeed. He referred to and showed the Secretary the telegram from the British Political Adviser Burrows this morning which made the point that it would probably be impossible to persuade the Sultan to get together with Saud if the United States only abstained and did not vote on the side of the British. The Secretary said that of course this point of view does not take into account Saud’s own position. He referred to the Saudis spear-heading the move to inscribe the Agenda and the Saudis point of view that Oman is an independent state. Caccia thought that our joint interests would not be served by an airing of the Saudi involvement in the Oman rebellion, saying that pushing debate would butter no parsnips and that they would not want to indict Saud in public, but no doubt would be obliged to do so. The Secretary referred to the Buraimi situation and negotiations as well as to the Saudis’ protest to the United Kingdom regarding their use of Buraimi as a base for operations in Oman. He referred to the Saudis’ point of view that the United Kingdom has no right to use Buraimi. Caccia referred to the British argument that Oman possesses no degree of sovereignty and there was a discussion of the provisions of the Treaty of Sib of 1920.

The Secretary said that in our opinion there would be strong reasons in favor of inscription of the item on the Security Council Agenda, but said that we are willing to depart from our regular policy in this case and abstain. This will give the United Kingdom the practical result it wishes. The matter, he said, has been debated in the Department for several days, and while the Secretary does not like the idea of abstention, as it seems to be a weak position, having heard the question debated by his staff during the past hour he was unable to find a better result. He believed the United Kingdom could put on a good front with this position.

Caccia brought up again the question of the distinction to be made between an internal matter and an international question and again discussed the provisions of the Treaty of Sib. The Secretary said that he did not know exactly what the Treaty says but that we did not want to commit ourselves now to saying it is or it is not an international matter. Some of our people take the point of view, he said, that it could be considered under Article 35,³ whereas others do not. He again referred to the Taiwan Resolution. He said also that we cannot very well take a position on the merits of the question until we know a little more about it. The Secretary also said that he is deeply concerned about the evident hostility between the United Kingdom and King Saud. He said this situation, superimposed on the Israeli problem, makes for a most difficult situation. The United States has sincerely been seeking to compose these differences but the Saudis felt bitterly, and of course the United Kingdom feels it has to maintain its own prestige with the Sheikhdoms. The general atmosphere in the area, he said, is certainly not good. We believed that during his visit here we opened Saud’s eyes to the dangers of communist penetration, and the events in Jordan confirmed this opinion of dangers to Saud…. We also have the most difficult question of passage in the Gulf of Aqaba to deal with…. This makes for a most distressing situation. We do not feel happy about it and are sure that the United Kingdom also are not happy. The Secretary wished that we could have an opportunity to sit down and thrash these questions out, as it is an awkward situation. The Secretary said that he thought Caccia should tell Selwyn Lloyd that we have, as we see it, no better alternative than to abstain. The issues are so framed, it seems to us, that as eager as we are to vote one way or another, it involves passing on the merits before we know what they are. The situation seems to include a series of relationships which do not have a counterpart in our society. Abstention seems the best we can do. Caccia asked the question whether in the time available the British possibly could demonstrate the nonstatehood of Oman. The Secretary said that our position would be more apt to change after some public discussion of the affair. He said if the British wished us to act on the merits, we should have some presentation, pro and con. Caccia replied that there would be no harm in the United Kingdom letting us see their case. The Secretary thanked the Ambassador and said that it would receive immediate consideration by our Legal Adviser and staff.⁴

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 786E.00/8–1957. Secret. Drafted by Murphy.
2. See footnote 2, Document 159.
3. Article 35 of the U.N. Charter referred to the terms under which Member and non-Member states might bring disputes or situations to the attention of the General Assembly or Security Council.
4. On August 19, after his meeting with the Secretary, Caccia wrote to Dulles, forwarding a summary of Sir Pierson Dixon’s arguments on Oman. In part, these arguments compared Britain’s support of the Sultan of Muscat with British aid to Greece in 1944. On August 20, Dulles replied, thanking Caccia for the information, and pointing out that “when we went into Greece in 1947 at its invitation to help to put down armed insurrections supported from outside, we expressly recognized the jurisdiction of the United Nations.” Dulles added, in part: “Therefore, I suggest that you do not press us on this analogy.” (Department of State, Central Files, 786E.00/ 8–1957)