116. Telegram From the Secretary of State to the Department of State1
Dulte 46. Eyes only Acting Secretary from Secretary for President.
“Dear Mr. President:
“Have just finished Four-Power dinner during which we discussed many serious matters.2
[Page 181]“I talked alone with Molotov about the China situation. He said it was very complicated. I referred to the menacing build-up of air-power and said he must know about it because it was being done with Soviet equipment. Molotov said this was purely a Chinese internal affair. I said we were exerting influence on the Chinese Nationalists and they should exert a comparable influence on the Chinese Communists. I said that we needed a situation where as in Germany, Korea and Vietnam, it was agreed that unification would not be sought by force. Molotov said they wanted peace. He suggested a Five-Power conference. I said a Six-Power conference would be better. He said the Chinese Communists would not meet with the Nationalists. I said we would not meet with the Communists without the Nationalists. I urged him to think about a way of solution, and he said he would do so. I said to communicate with us either through our Ambassador at Moscow or their Ambassador at Washington.
“I do not feel that much concrete progress was made, but I think that the Soviets may as a result of our talk put increasing pressure upon the Chinese Communists to avoid war.
“We discussed at great length the invitation to a Four-Power conference. On behalf of the three Western powers I explained the philosophy underlying it. Molotov seemed generally to agree. We also agreed that none of the heads of government would be excluded from bringing up any topic which he thought called for solution.
“One of Molotov’s most significant remarks was that they would propose a Five-Power conference. This clearly indicated that they would not stipulate that this first Four-Power conference should itself be a Five-Power conference.
“We discussed time and place. Molotov pressed insistently for Vienna. The three Western powers stoutly opposed this. We gave as the reason that we could not hold a conference in a country which would still be occupied. Actually we feel that it would have a very disastrous effect upon Germany if Vienna, as a reward for becoming neutral, should instantly be made a center of European activity, including discussion of the future of Germany. We strongly urged Switzerland.
“Molotov said to me privately as he left that our refusal to accept Vienna would make serious difficulties. My own feeling is they will accept Switzerland, though he indicated they would want Geneva rather than Lausanne because they have no consular facilities at Lausanne.
[Page 182]“As regards date, I said that without talking to you, I could not say whether or not it would be possible to have a date prior to the adjournment of Congress. The middle of July might perhaps be possible enabling you to return before Congress adjourned or else a date in August after Congress adjourned. He did not indicate that either period would be impossible, and I gather there is considerable flexibility as to time.
These are the highlights as I dictate them early Sunday morning. The rest I can tell you on my return.
“Faithfully yours,
“Foster”
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 110.11–DU/5–1555. Top Secret.↩
- The conversations took place during and after a dinner given by Secretary Dulles for the other three Foreign Ministers on May 14 at Ambassador Thompson’s residence. Memoranda of the discussion of a Four-Power Conference, summarized below, and on Indochina, disarmament, and the Berlin Autobahn tax, are ibid., Conference Files: Lot 60 D 627, CF 445. For two other brief accounts of the dinner, see Tides of Fortune, pp. 599–600, and Merchant, Recollections, pp. 3–4.↩