Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Austrian State Treaty; Summit and Foreign Ministers Meetings, 1955, Volume V

127. Letter From Foreign Secretary Macmillan to Secretary of State Dulles¹

London, May 29, 1955

Dear Foster: I have now had a chance of discussing with Anthony the various messages about the Four Power meeting and what has been happening while we have been separated by the calls of electioneering.²

2. Anyway, the first development is satisfactory, Molotov’s note of May 26³ formally accepts an early meeting of the nature which we have proposed. This is the vital point, and we have followed your wise line in our public statements, by ignoring polemics and concentrating on the hopeful fact of the Russian acceptance.

3. I am of course delighted to know that the President agrees with the broad conclusions which we reached in our talks in Paris and Vienna, and that he feels that the conference should take place as soon as practicable. Anthony shares this view. For our part, we of course would welcome it taking place in July. But we realise all the difficulties involved having regard to the President’s programme and his inescapable duties in relation to Congress.

4. While we are ready to meet the general convenience, the earlier the better so long as the preparatory conditions are such as to make the chances of a useful meeting as great as possible.

5. About the length of the meeting, we both now feel that four days may really be rather too short. Of course the formal work to be done by the Heads of Governments may not take very long, for it consists really in reviewing the ground that has to be covered and in deciding on the proper machinery for dealing with the various problems. We have never expected more than this as the first result of the conference of Heads. But of course there is always the chance (and that is the real purpose of these meetings) of some useful byproduct emerging in the course of the less formal discussions. It may happen that in such conversations among the Heads a phrase or two or a sentiment may emerge which will give us a line as to where we could most usefully probe a little further or where we might hope for possible concessions. Four days seems little time for this sort of atmosphere to develop. Five days, or even the possibility of going on for a week if things were going well, would give a better chance.

6. Anthony is sending a separate message to the President⁴ about how we should prepare for all this, which I hope you and he will consider favourably.

7. As regards the other plans set out in your message to me, I certainly agree the Tripartite Working Group in Washington from June 8 to 14 and also the meeting in New York of the three Foreign Ministers, say June 16 to 17 before going on to San Francisco. All this would suit me excellently.

8. I have also sent instructions about the private Anglo-American discussion which I agree with you in thinking most important.

9. The only thing that remains is about the place. We have no strong views about this except that it should not be in Vienna. Since we have had a hint that the Russians would compromise on Geneva, would it not be a good thing to propose it ourselves to them and so clear up that issue? I understand there may be some difficulties about accommodation, but these will probably apply to any of the places which have been mentioned if the meeting is to take place during the tourist period. But such problems can no doubt be solved. After all, we are quite important visitors.

10. I am sending a similar message to M. Pinay.

Yours ever,

Harold⁵

1. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 483. Secret. Delivered to the Department of State by Ambassador Makins on May 29, who stated that this message minus paragraphs 6 and 8 had also been communicated to Pinay.
2. British general elections were held on May 26.
3. See Document 124.
4. Supra.
5. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.