13. Memorandum of Discussion at the 296th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, September 6, 19561
Present at the 296th meeting of the Council were the President of the United States, presiding; the Secretary of State; the Deputy Secretary of Defense; and the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Acting Secretary of Commerce (for Item 2); the Special Assistant to the President for Disarmament; the U.S. Representative to the United Nations; the Acting Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Director, International Cooperation Administration; the Director, U.S. Information Agency; the Under Secretary of State; Assistant Secretary of Defense Gray; the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Acting Director of Central Intelligence; the Assistant to the President; William H. Jackson, Special Assistant to the President; the White House Staff Secretary; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.
There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the the main points taken.
[Here follows discussion of item 1, “Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security”.]
2. U.S. Policy Toward Latin America (NSC 5613; NSC 5432/1; NSC Action No. 1548; Memos for All Holders of NSC 5613, dated August 272 and 31, 1956;3 Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary same subject, dated August 314 and September 5, 19565)
In the course of his briefing of the National Security Council, Mr. William Jackson, newly appointed Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, first summarized the general content of the proposed new policy on Latin America (copy of [Page 102] briefing note filed in the minutes of the meeting). Upon concluding this summary, he asked the Council to go back over the paper in order to resolve the splits in certain paragraphs and to take account of the recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and of the Council on Foreign Economic Policy for further changes.
Accordingly, Mr. Jackson invited the Council’s attention first to the change recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in paragraph 16–e, on page 9 of NSC 5613. As originally written by the Planning Board, the sentence in question read as follows:
“If a Latin American state should establish with the Soviet bloc close ties of such a nature as seriously to prejudice our vital interests, be prepared to diminish governmental economic and financial cooperation with that country, when such action seems likely to weaken the Soviet ties; doing so, however, without necessarily relating those measures openly to the country’s attitude.”
The Joint Chiefs of Staff proposed to change the sentence to read as follows:
“If a Latin American state should establish with the Soviet Bloc close ties of such a nature as seriously to prejudice our vital interests, be prepared to employ appropriate political, military and economic measures, in order to weaken the Soviet ties.”
The Joint Chiefs’ reason for the change was their view that policy should not serve to restrict counteractions to the economic and financial fields. The nature of the counteractions to be applied and whether or not they should be openly related to the country’s attitude, should be matters for determination under the circumstances then existing.
Initially the President said that the Joint Chiefs’ language seemed to him simpler, and he was inclined to favor the change they proposed. Secretary Dulles, however, believed that a possible objection to the language of the Joint Chiefs was that it appeared so broad as not to give very clear guidance to those who were obliged to carry out the policy. He accordingly recommended that certain specific language be added to the more general language proposed by the Joint Chiefs. The President observed that this issue struck him as largely a matter of semantics. After a brief discussion the Council agreed on language which essentially included both that proposed originally by the Planning Board and that proposed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Mr. Jackson then invited the Council’s attention to the next split, in paragraph 21 on page 10 of NSC 5613. The paragraph dealt with ways and means of maintaining stable long-term trading policies with respect to Latin America. The majority of the Planning Board had wished to specify one such means by including language [Page 103] which called for “resisting, wherever feasible, efforts to limit the access of Latin American exports to U.S. markets.” The Commerce and Agriculture representative on the Planning Board proposed that this statement be deleted. In the same paragraph, moreover, the Council on Foreign Economic Policy had recommended the insertion of language endorsing the application of the most-favored-nation principle. At the end of his explanation of the proposed changes in paragraph 21, Mr. Jackson invited the comments of the Acting Secretary of Commerce, Mr. Walter Williams.
Secretary Williams first stated that Commerce was happy to go along with the CFEP recommendation for a reference to the application of the most-favored-nation principle. On the other hand, the Department of Commerce still believed that the language with respect to resisting efforts to limit access of Latin American exports to the United States should be deleted. There were, he said, four major reasons behind the attitude of the Department of Commerce. In the first place, there were already certain limits on Latin American exports to the United States established by law. An example was the Sugar Act. Accordingly, certain legal restrictions already existed.
Secretary Dulles interrupted to comment that Secretary Williams had slurred over the phrase “wherever feasible” pretty rapidly. Naturally, said Secretary Dulles, if the law of the land imposes certain restrictions on Latin American imports to the United States, it would not be feasible to contravene the law.
