128. Letter From President Eisenhower to Prime Minister Eden1
Dear Anthony: Our recent public statement of satisfaction over the release of four United States airmen conforms, I think, to your suggestion as to what we should do along that line.2
I agree that the three Western powers should have a clear accord among themselves as to their joint attitude on questions which will likely be raised at the Conference. I doubt, however, that it will be possible for me personally to undertake attendance at a preliminary meeting which would have as its purpose the formulation of such joint attitudes. It is always an awkward thing for the President to leave this country for more than a day or so, and at this particular time it seems more difficult than is usually the case.
However, it is clear that we must make arrangements that will bring about the desired accord. Possibly Foster and Harold should work on this.
As to the length of the “Summit” meeting, there are several reasons why we do not want it unduly prolonged. The first of these is, again, the difficulty I have mentioned above. The second is that long and laborious meetings, discussing substantive questions, will inevitably lead the public to expect concrete solutions to the specific problems that obviously trouble the world. A meeting of a very few days could logically be accepted by the people as an effort to ease tensions and to outline means and methods of attacking the tough problems we have to face. But a prolonged meeting would lead to expectations which cannot possibly be realized either quickly, or in this kind of meeting. Thirdly, we feel that we must be particularly careful that the meeting and the note on which it ends shall neither raise false hopes among our own people nor create despair among the captive nations.
We are, of course, quite ready to take what time is necessary in such a conference to discuss general attitudes and general methods to be followed in the solution of problems. To attempt more than this and at the same time try to devise a final communiqué that would convince the world that an easing of tensions has actually begun, would, I think, most certainly create confusion. Possibly it might lead the peoples of Eastern Europe to believe that we had finally and irrevocably [Page 207] accepted the status quo with regard to them. This, of course, we must not do.
If necessary, I think I can manage the “clear four to five days” that you believe will be required. But we would want to know that you were prepared to stand with us in preventing the development of long drawn-out, profitless arguments which could have nothing as their purpose except propaganda.
With warm personal regard,
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/5–3155. Secret and Personal. This message was transmitted to London in telegram 6091, May 31, for delivery to the Prime Minister.↩
- For text of this statement, dated May 30, see Department of State Bulletin, June 13, 1955, p. 953.↩
- Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.↩