117. Memorandum of Discussion at the 249th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, May 19, 19551
[Here follow a list of participants and discussion of items 1–5: Budget Objectives, National Petroleum Program, Middle East Oil, United States Policy Toward Finland, and Secretary Dulles’ Trip to Europe. An extract from Dulles’ report on his trip is printed in Document 76.]
6. Basic U.S. Policy on the Four-Power Heads-of-Government Meeting
Secretary Dulles indicated that preparations for the forthcoming Heads-of-Government conference would involve an immense amount of work. The President agreed with Secretary Dulles, and said that the Council might well pause at this point and talk a little about the very ready instrument for accomplishing this task which existed in the shape of the NSC Planning Board. The President said that he believed that the Planning Board would be a first-rate agency to prepare for the conference, because this staff group was so accustomed now to working together.
Mr. Dillon Anderson pointed out that the Planning Board had given considerable thought to the role it might play in preparation for the forthcoming conference, and had suggested that he present to the President and the Council certain of the subjects which the Planning Board believed it might usefully study. The object would be to solicit the Council’s guidance for Planning Board consideration of these subjects. In the first instance, said Mr. Anderson, the Planning [Page 183] Board proposed to present recommendations on the general U.S. attitude toward the purposes of the meeting and the objectives which the U.S. would seek to achieve.
The President commented that on a number of the subjects which would be included in such a report, U.S. policy had already been clearly stated. Even so, the President felt it would be desirable to put in a single package what the United States would talk about at the conference. The President added that he had been giving a great deal of thought to this matter.
Secretary Dulles agreed that the Planning Board could do a very useful task in certain areas of preparation for the Heads-of-Government conference. However, in addition to the work of the Planning Board, there must be coordination at the, so to speak, working level of plans for the actual conduct of the conference. Secretary Dulles indicated that he had asked the Counselor of the Department off State, Douglas MacArthur, II, to undertake this procedural coordination.
Secretary Dulles then indicated that the subject of disarmament would be among the most important matters on which the United States must be prepared for discussions at the conference. Governor Stassen pointed out that his interim progress report on this subject would be up for Council discussion at the meeting of next Thursday. Secretary Dulles went on to state that the disarmament problem would be hard to handle. The forthcoming Four-Power conference, while not expected to settle such difficult problems, would be expected to explore ways and means by which the interested nations could proceed to deal with the problem. We might decide to continue the present discussions in London, or perhaps to bring them to the United Nations, or something else. Perhaps what we really want to do is to set up some special and dramatic forum. In any case, disarmament needed to be pushed.
Governor Stassen then said that the thinking of his group who had been studying the problem, was to refer the interim report which he would make on May 26 to the Planning Board and to the appropriate departments and agencies. There were, he added, very strong differences of view, both among the U.S. departments and agencies and between the U.S. on the one hand and the British and French on the other.
Secretary Dulles agreed, and pointed out that the Soviets imagined that their recent disarmament proposal2 marked a big step by them toward meeting the U.S. position with respect to disarmament. Molotov had made this very point to him. In fact, however, said Secretary [Page 184] Dulles, the Soviets had actually gone a long way to meet the British and French position on disarmament, without realizing that there was a very wide gap between the United States and the British and French on the issue of disarmament.
The President inquired as to the nature of this gap between the U.S. and the British and French. After Governor Stassen explained the difference, Governor Stassen said that he had very real doubts as to the genuineness of the apparent Soviet change of heart regarding a disarmament program.
The President indicated that this discussion certainly showed that there were a lot of issues that must be coordinated by the United States Government prior to the conference. As he understood it, MacArthur would coordinate the procedures. Yet another problem where we had wide differences with our allies was that of East-West trade. This, the President was sure, would come up at the conference, and he expressed his familiar view that the traditional U.S. position with respect to strict controls on trade between the free world and the Soviet bloc was not a wise or practical position.
Governor Stassen pointed out that there were just as sincere differences within the Administration on the subject of East-West trade as on the subject of disarmament. Secretary Humphrey then pointed out the effect on East-West trade of the possible creation of a belt of neutral states in Central Europe. If in fact we were heading in the direction of such a belt, and if the line between the Soviet bloc and the free nations of Europe were to become fuzzy, as Secretary Dulles believed, this would be bound to have a great effect on trade relations between the free world and the Soviet countries.
Secretary Dulles said that he believed that we were now confronting a real opportunity in the present situation for a rollback of Soviet power. Such a rollback might leave the present satellite states in a status not unlike that of Finland. He for one, said Secretary Dulles, would not object to such a development. The big idea is to get the Russians out of the satellite states and to provide these states with a real sense of their freedom. Now for the first time this is in the realm of possibility.
Governor Stassen agreed that this was indeed the case, and repeated that if this development actually occurred the whole trade picture would be bound to change. Secretary Humphrey pointed out that such a change in the picture would be a very serious matter for the free world because the creation of the neutral states would offer the USSR a great chance to build up its internal strength through trade with these countries.
