63. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in India1
1030. For Ambassador. Following is uncleared NEA paper on possibility achieving reduction in tensions between India and Pakistan.2 Desire your comments before presenting to Secretary.
[Page 145]Issues:
1. Number major problems confront India and Pakistan. These include need to achieve (a) moratorium on arms race (b) workable division Indus waters (c) solution Kashmir issue. In addition both countries facing great difficulties attempting to increase, or at least maintain, economic development programs.
US Interest:
2. All these problems, indirectly, affect US. All interrelated. India’s request financial assistance and high level of US aid Pakistan combine to offer US opportunity approach both countries in attempt help them progress toward settlement disputes. Amjad Ali’s suggestions for such approach add to opportunity.
Alternative Approaches:
3. Two alternative methods achieving progress on issues paragraph 1 might be envisaged: (a) agreement to halt present arms race, which would reduce tensions between two countries, followed eventually by agreement on Kashmir and Indus waters. May be that last two issues difficult resolve separately because resolution could require offsetting concessions by India and Pakistan: (b) package solution involving all three issues (arms, Kashmir, Indus waters). Interrelationship of issues is such that “package” solution is preferable, may be more practicable.
Agreements Desired:
4. Whichever approach adopted, we should seek bring about: (a) Immediate agreement limit armed forces to something like present levels, possibly coupled with inspection against surprise attack. Precise level and timing of arms limitation to be worked out with Defense prior presentation, in order assure fulfillment Phase I commitment in Pakistan and maintenance minimum Pakistani force consistent Baghdad Pact–SEATO requirements, (b) Settlement Indus waters dispute by India assuring Pakistan continued flow water adequate meet 1947 requirements and by joint development new water resources with division added resources between countries as originally suggested by Lilienthal.3 Such development under direction [Page 146] Joint Waters Board, established and financed by both countries with neutral participation, (c) Settlement of Kashmir by both countries agreeing to Pakistan’s ownership of Azad-Kashmir and India’s of Jammu, with plebiscite in ten years for Vale of Kashmir, or by permanent partition along present dividing line with minor, mutually agreeable, adjustments in Pakistan’s favor to compensate for India’s retention of vale. Latter probably more practicable.
US “Package”:
5. US “package” assuring peace in area and definite aid level for period of years would enhance negotiability of overall settlement. “Package” might include (a) Assurance to Pakistan its total level military and economic aid not adversely affected by arms limitation with any decrease in military aid funds being made good by increase economic aid during period five year development plan, (b) Large-scale economic development loan or loans to India covering Five Year Plan requirements for capital assistance over next three years. Agreement to settlement should not be prerequisite to aid since it will be in US interest provide aid any event. Congressional reaction to Executive Branch request for aid more favorable if there is prospect of improved relations between India and Pakistan. This could be frankly pointed out. (c) Assurances Executive Branch prepared negotiate PL 4804 sales both countries during next three years if Congress provides adequate continuing PL 480 authority. We should wish negotiate sales in any event but statement of intent might be helpful in connection our initial approach, (d) US support IBRD loan assist joint development Indus waters area in accordance with agreement on such development between India and Pakistan, (e) Public statement by President re defense of India and Pakistan against aggression similar to Secretary’s earlier assurance to India.
Tactics:
6. Manner in which total settlement is proposed by US as important to success as contents. Utmost secrecy desired long as possible. Initial approach through informal call on Prime Minister of [Page 147] each country by US Ambassador. Ambassador indicate that President very concerned over economic conditions each country and growing arms race between them. Since US considers itself friend each country, it wishes offer good services in attempting correct situation. US conceived progress might be made through (a) agreement which linked all outstanding issues or (b) agreement on arms limitation which would reduce tensions and permit subsequent progress other issues. US prepared assist in exploring whichever alternative most promising to two governments. Prime Ministers’ initial reactions would be received. Ambassador then state that if both nations receptive general approach, President be happy discuss idea further with Prime Ministers. If they preferred, he would send trusted representative explore matter further.
Special Problems:
7. Two special problems must be kept in mind during negotiation: (a) Lack of mutual confidence between two. This makes it difficult negotiate even agreements which both countries believe in their interest. (US initiative and proposed security assurance might help bridge gulf.) (b) Reactions of Baghdad Pact and SEATO nations to US advocacy of arms limitation which would affect one of its allies. (Could be countered with frank, secret statement by US Ambassador to government involved, explaining our military assessment of situation, i.e. that arms limitation with concomitant easing tensions would actually strengthen ability Pakistan where area defense concerned since it would free most of Pakistan’s military strength, which now pinned down along India border.)5
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 690D.91/10–2157. Secret; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Rufus Burr Smith, Officer in Charge of Economic Affairs, SOA, and by Rountree. Also sent to Karachi.↩
- The uncleared NEA paper on which this telegram was based was a draft memorandum from Rountree to the Secretary dated October 15. The paper, prepared at the suggestion of S/P, was drafted by Smith and Buckle of SOA and by Henry Owen of S/P. A copy of the memorandum was sent by Owen to C. Douglas Dillon on October 22. (Ibid., 690D.91/10–2257)↩
- David E. Lilienthal, former Director of the Tennessee Valley Authority and Chairman of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, wrote an article in 1951 (“Another ‘Korea’ in the Making?”, Collier’s, August 4, 1951, p. 22), emphasizing the importance of the canal waters dispute and suggesting that the problem might be solved on the basis of an overall plan providing for the most efficient utilization of the waters available from the Punjab rivers system. Eugene Black, head of the IBRD, had then attempted to use Lilienthal’s plan as a basis for reaching an agreement between India and Pakistan. Additional documentation on this subject is printed in Foreign Relations, 1951, vol. VI, Part 2, pp. 1807 ff.↩
- P.L. 480, Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act (68 Stat. 454), approved on July 10, 1954, was designed to help dispose of U.S. agricultural surpluses by increasing the consumption of U.S. agricultural commodities abroad.↩
- In telegram
934 from Karachi, October 24, Ambassador Langley commented that the NEA paper was in his opinion “excellently organized”.
He suggested that secrecy would be necessary during any
negotiations. (Department of State, Central Files,
690D.91/10–2457)
In telegram 1225 from New Delhi, November 6, Ambassador Bunker stated that the Embassy believed that sustained efforts to reduce tensions between India and Pakistan deserved the highest priority and that it welcomed the NEA paper. He made specific comments regarding the various aspects of the proposed plan, agreed with the substance of the NEA paper, and suggested certain modifications. (Ibid., 690D.91/11–657)
↩