Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Western European Security and Integration, Volume IV

64. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, November 21, 1957, 4 p.m.¹

Washington, November 21, 1957, 4 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

• United States
  • The Secretary of State
  • Mr. Murphy
  • Ambassador Bruce
  • Mr. Elbrick
  • Mr. Gerard C. Smith
  • General Guthrie
  • Mr. Timmons
  • Mr. Reinstein
  • Mr. Reinhardt
• Federal Republic of Germany
  • Foreign Minister Dr. Heinrich von Brentano
  • Ambassador Blankenhorn
  • Ambassador Krekeler
  • Mr. Limbourg
• Interpreters
  • Mr. Weber
  • Mr. Charlick

The Secretary said he had already expressed, in the previous conversation in his home,² his great satisfaction that Herr von Brentano had been able to come to Washington for a discussion of the forthcoming NATO meeting. As he had said in his earlier discussion with Herr von Brentano, he knew that the two Governments were in agreement on objectives. It was useful to discuss how to give effect to these objectives. He know that the German Federal Government wished to contribute to the success of the NATO meeting. The United States wanted to learn of the German ideas. For his part, he would be glad to inform Herr von Brentano of the American ideas as they had developed to date.

Statement by Herr von Brentano

The NATO Meeting

Herr von Brentano suggested that he should begin by explaining the German ideas. He could say what the Federal Government and the Chancellor in particular thought about the NATO meeting. In doing so, he did not wish to prejudice the discussions which would take place at the NATO meetings. He thought it would be useful, however, to lay before the Secretary and members of his staff the general ideas of the German Government on the subject.

Herr von Brentano said that the meeting was awaited with great expectation by the free world. Much would be expected from the meeting. The German Government did not feel that the meeting should deal exclusively or even primarily with military matters. The NATO Governments should make clear that NATO desires to seek a peaceful solution to the problems confronting the world. Concrete ways should be found to reach these objectives. The declaration issued at the meeting should lay stress on the common purpose of the NATO countries in seeking freedom, independence, and the preservation of national integrity of all peoples. It should also refer to our relations with the Soviet Union. The public should be informed that the Heads of Government had come together not just because of technical developments but because of the failure of the disarmament talks. It should be made clear that the NATO Governments are ready to proceed with disarmament when agreement is reached on controls. Such a declaration would appeal not only to public opinion in the NATO countries, but also to the under-developed countries.

Herr von Brentano said that he would like to outline what the German Government thought could be done in the NATO Community. He suggested that the Eisenhower–Macmillan Declaration³ could serve as a model for the declaration to be issued at the NATO meeting. He thought that is should deal with the following points.

Political Consultation in NATO

The first was political consultation. Herr von Brentano said there should be no misunderstanding on this point. The NATO Governments must emphasize that they have a common policy and that more will be done in this field in the future than heretofore. It must be emphasized that NATO is more than a military alliance. He said that the Germans knew that consultation must be noncommittal as to certain areas. He did not feel that any institutional changes were necessary in NATO, nor did he contemplate that at the end of discussion in NATO there would be any voting. However, something must be done to remind the NATO Governments that they must do more. There must be no more unpleasant surprises. He suggested that Article 39 of the Bogota Treaty could serve as an example of what might be done.⁴ The provisions of this Treaty provided for effective consultation without committing governments beyond what could realistically be asked.

Herr von Brentano said that the powers of the permanent representatives to NATO should be enlarged. They should receive instructions from their governments which would enable them to engage in meaningful consultation. The powers of the Secretary General should also be enlarged as had been proposed last December. He should be authorized to get in touch with the individual member governments, to ask questions, and to take a greater degree of initiative.

Herr von Brentano said these steps would help to form a common policy and would remove the feeling which exists in many quarters that NATO is disintegrating. He said that reports which had been received from the Annual Review made clear that we could not go on as we had up to now. The Secretary asked Herr von Brentano to elaborate on this last remark. Herr von Brentano said that the reports which the German Government had received on the Annual Review were very depressing. There was a let-down in the military effort. In saying this, he did not omit the Federal Republic, which he recognized had neglected to do things in the past which should have been done. In the Annual Review one country after another was appearing to say that it could not do this and that. There is a lack of common will on the part of the Europeans to defend themselves. He remarked that they could not of course do this without American help.