The second major reason for the Commerce proposal to delete this language, said Secretary Williams, was the conviction of the Department of Commerce that it was inappropriate to base a statement favoring freer access of foreign imports to U.S. markets solely on the Latin American region.
Thirdly, said Secretary Williams, Commerce felt that there were a lot of other ways to maintain and establish long-term trading policies other than by resisting efforts to limit Latin American exports to the United States. It seemed unwise to single out for special mention only one such means.
Lastly, Secretary Williams said that the Department of Commerce felt it wiser to leave this statement in very general terms, thus avoiding the trap of getting ourselves into a restrictive box with these particular words.
At the conclusion of Secretary Williams’ statement, the President said he could not but feel that this statement made very good sense. The President also pointed out that obstacles to trade between the United States and the Latin American Republics could be created by the Latin American Republics as well as by ourselves. Secretary Humphrey said he agreed with the Department of Commerce in favor of deletion of the controversial language. Secretary Dulles [Page 104] added that he did not think the issue very important, and would have no objection to deletion. Accordingly, it was agreed to delete this language.
Mr. Jackson then turned to paragraph 22, on page 11 of NSC 5613, reading as follows:
“Be prepared to assure, through the Export-Import Bank, the financing of all sound economic development projects, for which private capital is not readily available, provided each loan is (a) in the interests of both the United States and the borrowing country; (b) within the borrower’s capacity to repay; (c) within the Bank’s lending capacity and charter powers; and (d) sought to finance U.S. goods and services.”
He then called attention to the proposal by the Department of Commerce to add, after the word “available” in the above paragraph, the words “except in cases where habitual and serious discriminatory practices by the borrowing government caused the unavailability of private capital”. When called upon to elucidate the reasons for adding this language, Secretary Williams confined himself to pointing out that the Latin American Republics were often able to do things over which the United States had no control. It was essential to keep an eye on discriminatory practices against private capital. To leave out the language proposed by Commerce would seem to condone such malpractices.
Secretary Dulles asked the President if the Council might hear from Under Secretary of State Hoover on this issue. Secretary Hoover pointed out that the Export-Import Bank did not lend money for petroleum development to Latin American countries where government oil monopolies existed. He nevertheless thought that a caveat like that proposed by the Department of Commerce would be a useful addition to the policy statement.
Secretary Dulles pointed out that there would be a danger in adopting the Commerce language if it should suggest that on account of discriminatory practices by a Latin American country in one particular field, the United States was prevented from making any loans in any field to the countries in question. He pointed out that we made loans to Mexico and Brazil despite the fact that petroleum production in both countries was a government monopoly.
Secretary Humphrey—speaking, he said, in this instance for the banks—said he would like to see this paragraph, if retained at all, be as short as possible and to contain as few limitations as possible. After all, before any of these loans were made to foreign nations, there were a series of screenings to assure that they were appropriate.[Page 105]
The President said that what bothered him about the Commerce proposal was that it seemed to commit the United States to measuring its own national interests with the yardstick of the internal policies of some foreign government. Such a course of action could be dangerous.
Secretary Dulles pointed out that the Administration had a very high-level committee to pass on all Export-Import Bank loans before they were finally made. Accordingly, the Commerce caveat seemed unnecessary to him. Secretary Humphrey said that by and large he would prefer to see the whole paragraph left out, but if the Council decided to retain it, he had a few changes in language to suggest, which he proceeded to enumerate. Secretary Williams agreed with Secretary Humphrey in suggesting deletion of the entire paragraph on grounds that the conditions under which the Export-Import Bank was enabled to make loans was set forth in legislation. Secretary Dulles did not wholly agree. While the law imposed certain limitations on the capability of the Bank to make loans, the policy statement in paragraph 22 was a positive recommendation to the Bank to make loans to Latin American countries provided the legal conditions were met. He accordingly favored the retention of the paragraph, but the deletion of the additional language proposed by the Department of Commerce.
