Office of the Historian

27. Telegram From the Department of State to the United States Mission at the United Nations1

Washington, June 8, 1956—8:39 p.m.

689. For Lodge from the Secretary. Re Kashmir urtel 1046.2 While I can see certain advantages to postponing SC Kashmir action until January I do not believe we should push Paks for such timing at expense substance position we would have to take whenever [Page 84] question considered. On number recent occasions (SEATO and Baghdad Pact communiqués)3 we have tried give satisfaction Paks to extent acknowledging continued validity commitment both parties to holding UN plebiscite. In such public statements however we have avoided entering into merits case and have made clear our hope for early settlement either through UN or by direct negotiations.

I believe Paks can be in no doubt that my March 7 statement, made in closed SEATO session, was not intended exclude alternative means achieve settlement. In talking to press in both Karachi and Delhi immediately following SEATO conference (excerpts pouched USUN) I reiterated above position. It is understandable Paks would wish make it appear that our “commitment” to “support” their side of case against India is a firm one.

In view our primary concern peaceful settlement acceptable both sides, and since unlikely any action Security Council could take would accomplish what Paks desire, it is in our interest avoid insofar as possible playing leading role which would incur wrath both sides. We should continue coordinate closely with UK in this intra-Commonwealth dispute. We understand UK will not press Paks delay SC action beyond Commonwealth Conference end this month. In circumstances we should not seek prevent Paks reopen case SC if their domestic pressures require it, and should avoid definite undertaking regarding future US action.

Re suggestions para 6 reftel I suggest you take following position with Pakistanis:

(a)
For reasons Mir Khan acknowledges, we see advantage postponing SC action about two months (as Paks now seem to plan).
(b)
We desire see peaceful settlement acceptable both sides. Karachi SEATO communiqué referred to statements Soviet leaders on Kashmir and said “the members of the Council, noting that the UN resolutions remain in force, affirmed the need for an early settlement of the Kashmir question through the UN or by direct negotiation”. US adheres this position.
(c)
When case comes before SC, US would be willing consider possibility SC action designed to reaffirm validity UN resolutions and to send high-ranking individual to area to discuss problem with parties concerned.

Dulles
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 690D.91/5–3156. Secret. Drafted by Ludlow, Samuel DePalma, Deputy Director of UNP, and Witman; cleared with Rountree and Wilcox; and approved by the Secretary of State. Repeated to Karachi with instructions to pouch it to New Delhi.↩
  2. Document 25.↩
  3. The Baghdad Pact communiqué was issued after the second meeting, held in Tehran, April 16–19; it is printed in Department of State Bulletin, May 7, 1956, pp. 754–756.↩