Scientific Cooperation in NATO

Herr von Brentano said that the second main subject which should be dealt with was basic research. The French had made a proposal on this subject, for which he wished to express the support of the Federal Government. Great changes had taken place within the world. The Soviet Union has enormous resources of money and manpower. Fortunately, the United States also had such resources. Europe, too, could make a contribution in this respect, but the individual European states were too small to do this by themselves. They should therefore agree on a program of common research going beyond national boundaries. The center of this effort must, however, be the United States. Herr von Brentano said that this proposal was not put forward for selfish motives. It was essential that research, both basic and applied, be carried on. However, the Europeans could carry it on only in cooperation with the United States. He knew that there were difficulties of a legal character in the United States, but difficulties existed to be overcome.

Herr von Brentano said he had discussed this matter with Signor Pella, who was in agreement. He believed that the Benelux Governments would also agree. The idea was to establish a European center of armament research, which could be directed to those matters of particular interest to European countries. He cited by way of example the development of an intermediate range missile with a range of 2000 kilometers. Herr von Brentano said that the Europeans did not wish to compete with the United States, but rather to relieve the United States of some of its burdens. However, they could only do this with the help of the United States. He realized that the matter could not be settled at the NATO meeting. There was for example the question of the protection of security, which was extremely important. However, agreement should be reached on the principle. Its application could be worked out in a meeting of Foreign Ministers at a later time.

NATO Military Organization

Herr von Brentano said that the third principal point which should be dealt with at the NATO meeting was the subject of military organization. We should try to reach a greater measure of integration in some fields. For example, there still are separate French, Belgium, and Dutch air forces. He said this was medieval. We could no longer afford to have separate forces. More should be done also in the way of standardization of weapons. NATO could make recommendations and put pressure on the Governments to do more. There could be sharing of tasks. There should also be greater integration in training.

Herr von Brentano said that another subject in this field was that of the Supreme Command. He did not doubt the competence of the members of the Standing Group. However, they were too dependent on their governments. The Standing Group should be given greater independence. As matters now stand, they do not think in terms of the alliance as a whole.

Nuclear Weapons

Herr von Brentano said he also wished to speak about atomic weapons. He said that the Federal Republic does not want either now or in the near future to be released from its Treaty obligations. It does not want to produce ABC weapons.…

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Procedure at the NATO Meeting

Herr von Brentano said he would also like to make some comments on procedure to be followed at the NATO meeting. The Federal Republic thinks that the meeting should not take up the routine matters normally dealt with at the December Ministerial meeting. The Annual Review resolution should be approved before the meeting. He suggested that General Norstad should give a briefing on the present military situation and on the measures which needed to be taken. Finally, all member governments should give the Secretary General in advance of the meeting a basic outline of the proposals they would make.

Herr von Brentano said that he would give the Secretary on the following day a separate paper covering the points which he had outlined.

Statement by the Secretary

Declaration to be Issued at the NATO Meeting

The Secretary thanked Herr von Brentano for the expression of his views. He thought that his own thinking was very much in harmony with what Herr von Brentano had expressed. He said he would like to comment on some of the specific suggestions which had been made and perhaps to add a few thoughts of his own. The Secretary said he agreed it was of the utmost importance that the declaration to be made at the meeting should not deal exclusively with military matters and that it should indicate the great concern of the NATO Governments for the peace, independence, and welfare of all peoples. The world situation should be put in true perspective. People forget what has happened. They have heard a great deal of propaganda about NATO being an aggressor military bloc. We should explain again why NATO came into being. The primary reason was because the Soviets used their veto to prevent the Security Council from exercising its functions. Had the Security Council been able to function effectively, there would be no need for regional security organizations. The United Nations Charter had contemplated this possibility and had left open the alternative of the establishment of regional organizations. The immediate reasons for establishing NATO were, of course, the Soviet actions in Greece, Czechoslovakia, and Berlin and, following the signature of the Treaty but before the organization was established, the attack on the Republic of Korea.

The Secretary said that NATO was designed to meet the threats which had been made by the Soviet Union against various countries, a situation which had continued up to the present and to some degree had been intensified. One NATO country after another had been threatened with attack if it did not submit to the will of the Soviet Union. It was only for these reasons that the NATO countries had banded together to protect themselves.

