Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Austrian State Treaty; Summit and Foreign Ministers Meetings, 1955, Volume V

129. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France¹

Washington, May 31, 1955.

4280. For Ambassador. From Acting Secretary. Please convey following highly confidential message from me to Pinay, stressing importance of secrecy pending tripartite agreement and subsequent notification to Soviets of Western views regarding date, place, etc., of four-power meeting of Chiefs of Government.

Begin text. Dear Mr. Pinay: Your message of May 27² to Mr. Dulles regarding the four-power meeting was received just after his departure from Washington for a brief absence until June 2. However, in view of the urgency of this matter and the importance of the points you made, your message was forwarded to him. I now have his ideas, which are as follow:

1. With respect to the date of the four-power meeting of Chiefs of Government, we understand that the dates of July 18–21 raise real problems for you. On the other hand, while not excluding the possibility of a meeting in late Aug if the circumstances leave no other alternative, in the light of Mr. Macmillan’s reply³ (copy of which I understand was sent to you) indicating that the British Govt would welcome the meeting taking place in July if this meets with general convenience, the President and Mr. Dulles wondered whether you and Prime Minister Faure might be willing to re-examine the possibility of the July meeting. The President and Mr. Dulles continue to feel there is much advantage in making an early specific suggestion to the Soviets as to time and place so that we could try to reach agreement with them on these two points before the San Francisco meeting. If the three of us could agree on a date and place, we might put this to the Soviets within the next week.

2. In regard to the length of the meeting, Mr. Macmillan has suggested that four days may really be rather too short and that five days might be better. I have discussed this matter with the President, who, while willing to consider the possibility of a five-day meeting, feels that in the first instance we should propose a four-day meeting to the Soviets. Since by agreement, the Chiefs of Government will not enter into discussion of solutions of the various issues but rather try to identify them and to agree on methods to attack these problems, four days would seem to be adequate. This would mean that discussion of solutions of the issues themselves would occur at a later date at Foreign Minister level.

3. Regarding the place of the meeting, Mr. Dulles fully agrees that we should refuse to accept Vienna and should press hard for Switzerland. In view of Soviet opposition to Lausanne, he believes we might suggest Geneva, as a compromise between Vienna and Lausanne. The Swiss Govt has let us know confidentially and informally that it would be possible to hold the meeting in Geneva prior to the Atomic Energy Conference which begins in early August. Before suggesting a date and place to the Soviet Union we would of course have to request, officially and very confidentially, Swiss agreement, but this should not take more than about a day.

4. Mr. Macmillan has accepted the suggestion that the three Foreign Ministers meet in New York on June 16–17, but we fully understand the difficulties which these dates present for you. Mr. Dulles does feel that it is exceedingly important to have good and full tripartite discussions before meeting with Molotov. Your proposal that the three Foreign Ministers only meet in San Francisco on the day after the opening of the UN Conference would hardly permit this, since presumably Mr. Molotov would already have arrived and be expecting to meet with the three Western Ministers very soon after the opening of the UN Conference on June 20. In addition, the pressures on Mr. Dulles, as host Foreign Minister, particularly during the opening days of the San Francisco meeting, will be very heavy. If it is not possible for you personally to come to New York on the 16th and 17th of June, could you designate a representative who might meet in New York with Mr. Macmillan and Mr. Dulles? In these circumstances, the three Western Ministers would of course also meet briefly together in San Francisco prior to seeing Molotov.

5. In your message to Mr. Dulles, you also suggested a series of working group meetings in various places. Inasmuch as many of the questions which require tripartite discussion and preparation are overlapping and interrelated, we feel there would be great advantage in the first instance to discuss them together. Therefore, to begin with, we would suggest that a single working group be established in Washington on June 8 to prepare for the talks with Molotov and also to begin exchanges of views on the important substantive matters which we must discuss thoroughly prior to a four-power meeting. As you know, Mr. Macmillan has agreed to the June 8 working group to meet in Washington.

Mr. Dulles would appreciate very much your thoughts on the above ideas, which he asked me to transmit to you, together with his warm regards.

Sincerely, Herbert Hoover, Jr. End text.

Hoover

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1/5–3155. Secret; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Bonn, Moscow, and London. The same day Hoover sent a message to Macmillan, enclosing a copy of this message and thanking him for his note of May 29. (Telegram 6092 to London; ibid.)
2. Document 125.
3. See Document 127.