Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Austrian State Treaty; Summit and Foreign Ministers Meetings, 1955, Volume V

118. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, May 20, 1955, 2 p.m.¹

Washington, May 20, 1955, 2 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Meeting of the Chiefs of Government

PARTICIPANTS

• The Secretary
• Mr. Murphy
• Mr. MacArthur
• Mr. Merchant
• Mr. Bowie
• Mr. McCardle
• Mr. Beam
• Mr. Vedeler
• Mr. Lyon
• Mr. Reinstein

The Secretary approved Mr. MacArthur’s proposal that the Chiefs of Government should meet for four days, July 18–21, and that the Foreign Ministers of the Four Powers should meet on July 16 to arrange procedures before their chiefs gather. After discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of several sites, it was agreed that the US would initially propose Lausanne, with a fall-back position of Geneva. The US will propose that the delegations themselves will be composed of the Heads of Government, the Foreign Ministers, the Ambassadors to Moscow, such experts as are needed, plus press and communication personnel.

The Secretary also approved proposing to the British and French a tripartite meeting of the Foreign Ministers in New York on June 16–17 prior to the UN ceremonies in San Francisco, and agreed to the proposal that a Tripartite Working Group begin its work in Washington on June 8. The Secretary asked that Mr. MacArthur clear these matters with the President during his conversation on Monday,² and also mention the complications attendant on the mid-June Foreign Ministers’ meeting in New York and the San Francisco ceremonies: namely, French elections, the relocation test and Queen Elizabeth’s State Visit to Norway.

Mr. Merchant reported that the Swiss Minister here visited him yesterday inquiring about the Secretary’s activities during his recent trip to Europe and that during this conversation he had asked whether a site had been chosen for the Summit meeting.³ Mr. Merchant told him that Geneva and Lausanne were both under consideration and sought the Minister’s view as to his Government’s reaction. The Swiss Minister said if all four nations agreed on a site in Switzerland, he felt certain that his Government would be pleased to play host.

In a further discussion of administrative facilities in the two Swiss cities, the Secretary noted reports that both UNESCO and the Peaceful Uses Conference would be in session in Geneva in the latter part of July. He agreed that Lausanne would be the initial US proposal, but went on to say that the purported public sentiment against Geneva did not weigh heavily with him.

Mr. Beam was asked to draft the follow-up note to the Soviets. In this connection the Secretary emphasized there is to be no formal agenda for the Chiefs of Government meeting. The Secretary pointed out that, although the schedule would be crowded, if the meeting could not be held on the dates we proposed, it would have to be set back a full month since it would be necessary for the President to be in Washington for ten days before and ten days after the recessing of Congress to discharge his constitutional duties.

Mr. Merchant noted that it was not certain that Foreign Minister Macmillan would attend the ceremonies at San Francisco. The Secretary asked that Mr. Merchant check this matter with Ambassador Makins.

The Secretary asked Mr. Bowie what he knew of Governor Stassen’s disarmament plan. Mr. Bowie replied, although the plan was still fuzzy, it provided essentially for a freeze on armaments; that is, a standstill agreement. Mr. Bowie was unable to say whether such an agreement would resemble the Korean one.

Mr. Merchant presented to the Secretary a paper prepared in EUR entitled “Reunification of Germany”,⁴ After reading it the Secretary said that the meetings of the Chiefs of Government would not deal with substantive issues. It would determine what issues the four nations would discuss and how, when and where they would be discussed. He said that he foresaw the German issue being assigned to the Foreign Ministers as a problem for a subsequent meeting with the three Western Allies consulting fully with the Federal Republic during the course of the meeting, while the Soviets did the same with the representatives of the German Democratic Republic.

Mr. Merchant pointed out that the Soviets might well introduce concrete proposals at the Summit meeting which are of such a nature that we must react almost at once. The Secretary said he expected that the Soviets will have staked out their position with great care and precision and may try to dominate the meeting from the propaganda standpoint. Mr. Merchant agreed and observed that such action by the Soviets might also give their proposals a degree of priority at the Foreign Ministers level. The Secretary commented that this is one of the inherent disadvantages in being one of three. The three Western Allies cannot hope to reach agreement on non-substantive issues of such moment on such short notice. Mr. MacArthur said that if there is no fundamental agreement among the three Allies, the Soviets can drive a wedge between us. Mr. Bowie expressed his concern, saying that the Soviets would very likely expound their point of view either orally or in written proposals while the three Western Chiefs of Government either sat at the table tongue-tied or accepted the lure and began to discuss these grave issues without adequate coordination.

Mr. Bowie asked whether it would be possible to discuss the German reunification problem without also going into the problems of European security and disarmament. He said he could foresee a considerable discussion of these topics by the Chiefs of Government solely to determine the nature and extent of the problem which they would delegate to their Foreign Ministers. In this connection he pointed out that Governor Stassen’s disarmament survey would very probably not be cleared by the US Government on all levels before mid-July.

The Secretary said he felt there was need for talking papers on the following subjects:

1. Germany.

This would not be difficult to prepare since there was adequate material available in the Berlin Conference file.

2. Disarmament.

A paper on this subject must await Governor Stassen’s report.

3. Level of armaments and forces.

4. Status of the satellites.

5. Extension of WEU controls into Eastern Europe.

In reply to Mr. Bowie’s query as to how the German paper was to be prepared, the Secretary said that the Chiefs of Government were meeting not to discuss the substance of these issues but to find new paths and new approaches to these subjects. We shall need to prepare counter-statements to use if the Soviets resort to a propaganda offensive.

Mr. Bowie observed that the possibility remained that the Soviets would put forth proposals for other than propaganda purposes and that in that event we must be careful to maintain an atmosphere so that they know they can conduct further fruitful discussions with us. In Mr. Bowie’s opinion the nub of the problem is what price will we and our Allies pay to get the Soviets out of the satellite states. JCS studies basic to this point were scheduled for completion June 1.

Mr. Murphy contrasted the brief period planned with the six weeks spent at Moscow in 1946–47 discussing only Germany. The Secretary said that we shall need alternate courses of action to deal with either a serious Soviet approach or a propaganda contest. Propaganda ammunition could be found in abundance in the Berlin conference record. A three-or four-page “Atoms for Peace” talking paper would be useful. Another subject which should be covered is “Why the US will not agree to a Five-Power Meeting including Communist China”. The Secretary went on to say when we talk with the Soviets on the subject of relaxing international tensions we should mention not only Germany and the conduct of Communist China but stress the status of the satellite states over which the USSR presides as a jailer and the international Communist apparatus which seeks to overthrow our governments. If the USSR would abandon such foreign adventures and look instead to raising the living standards of its own people, international tension could be reduced.

1. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 471. Secret. Copies of this memorandum were circulated as PMCG MC–1, dated May 23; a set of the PMCG MC is ibid.
2. See footnote 1, infra.
3. A memorandum of Merchant’s conversation with the Swiss Minister is in Department of State, Central File 396.1/5–1955.
4. Not found in Department of State files.