The Secretary said that he thought there was another point which should be made in the declaration, which had been mentioned in the letter from Chancellor Adenauer which Herr von Brentano had given him. There had been brought together in this way in the Atlantic Community a group of countries which had ties which went back many centuries. They were bound together by ties of race, culture, and religion. We should look on this organization as something going beyond its original purposes and as a permanent drawing together of the nations of the North Atlantic Community. The dates which were specified in the Treaty were not really of significance. We should look on NATO as a more or less permanent organization.

Disarmament

The Secretary said that he thought the idea suggested by Herr von Brentano of referring in the declaration to the failure of the disarmament talks was a good one. We should make clear where the responsibility for this failure lies and our readiness at all times to agree to disarmament provided it is controlled and that there are no adverse political effects. He said that it was his own personal conviction, which he was not certain it was wise to reflect in the communiqué, that it was extremely difficult to bring about disarmament in the face of injustices in the world, such as the division of Germany. Such injustices, whether we like it or not, contain the germ or at least the possibility of war. The Eastern European countries are kept under control by the Soviet Union only by military might. Situations like this make it very difficult to see how agreement on disarmament can be reached. History indicates that one does not obtain disarmament unless there is confidence. Disarmament must be voluntary. It cannot be imposed. The Secretary cited the Washington Arms Conference as an example. The United States, which was desirous of disarmament, actually went below the armament levels fixed by the Treaty. Japan, on the other hand exceeded them, although this process was concealed. In this particular case, the limitations were rather simple and dealt with identifiable units.

The Secretary said it was his conviction that it was very difficult to separate the problem of limitation of arms from the settlement of some of the political problems which are a danger to the peace or, in the case of the Soviet Union, are the very reasons for the maintenance of armaments. However, it may be possible to find some areas where we could agree to some limited disarmament.

The Secretary said it would be impossible to go into this matter in detail at the NATO meeting. The declaration should say that we stand on the London position and should point out that disarmament rarely comes about in the kind of political situation which now exists or through a world body.

Negotiations with the Soviet Union

The Secretary said the declaration should also mention the obstacles in the way of negotiating a settlement with the Soviet Union in view of its long record of broken promises. There is a feeling in some countries, which is cultivated by Khrushchev and Soviet propaganda, that this is a terribly long and hard process and costs lots of money. People wonder why we can’t achieve relaxation of tensions some easier way. The difficulty is that the price which the Soviets attach is very high. In the case of Germany, the Secretary said he could not imagine an agreement except on terms which would give the Soviet Zone regime the possibility, even the probability, of controlling all of Germany. The Soviets terms would involve leaving all of Eastern Europe under their control. The conditions which they would require in the Far East would mean Soviet and Chinese Communist control over the Pacific area. Furthermore, we would have no assurance that they would not use these advances as a basis for going further. This was, in fact, what had happened at Yalta. They had been given an advanced position. They broke their promises and used this agreement as a basis for further advances.

The Secretary said there were some people in the West who were so eager for relief from burdens that they were inclined to engage in wishful thinking. We should take the occasion of the NATO meeting to make clear that we would like nothing better than to achieve tranquility. However, unless and until the Soviets showed more indication of willingness to observe their promises than they have in the past, it would be reckless indeed to look to such an approach as a solution to our problems.

Aid to Under-developed Areas

The Secretary said he thought the NATO meeting should also have a look at economic problems. He did not think that one should try to make NATO into an economic body. There were useful economic bodies such as the OEEC and the CSC already in existence, and there would soon be the Common Market and the Free Trade Area. He did not think that NATO would be a good instrument to use for giving aid to under-developed countries. It was under suspicion as being under the influence of the colonial countries. He thought it would be useful, however, to indicate the concern of NATO Governments that the new nations should be able to achieve economic independence; the declaration might call on the member governments to give assistance to these nations.

