67. Letter From the Secretary of State to Chancellor Adenauer1
My Dear Chancellor Adenauer: My letter to you of November 24, 19572 was, as it indicates, written prior to the concluding exchange of views which took place at my house with Dr. von Brentano, Ambassador Blankenhorn, and Ambassador Krekeler.
[Page 212]At that meeting we discussed further the problem of NATO “consultations”.
I made a point which no doubt will be reported to you, but which is so important that I want to speak to it myself.
Under present conditions, and with a man of Khrushchev’s temperament at the head of affairs in Russia, there is a great likelihood of Communist “probing” operations in Europe (e.g. Berlin), the Middle East, and the Far East. These probing operations will be designed primarily to test United States will, and to see whether recent Soviet developments such as sputniks and the potential intercontinental missile have now made the United States less willing to defend wherever our allies may be threatened.
It is of the nature of a probing operation that in the first instance it is exploratory, involving no committal of prestige. If it encounters a quick, strong response, then the probe ceases.
If, however, there is no such quick response, the inference is that the opposition is indecisive. The probe then grows into an operation of a different character. The prestige of the prober becomes committed, and what would otherwise be a minor incident becomes grave.
Since it is a fact that the determination and will of the United States has not wavered in the slightest, it is of the utmost importance that we be in a position to make this evident to the Soviet or Chinese probers. Delay, and an appearance of indecision, could have serious consequences and increase the likelihood of a major conflict.
I pointed out during our talks on Saturday and Sunday that the United States is prepared to explain and discuss its general policy, as indicated above, at the NATO Council. And we are quite willing always to explain why we did what we have done. But I do not think it is in the common interest to adopt a formula so rigid that it would disenable us from reacting quickly to a probe. That might be the case if we were committed to submit any proposed reaction to prior consultation in the NATO Council. And I might add if such consultations were deemed by us to be consistent with the general welfare, other demands would arise. The result would be a false appearance of weakness and indecision which would encourage Communist boldness to a point which would really involve the risk of major war.
I said to Dr. von Brentano that our nations are in effect like a doctor prescribing a capsule for a patient. There are three necessary ingredients: consultation, capacity for quick action, and trust. The patient will die if we prescribe a capsule which has no content other than consultation and which excludes a capacity of quick action with a willingness to trust each other to some reasonable extent.
I can assure you that I do not think that such trust will be misplaced or that there will ever be any reckless action. There are [Page 213] always risks, but the greatest risk of all would be not to be able to react quickly to Sino-Soviet probing.
I know that consistently with this there can be a very large measure of useful consultation and follow-up information, and the United States is prepared to go to the limit in this respect.
We have been much disturbed over the last few days by the President’s illness. Happily, he is making such an almost miraculous recovery that it is now not wholly excluded that he should come to the NATO meeting. However, this should not be counted upon.
I was sorry to hear you were laid up with a cold. I hope it is nothing that will trouble you for long.
With every best wish, I am
Faithfully yours,