Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, South Asia, Volume VIII

64. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, October 30, 1957¹

Washington, October 30, 1957

SUBJECT

• Foreign Minister Noon’s Further Request for US Assurance of Support to Pakistan in the Event of Aggression by India

PARTICIPANTS

• Mohammed Ali, Ambassador of Pakistan
• William M. Rountree, NEA
• Garrett H. Soulen, SOA

The Pakistan Ambassador called on Mr. Rountree to give him Foreign Minister Noon’s reaction to discussions held in the Department on October 29.²

The Ambassador stated that Foreign Minister Noon had been quite disappointed over the negative reply he had received to his request of late September that the United States issue a public declaration guaranteeing Pakistan’s political independence and territorial integrity against aggression by India. The Foreign Minister wished to make two counterproposals:

1. That the Secretary of State give him written assurance that the United States would support Pakistan in case of any aggression against his country. Such written assurance would be given no publicity. It would be used only to reassure the new government of Pakistan³ that United States interest in Pakistan was based upon the country and the Pakistani people rather than upon personalities such as ex-Prime Minister Suhrawardy.

2. In this same context of assuring the new Pakistan Government the Foreign Minister wished to suggest that the United States enter into a mutual defense pact with Pakistan.

The Ambassador, in answer to a question, stated that to the best of his knowledge this further request for U.S. assurance by the Foreign Minister originated with Mr. Noon and was not based upon a considered opinion of the Government of Pakistan that it needed such an assurance.

The Ambassador stated that Mr. Noon had been highly appreciative of Secretary Dulles’ statement regarding SEATO and U.S. support for local armies. Mr. Noon had instructed him to inform the Department that the Government of Pakistan would welcome any magnitude of expansion of U.S. support to the Pakistan army on the firm understanding that such Pakistani troops would be available for use by the United States anywhere in the world. Two divisions could be raised easily. The Ambassador, in answer to a query, stated that Mr. Noon’s offer had not been cleared with his Prime Minister.

Mr. Rountree stated that he would only be able to make general observations at this time to Mr. Noon’s further requests or suggestions. He pointed out to the Ambassador that U.S. policy regarding aggression of any sort, in any part of the world, was certainly well-known having been demonstrated on numerous occasions. As to formalizing an agreement such as a mutual defense pact between Pakistan and the United States, Mr. Rountree observed that such agreements are really treaties; they require time-consuming, detailed negotiations. He told the Ambassador that he would relay Mr. Noon’s request and suggestions to the Secretary and would get in touch with the Ambassador on these subjects as soon as possible.

As the Ambassador was being escorted to his automobile, he suggested to the Departmental officer accompanying him that a further alternative to Mr. Noon’s request for written assurances of U.S. support in case Pakistan were attacked would be for the Secretary to arrange an appointment to see Mr. Noon prior to the latter’s departure for Pakistan, now tentatively scheduled for early November. The Ambassador said this suggestion was his own. However, he was sure Mr. Noon would be most appreciative if, as a result of such a meeting, he could return to his new government in Karachi and assure them of continuing U.S. support and interest in Pakistan.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 690D.91/10–1957. Secret. Drafted by Soulen.
2. Those discussions concerned a recent request by Pakistani Foreign Minister Malik Firoz Khan Noon that the United States make any new aid to India dependent on two conditions: (1) that India conclude “just and equitable settlements of her two outstanding disputes with Pakistan,” and (2) that the United States “allay the apprehensions of its ally by guaranteeing its political independence and territorial integrity against aggression by India.” (Letter from Noon to Dulles, September 26; ibid.) During his meeting with Mohammed Ali, Rountree informed the Ambassador orally of Dulles’ response to Noon’s request. The Secretary, he explained, wanted to assure the Foreign Minister that in considering any request by India for aid, the United States would keep the legitimate interests of Pakistan clearly in view. Should a formal Indian request for aid be received, however, it would not be feasible for the United States to depart from its firmly established policy of not tying political strings to its economic aid. (Memorandum from Bartlett to Rountree, October 29, and memorandum from Rountree to Dulles, October 19; both ibid., 690D.91)
3. Ismail I. Chundrigar became Prime Minister of Pakistan on October 18.