Cold War Aspects of Economic Problems

The Secretary said another subject which might be looked at was what might be called the cold-war aspects of economic problems. Perhaps something could be done to improve our organization for coping with such problems as Icelandic fish, Lebanese apples, and Sudanese cotton. These were situations where the action required in itself was not expensive but failure to act might be very expensive in terms of its cost to NATO. It might be useful to have a committee of NATO charged with this type of problem. The Secretary remarked that he was expressing largely his personal views. The staff work on the preparations for the NATO meeting had not been completed, and he was expressing thoughts which were novel to his associates, who would no doubt tell him they were not workable. While this might be so, he thought the discussion would be more fruitful if it proceeded in this vein.

Political Consultation in NATO

Turning to the subject of political consultation, the Secretary said that he thought progress had been made in this field as a result of the report of the Three Wise Men, but primarily as a result of the Suez crisis. This crisis was an object lesson in the results which could flow from some of our associates striking out on their own, knowing they could not count on our support. The United States had tried, perhaps not wholly adequately, to be loyal to the concept of political consultation. He thought we had contributed considerably to the process. We had tried to keep our representative in NATO fully informed, although we had not always been able to do so. No doubt we could do better. The Secretary said he had remarked to M. Pineau that this was a subject on which it was hard to prescribe rules. What is necessary is to make political consultation a habit. Acquiring this habit had its own problems for us in Washington. We were farther away from the Council than other countries.

The Secretary said he would welcome suggestions as to ways for more intimate consultation. However, he did not think we could or should be asked to consult to a degree which would make it impossible for us to act promptly and decisively in case of need. We would not act promptly and decisively except pursuant to policies known to our Allies. However, there are situations in which promptness is essential. We could not be tied down to such a degree that we could not act for a couple of weeks while leisurely consultation was going on in NATO. Sometimes within that time the situation would have developed to a point where the only remedy was general war. The enemy might be engaged in a probing action. If this were promptly met, he would draw back. If it were not dealt with promptly he might have committed his prestige to an extent which would make it difficult or impossible to draw back. The Secretary said he thought this point was of particular importance in relation to Berlin, which he regarded as a great danger spot. The Soviets were pushing at us more and more. The time might well come when we would have to act quickly and strongly in Berlin.

The Secretary pointed out that we have heavy responsibilities in other parts of the world. We had taken certain action, for example, in the Formosan Straits. He was aware of the fact that we had been criticized for doing so by some of our Allies. This criticism came from people who did not know the facts. As a result of what we did, the situation had been calm for two or three years, and Quemoy and Matsu were still being held. If, before we had acted in that situation, we had had to consult for a week or two, the whole area might have been lost.

The Secretary said that as he had stated previously, there was no aspect of our policy which we were not prepared to discuss and to be questioned on. However, when we had to act pursuant to these policies, we would have to have the confidence of our Allies that we would not act recklessly. We might act boldly, but we would not act recklessly.

The Secretary said he agreed that it would be desirable to increase the authority and stature of our representatives in NATO. This was somewhat harder for us than for the Germans, since it was difficult for the American representatives to return to Washington to attend meetings of the Cabinet and of the National Security Council. He thought it was also sound to enlarge the powers of the Secretary General. He did not think we would have to do much on this subject. M. Spaak, who was a dynamic personality, would do it himself.

The Secretary said there was one suggestion on which he would welcome Herr von Brentano’s views. It might be helpful if the Ambassadors of the NATO countries could meet with the Foreign Minister in a particular capital for consultation if a specific occasion for doing so arose. He said that if the need arose he would be prepared to meet with the NATO Ambassadors. No matter how capable the permanent representatives were and in our case we had capable representatives, there was no substitute in some circumstances for getting information first-hand, since everything could not be conveyed by cable. He thought that this procedure might be particularly applicable in Washington, London, Bonn, and Paris. In Paris, of course, the French Foreign Minister could meet with the permanent representatives in the Council.

NATO Military Organization

The Secretary said he was a little at a loss as to what to say on military matters. He would ask Mr. Smith to speak on the question of basic and applied research, since he was somewhat better posted on this subject. He did not wish to comment on matters of military organization in the absence of representatives of the Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Nuclear Weapons

As to nuclear weapons, the Secretary said it seemed to us that it would be a very wasteful use of our combined assets if at this stage one country after another were to undertake the long and expensive process of trying to make such weapons.…

. . . . . . .