Dr. Flemming then inquired of the President whether he could raise another question. He reminded the President that he had said the other night that in the course of preparing for the conference and [Page 185] going through with it, the United States must remain strong and confident. Ought not the Planning Board to give consideration to this aspect of the problem?
The President replied in the affirmative, and said that with regard to the posture which the United States would assume in anticipation of the Four-Power conference, he had himself been speculating on the wisdom of the plan to carry out a test evacuation from Washington of essential Government personnel. This test was scheduled for June 15, 16 and 17 to test the continuity of the Government in the event of a devastating air attack, and he himself was supposed to take part in it. Was he, however, the President asked, to run out to a cave for a few days in what was essentially a war game, and then turn around and go to a Four-Power conference? The whole thing seemed “queer and incongruous” to him.
Dr. Flemming said that this was the kind of problem which he had in mind in raising this question. On the other hand, as an illustration of the effects of the President’s strong leadership, he wished to inform the Council that the Congress had at long last manifested a real interest in a dispersal program for the Legislative Branch. Dr. Flemming then quoted from a letter he had received from several members of Congress, requesting an investigation of an emergency relocation site for the Congress. The President expressed his pleasure, and Dr. Flemming indicated that we do not want to lose the momentum and progress that was indicated by this inquiry; and yet, on the other hand, we did not wish to create the wrong atmosphere in Congress in regard to the approaching Four-Power meeting.
Mr. Allen Dulles said that he felt compelled to point out to the Council that there was absolutely nothing to indicate that the Soviets were relaxing one little bit on going ahead with the development of their military program.
The President then suggested that Mr. Dillon Anderson and Douglas MacArthur get together and explore the need for any additional coordination between the work of the Planning Board and of the State Department in the preparations for the Four-Power conference.
Mr. Anderson then continued to describe his proposal for an over-all paper to be prepared by the Planning Board on the basis of an initial draft prepared in the State Department. The President added that he wanted everything brought together into a single package paper. There were certain issues that the United States did not wish to have brought up at this conference. There were certain others which it did.
Mr. Anderson, having completed his description of the general over-all paper, went on to point out the need for an exploration on the topic of a European security system including Germany.
[Page 186]Secretary Dulles said that he understood that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had been requested to come up shortly after June 1 with a report on the implications of a withdrawal of U.S. forces from Europe. Admiral Radford said that this paper was in preparation.
Turning to Secretary Wilson, Secretary Dulles suggested that it would be desirable to have additional machinery and additional personnel earmarked in the Defense Department to go forward with the task of preparing for the conference. Specifically, Secretary Dulles said he wanted a top Defense Department official to work with Mac-Arthur.
Secretary Wilson replied that Assistant Secretary Struve Hensel wished to leave the Government service on June 30. Secretary Wilson had been planning to have a successor for Hensel by that date. If, however, he could find the right man, he could appoint him at once to do the kind of job which Secretary Dulles had thought to be desirable.
The President inquired what kind of tasks Secretary Dulles had in mind that the Joint Chiefs of Staff were not already geared up to perform. Secretary Wilson replied that the Defense Department always seemed to have some borderline cases. The President repeated that he believed that the interests and responsibility of the Defense Department with respect to the coming conference would largely lie in the area of military advice, which would be provided by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Secretary Wilson replied that in the Defense Department we seem always to have a certain number of borderline cases. The President repeated his view that the Defense interest in the forthcoming conference would lie largely in the area of military advice by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Mr. Allen Dulles said that he had one point of very great importance to put before the Council. He felt that the Council was assuming much too quickly that what had happened in Austria and the concessions made by the Soviets to get a treaty, was clearly understood by the populations behind the Iron Curtain. Actually, these populations know little or nothing about the Soviet concessions at Vienna. It was going to be a very big job to get this information in the hands of the satellite countries. The President merely commented that the U.S. Information Agency should get to work at once.
Mr. Dillon Anderson said that he had yet another matter with respect to the Planning Board work on the problems of the Four-Power conference. Should the Planning Board study the problem of China and Far Eastern security? What did the Council think of this suggestion?
The President replied that he did not believe that Far Eastern problems should be studied as a matter of urgency at this time. He said he was determined not to take part in any Five-Power conference [Page 187] at present. It was his advice that the Planning Board get its European ducks in a row first, although, of course, we could not overlook the problems of China and the Far East.
Secretary Dulles inquired whether Mr. Anderson’s suggestion for a study of Far Eastern problems implied any idea that the Administration should revise its policy with a view to considering U.S. participation in a Five-Power conference to include the Chinese Communists but not the Chinese Nationalists. Mr. Anderson answered that his query had not arisen in the context of any Five-Power conference, but was put forward because the Planning Board believed that the general subject of China and Far Eastern security matters could be looked at to advantage.