Secretary Hoover also proposed certain changes in the paragraph, including deletion of the term “all” in the second line. He believed that inclusion of this word made the guidance to the Export-Import Bank too broad. The President spoke in favor of generalizing the language of the paragraph as far as possible, including deletion of specific reference to the Export-Import Bank as a lending agency. Secretary Dulles replied that he could not follow this last suggestion of the President, since this paragraph as originally written was intended to be clear policy guidance to the Export-Import Bank on loans to Latin American countries. After all, said Secretary Dulles, the Export-Import Bank was an instrument of national policy. The President thereupon agreed to the retention of the reference to the Export-Import Bank, but suggested that the word “encourage” should replace the word “assure” in the first line of the paragraph. As thus amended, paragraph 22 was agreed upon by the Council.
Thereafter, Mr. Jackson pointed out the split in paragraph 32, on page 14 of NSC 5613, and the related split in paragraph 14, on page 7, dealing with the missions of the armed forces of the Latin America Republics. He pointed out that the Bureau of the Budget proposed deletion of paragraph 32–b which read as follows: [Page 106]
“32. Encourage acceptance of the concept that each of the Latin American states is responsible for its own internal security and for providing, through effective military and mobilization measures, a contribution to the defense of the Hemisphere by:6
. . . . . . .
“b. Its participation in combined operations in support of U.S. military responsibility under paragraph 31 above, including defense of the Panama Canal, where its location and resources make such participation feasible.”
Mr. Jackson then called upon the Acting Director of the Bureau of the Budget7 to explain the position of the Bureau.
Mr. Jones explained that the opposition of the Bureau of the Budget to the above policy statement was related to two main things, timing and resources. As to timing, the best moment to restrict our military assistance programs to foreign nations was before these nations got themselves accustomed to enjoying more extensive U.S. programs of military assistance to them. As to resources, Mr. Jones pointed out that U.S. resources are not adequate to finance these more extended missions for the armed forces of the Latin American countries. Indeed, he said, both NSC 5613 and the comments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff clearly recognized the fact that the military contributions and missions of the Latin American countries largely depended on the provision of U.S. military assistance. In addition to these specific objections to the enlarged missions in paragraph 32–b, Mr. Jones pointed out the more general objection of the Bureau of the Budget that, while this policy paper seemed to add considerably to the size of U.S. commitments to assist the military forces of the Latin American countries, there was nowhere in the paper any compensatory reduction in the size of U.S. programs to assist the Latin American states.
Secretary Dulles said that he had some observations to make on the paragraphs of NSC 5613 dealing with military matters. Implicit in this policy statement, said Secretary Dulles, was a problem which ought to be made explicit. This was the question as to whether the United States really wanted to build up large military establishments in these Latin American Republics. He for one did not believe that it was wise to expand the missions and functions of the military forces of the other republics to a point which would require these republics to maintain extensive military establishments. In many cases the governments of these republics were not sufficiently stable to enable us to estimate reasonably what use they will make of larger military [Page 107] establishments. It was to be feared that in some cases one country would use its enlarged military establishment to threaten its neighbors. Accordingly, Secretary Dulles expressed the belief that the United States would be better off if by itself alone it undertook to protect the sea lanes of communication and the Panama Canal, rather than to provide military establishments in the other republics sufficiently large to enable these republics to assist the United States in executing such far-flung missions. If we expand the missions of the Latin American forces, for which we will be obliged to build up large military establishments, we will presently find ourselves getting into a series of very difficult problems.
Secretary Humphrey—speaking, as he said, for the Treasury Department—agreed that the present policy paper obviously did not really contemplate any very large expenditures for building up the military forces of the other American republics. Nevertheless, if you chose to follow the precise wording in paragraphs 31 through 33 in a literal way, it would be possible to build up enormous military establishments in the other American republics. If we ever did follow such a course of action, said Secretary Humphrey, we would be getting ourselves way out on a limb.
Secretary Dulles said he certainly favored deletion of the phrase “and routes of communications associated therewith”, as presently set forth in paragraph 32–a. The President said that he had assumed that this reference to routes of communications had reference only to local routes of communication within and adjacent to the territory of one of the Latin American states. Mr. Jackson and Secretary Humphrey, on the other hand, said that they believed the reference to apply to more extended and remote communication lanes.