Secretary Dulles then remarked that he was still assuming that the United States would not wish to sit down at any Five-Power conference. Indeed, it would be little short of catastrophic if we undertook to do so. Mr. Anderson again indicated that he was making no suggestions whatever regarding a Five-Power conference, but only inquiring as to the advantage of a broad study of U.S. security policy in the Far East in the light of present developments.
The President agreed that we had always made it clear that the United States would not attend any Five-Power conference under present conditions. On the other hand, if at the forthcoming Four-Power conference the Soviets inquired as to what the conditions were which might induce us to attend a Five-Power conference, what could we say? At the very least we ought to know the answer and be able to list our reasons clearly.
The Vice President offered the suggestion that the Planning Board might usefully explore whether there was any other choice open to the United States than a Four-Power or a Five-Power conference.
Secretary Dulles indicated a conviction that the Soviets and the Chinese Communists would never agree to holding a Six-Power conference to include the Chinese Nationalists. Secretary Dulles added his thought that there were a great many things more urgent at this time than a review of U.S. policy toward Communist China. Such a review would be a very tough job as long as the United States continued to stand on the proposition that it would not attend a Five-Power conference including the Chinese Communists but excluding the Chinese Nationalists.
The President agreed that this was so, but pointed out that the United States had also stated publicly its willingness to meet with the Chinese Communists separately on the subject of the Formosa Straits. Accordingly, the Soviets may very well ask us why, in this case, we would refuse to meet the Chinese Communists in the presence of representatives of other powers. The President felt that we [Page 188] must have a satisfactory answer for such a question. It was all right to refuse to attend such a conference, but a decent respect for the opinion of mankind required us to be in a position to state the reasons for our refusal. The United States cannot be put in a position of simply saying it refused to talk. Nevertheless, the President went on to agree that there was no need at present to review the entire field of United States policy toward China. It would be sufficient if we marshalled all the reasons why we are opposed to a Five-Power conference.
Mr. Dillon Anderson countered with a suggestion for a somewhat broader treatment of the problem posed by Communist China, and asked what our response would be if the Chinese Communists should suddenly be induced to follow a line in the Far East something like the Soviets had followed in Austria. Would it not be profitable to study how we would respond to such a Chinese Communist initiative?
The Secretary of State expressed agreement with the President’s point that study should be made of a possible U.S. response to a Communist proposal for convoking a Five-Power conference. It was necessary, he added, to be clear on the reasons why we opposed such a conference.
Dr. Flemming then asked if he could suggest once again a position paper on the point which he had raised earlier in the meeting—namely, the posture of strength and confidence which the United States ought to assume in the period prior to and during the Four-Power conference. The President answered that he thought this was a good suggestion, and then with a smile said that he seemed to be getting a reputation throughout the world for being a very peaceful man who was surrounded by warmongers. Amid laughter, Secretary Dulles observed that the situation the President described was not without its advantages.
Secretary Dulles brought the discussion to a close with the statement that one of the greatest dangers the United States would face at the forthcoming conference was the danger that the Soviets would present projects and ideas designed to create the impression that the United States and the free world were willing to accept the current situation in the Soviet satellites. Under the circumstances it would be highly advantageous for the U.S. to take certain initiatives to prevent any such view from gaining currency. In other words, we must raise very affirmatively the issues of freedom for the Soviet satellites and the activities of the international Communist movement. On the these two fronts the United States must proceed to launch strong counter-offensives.
[Page 189]The National Security Council:
- a.
- Discussed procedures for developing a U.S. position on the Four-Power Heads-of-Government meeting, in the light of the above report by the Secretary of State and suggestions by the NSC Planning Board as reported by the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.
- b.
- Directed the NSC Planning
Board to prepare as a matter of urgency for Council
consideration, recommendations on the basic U.S. policy with
respect to the Four-Power Heads-of-Government meeting,
including:
- (1)
- The general U.S. attitude toward the purposes of the meeting and the objectives which the U.S. would seek to achieve, taking into account: British and French objectives; estimated Soviet objectives, immediate and long-term; existing or anticipated Soviet proposals and possible U.S. proposals which might be introduced at such a meeting.
- (2)
- Maintenance of a U.S. posture of strength and confidence before, during and after such a meeting.
- (3)
- Disarmament (incorporating any Council decisions based on the progress report on May 26, 1955 of the Special Assistant to the President on Disarmament).
- (4)
- European security, including the U.S. position toward Germany; a neutral belt of European states and its impact on trade with the Soviet bloc; the status of satellite countries; and the activities of the international Communist movement.
- (5)
- The U.S. position on Far Eastern issues which might be raised, including the basis for U.S. opposition to a Five-Power meeting.
- c.
- Noted that the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs would coordinate the above-directed Planning Board activities with the Counselor of the Department of State, who would be responsible for coordinating the arrangements for the Four-Power meeting.