Admiral Radford then asked if he might be heard. Speaking with emphasis, he pointed out that the proposed new policy statement in NSC 5613 actually represented a “watering-down” of our existing policy on Latin America, NSC 5432/1. Moreover, our military assistance programs to the Latin American Republics, with the possible exception of Brazil, had been negligible in character, despite heavy pressure by the State Department to increase the size of these programs. Accordingly, Admiral Radford warned that it would be very dangerous indeed to change abruptly our policy of military assistance to Latin America. If we made drastic changes there would be serious repercussions. It was already proving difficult to keep the Latin American Republics in line because in fact we provide them with so little military assistance. It would be worse if we proceeded to still further reductions. Moreover, Admiral Radford pointed out, if these Republics were unable to secure from us the military matériel that they believed they needed, they would certainly secure such matériel from other sources. The really important objective in [Page 108] his mind, said Admiral Radford, was to keep the good will of Latin America. This was not easy. For example, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had been virtually unable to approve any military grant aid to any Latin American Republic either because the military assistance funds available were insufficient or because the precise terms of the legislation covering graid [grant?] aid were so restrictive as to prevent the extension of such aid to Latin America.
Secretary Humphrey said he sympathized with Admiral Radford’s dilemma, but wondered whether, nevertheless, we could not put in limiting language so that our military assistance programs to the Latin American countries would not be completely open-ended. He pointed out that the present policy seemed to indicate that we were going to extend all our military assistance on a straight grant basis. Admiral Radford replied by pointing out that the actual wording of paragraph 33 called for the extension of military assistance to Latin American states on a grant aid basis only “If necessary”. He repeated his view that the United States was spending too little rather than too much in the way of military assistance in Latin America. He reiterated his warning likewise that a drastic change in our policies toward Latin America in this respect should not be made until the Council had had a long hard look at the probable results of such a change. In any case, he added, the State Department would be more severely affected by such a drastic change than would the Defense Department or the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
The President said he had an observation to make on this general subject. It had been his experience that the more armament you give to a foreign country the more dependent that country becomes on you for replacements, spare parts, ammunition, and the like. We could get into an awful jam if and when the shooting started. On the other hand, the President said, he agreed with Admiral Radford that what we want to preserve above all is the good will of the Latin American Republics and, he added, to assure their internal security, without which their good will would be useless to us. But beyond the capability to maintain internal security, the President expressed doubt as to whether much could be expected by way of capabilities and missions for the armed forces of the Latin American countries. He concluded with a warning that the United States must not be put into the position of being the sole source of supply of military equipment for all the countries of the world. We should try to induce our friends and allies to begin to produce their own spare parts and ammunition.
Admiral Radford went on to state that our greatest problem in Latin America, from the military viewpoint, was our inability to prevent the Latin American states from buying arms elsewhere if they cannot buy them in the United States. Perhaps the maintenance [Page 109] of Latin American good will remained our greatest single objective in the whole area of foreign policy. Before we made such changes as the Council seemed prepared to make in our policy toward the southern hemisphere, he asked again for a long hard look.
Governor Stassen agreed with Admiral Radford that the Council should move very slowly in undertaking any drastic change in our policy toward the other American republics, not least of all because such change might provide dangerous openings to the Soviet Union to move in on Latin America.
Secretary Dulles said that he could not disagree with Admiral Radford’s general position, nor with the specific reasons that Admiral Radford had cited in defense of this position. Secretary Dulles said he started from the premise that the ideal course of action was to hold down the military establishments of the other American republics to the general level which would enable them to provide for their own internal security. In practices, however, Secretary Dulles admitted, we could not always achieve this ideal. Accordingly, if a Latin American state felt that it must have more by way of armed forces than we thought requisite for its internal security, it was better that such additional armament come from U.S. stocks and supplies of arms than from some foreign source. In concluding, Secretary Dulles said that his only real objection to the military paragraphs of NSC 5613 was that instead of applying a correct standard by which to measure the amount of military assistance we should provide, the paper sought to increase the amount of military assistance to Latin America by enlarging unrealistically on the roles and missions of the Latin American military establishments.
The President then suggested that this portion of NSC 5613 should be rewritten on what he called an “honest” basis. In other words, we should set forth clearly what we regard as the appropriate level of military strength which each Latin American nation should maintain for military reasons. We should then recognize that these levels may have to be raised for political or for hemisphere defense reasons. These latter would constitute special cases.
Admiral Radford warned that if NSC 5613 did not include some reference to the Latin American military mission of assisting the United States in the defense of sea lanes, communications, and the Panama Canal, the Joint Chiefs of Staff would be debarred from making available any grant aid whatsoever to a Latin American state. This situation, Admiral Radford explained, derived from the fact that our laws require that any grant military assistance to Latin American nations be extended only if such assistance makes a contribution to the protection of U.S. security.
Secretary Dulles commented that it now seemed clear to him that the references in these paragraphs to the defense of the sea [Page 110] lanes and of the Panama Canal were put in the paper not because we believed that the Latin American nations would be in a position to assist in defending these communications or the Canal, but rather in order to satisfy the terms of the legislation governing the extension of grant military aid to Latin America.
The President stated that these military paragraphs should be taken back to the Planning Board and revised.
Mr. Jackson then went on to paragraph 34–a, on page 15 of NSC 5613, which read as follows:
“Recognizing that Latin American requests for military equipment are requirements against limited MDAP funds and supplies of U.S. military equipment; that their purchases of military equipment, especially on credit, have an adverse effect on their borrowing capacity and our ability to make loans to them for economic development purposes; and that the denial of their requests has disadvantages for the United States, discourage Latin American governments from purchasing military equipment not essential to the missions in paragraph 32. [Notwithstanding the foregoing, if a Latin American government cannot be dissuaded from purchasing unneeded military equipment, and if it is essential for U.S. political interests, make additional equipment available on a cash, credit or, under extraordinary circumstances, grant basis.]”8
Mr. Jackson pointed out that Treasury and Budget proposed to delete the last and bracketed sentence of paragraph 34–a. The President, however, said that he did not see anything particularly troublesome in the bracketed language. After all, we were not proposing to provide a Latin American government with unneeded military equipment unless it was really essential from the point of view of U.S. political interests. In point of fact, we could do anything on this basis. The President did recommend that the adjective “political” be deleted, but on a plea by Secretary Hoover agreed to the retention of this wording.
At this point, Admiral Radford repeated his plea for NSC 5613. In essence, he said, the present policy statement continues U.S. military policies toward the other American republics which have been in force over a period of many years. If these policies were now suddenly changed, the repercussions would be very serious. Mr. Jackson suggested that this paragraph likewise be referred for revision to the NSC Planning Board, along with paragraph 32. Secretary Dulles, however, stated his belief that paragraph 34–a should stand as written. With this position the President expressed his agreement.
Mr. Jackson then went on to deal with paragraph 34–b, on page 15 of NSC 5613, reading as follows: [Page 111]
“In order to be in a position effectively to supply military equipment on a reimbursable basis in accordance with this and the foregoing paragraph:
- “(1) Offer to Latin American governments military equipment at competitive prices.
- “(2) Make sales of military equipment to Latin American governments on credit.”
Mr. Jackson also pointed out the proposal of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to introduce into this subparagraph language supporting the effort to reach ultimate standardization of Latin American military equipment along U.S. lines. Secretary Hoover warned the Council that the term “standardization” carried with it the implication that the United States must also be responsible for the modernization of the equipment. In such matters as the provision of jet aircraft, such an obligation to modernize Latin American military units could prove very costly, and the Council should examine the problem carefully before agreeing to include the language proposed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
In reply, Admiral Radford pointed out that if any Latin American state actually bought any considerable amount of military material from a European country, history proved that the ultimate result was generally the establishment in the Latin American country of a military mission from the country that supplied the material. This had been very serious before the outbreak of World War II, and it was clearly in our national interest to prevent such broad contacts between Latin American countries and European countries. Our motives in this instance were certainly just as much political as they were military.
Mr. Jackson suggested that this paragraph likewise be returned to the Planning Board for review, along with the other military paragraphs of NSC 5613. He then went on to the final split in the paper, which came in paragraph 45, on page 17. Paragraph 45 as originally written read as follows:
“Study the feasibility of encouraging the use of the Latin American military personnel for a constructive role in economic development projects.”
Mr. Jackson said that the Defense Department and the Joint Chiefs of Staff proposed that this paragraph be deleted, on grounds that to encourage the use of military personnel on economic development projects would only subordinate the accepted military purposes of such forces. Admiral Radford warned that if this paragraph remained in NSC 5613 the result would be to increase the size of our military assistance programs to the Latin American states. The President added that it would certainly increase the already undesirable military [Page 112] influence on the civilian governments of the other American republics.
Mr. Hollister pointed out that the proposed course of action was actually working very well in certain countries of Latin America, such as Bolivia. He also pointed out that the paragraph did not direct the use of Latin American military personnel in economic development projects; it merely called for a study of the feasibility of such use. He added that the United States could probably save money if such a use of Latin American military personnel were found to be feasible. Secretary Hoover said that the State Department strongly supported the policy stated in paragraph 45.
The President said he felt this way: He had been struck, at the Panama Conference of the Heads of Governments of the American States,9 that only two or three of the leaders of the Latin American Republics wanted to be called by other than some military title. Moreover, their chests were hung with a great variety of military medals, which were probably struck for their own purposes. In short, the President certainly did not wish to do anything, he said, which would encourage any further dependence on the military element in these countries. He was still a strong believer in civilian control of governments. He believed that the paragraph should stay, but suggested that the word “advisability” should be substituted for “feasibility”.
Admiral Radford repeated his warning that if this paragraph remained in the policy statement the United States would get a lot of new requests from the Latin American states for additional military assistance. Secretary Humphrey commented that Admiral Radford’s warning emphasized his own fear that the United States would now proceed to develop great new programs of assistance to Latin America. The President, however, repeated his earlier suggestion that, in dealing with the military paragraphs of NSC 5613, the revised policy statement should set forth the desirable level of military forces in the Latin American Republics and the missions of these forces which clearly served the security interests of the United States. If for other than military reasons the missions of the Latin American armed forces should be further extended, the paper should recognize that this confronted us with a special problem to be dealt with on a case-by-case basis.
The National Security Council:
- Discussed the draft statement of policy on the subject contained in NSC 5613, prepared by the NSC Planning Board pursuant [Page 113] to NSC Action No. 1548; in the light of the comments of the Council on Foreign Economic Policy transmitted by the reference memorandum of August 31, and of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff transmitted by the reference memorandum of September 5.
- Adopted the statement of policy in NSC 5613, subject to the following amendments:
- Page 9, paragraph 16–e: Revise the second sentence to read as follows: “If a Latin American state should establish with the Soviet bloc close ties of such a nature as seriously to prejudice our vital interests, be prepared to diminish governmental economic and financial cooperation with that country and to take any other political, economic or military actions deemed appropriate.”
- Page 10, paragraph 21: Delete the bracketed language and the footnote relating thereto; and insert in the second sentence, after “inter-American trade”, the words “in accordance with the most-favored-nation principle”.
- Page 11, paragraph 22: Revise the first two lines to read as follows: “Be prepared to encourage, through the Export-Import Bank, the financing of sound economic governmental development projects or private commercial projects,”; and delete the asterisk and the footnote relating thereto.
Page 7, paragraph 14; page 14, paragraph 32; page 15, paragraph 34–b; and page 16, paragraph 35:
To be revised by the NSC Planning Board in the light of the discussion at the meeting.
- Page 15, paragraph 34–a: Include the bracketed sentence; and delete the brackets and the footnote relating thereto.
- Page 17, paragraph 45: Change “feasibility” to “advisability”; and delete the brackets and the footnote relating thereto.
Note: The action in b. above, as approved by the President, referred to the NSC Planning Board to prepare for Council consideration the revisions referred to in b–(4).
[Here follows discussion of item 3, “U.S. Policy Toward East Germany”.]
- Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Prepared by Gleason on September 7.↩
- Reference is to Lay’s memorandum transmitting the Financial Appendix to holders of NSC 5613; see footnote 1, supra.↩
- Reference is to Lay’s memorandum transmitting to holders of NSC 5613 revised pages for insertion into the Financial Appendix. (Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5613—Memoranda)↩
- Reference is to Lay’s memorandum transmitting to the NSC a memorandum by Randall to Dillon Anderson, dated August 30, containing the CFEP’s comments concerning NSC 5613. (Ibid.)↩
- Reference is to Lay’s memorandum transmitting to the NSC a memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, signed by Radford to Secretary of Defense Wilson, dated August 31, containing the comments and recommendations of the Joint Chiefs on NSC 5613. (Ibid.)↩
- Omission indicated in the source text.↩
- Arnold R. Jones.↩
- Brackets in the source text.↩
- Reference is to the meeting of the Presidents of the American Republics, held at Panama, July 21–22; see Documents 109 ff.↩