Making these weapons is, of course, a very costly process. United States production was increasing both the quality and quantity. We were getting them clean and making them smaller. We were doing this at enormous cost and it would be folly for all the countries of NATO to attempt to do this.…

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Procedure at the NATO Meeting

With regard to the procedure at the NATO meeting, the Secretary said that the question of acting on the Annual Review prior to the meeting would be discussed again on the following Tuesday. He hoped that it would be decided to dispose of the Annual Review before the Heads of Government meeting. He thought that Herr von Brentano’s suggestion regarding General Norstad was a good idea. He believed that this sort of thing had been done before and thought we would go along with whatever the majority wanted. As to the declaration, it was important that work should be done in advance. The declaration could not be written in the last few hours of the meeting as is usually done with a communiqué. He thought that M. Spaak was perhaps preparing a draft for discussion by the permanent representatives. If it were to be done by one person, M. Spaak was probably the best choice. The Secretary said he hoped he could get to Paris a day or two before the meeting, perhaps on the previous Sunday. It might be useful if some of the Ministers were in Paris before the meeting and could work with Spaak.

Scientific Cooperation in NATO

The Secretary asked Mr. Smith to discuss scientific cooperation. Mr. Smith said that as he understood it, Herr von Brentano had referred to three principal areas: (1) basic research; (2) applied research; and (3) design of long-range missiles. He thought that these presented different degrees of difficulty. As to basic research, we were studying the report of the NATO Task Force. We were in general agreement with it and thought we could be quite forthcoming at the Paris meeting. The field of applied research involves problems of greater difficulty, but they were ones which we believed were manageable. He thought we would have proposals to make in this area. The third area presented even greater difficulties, although we felt that good results were well within the order of possibility. It would be quite ridiculous if we did not tap European and particularly German talent, in view of the role Germany had played in the missile field. On the other hand, there were other problems involving proprietary rights, for example. One should not expect too rapid progress. He said that the United States would approach this matter sympathetically at the meeting.

In addition, Mr. Smith said that reference had been made to a joint venture with the French and Italians. As to this point, he could only echo what the Secretary had said. He did not think that this would be an economical use of resources. He suggested that agreements under Section 144(b) of the Atomic Energy Act might be a more practical approach. He pointed out the problem of designing warheads for ballistic missiles was extraordinarily complex. It had taken the United States ten years to develop a warhead for the intermediate range missile. The Secretary asked how much money it had cost us, remarking that it was probably between ten and twenty billion dollars. Mr. Smith said that we would have to take our entire investment into account. He thought that the cost could reasonably be estimated at $12 billion.

An Exchange Between Herr von Brentano and the Secretary

German Military Build-up

The Secretary said that Herr von Brentano had spoken of the Annual Review. He had been frank enough to recognize that the Federal Republic had been delinquent to some extent in connection with its own build-up. He hoped that some reassurance could be given to the NATO meeting on this point. This was something which was always being thrown at NATO and at us, because we were to some extent partners of the Federal Republic. He hoped that something could be said on this subject by the Chancellor. A good many countries, including the United States, would want to hear what the Federal Republic was proposing to do.

Herr von Brentano said that General Norstad was satisfied with and agreed with the plans for the build-up of the German forces. However, the new German Minister of Finance had drawn a very serious picture of the German financial situation when the matter had come up. Herr von Brentano suggested that Herr Etzel should come to the United States and talk with the Secretary and with the Secretary of the Treasury on the subject. When the German build-up had been discussed in the Defense Council, it had been estimated that the cost for 1958 would be DM 14 billion, for 1959 DM 17 billion, and for 1960 DM 21 billion. This was to be compared with an existing budget level of DM 9 billion. It was not clear how these sums could be raised. They would have to be raised in part by increasing taxes. This might cause difficulties with Parliament, but the Federal Government was resolved to push forward with the build-up, not only because of its Treaty obligations but because it felt there was an urgent need for doing so.

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Relations between Regional Security Organizations

The Secretary said one suggestion we were thinking of was some way of interlocking the various regional security organizations. This could perhaps be done by having observers from the various organizations attend meetings of the other organizations. This would have both advantages and disadvantages. The fact of the matter was that the world is becoming interlocked. While it is possible to have local wars, there is a danger that a local war would give rise to a general war. The idea of observers had been suggested by one of the organizations. We had reached no conclusion about it and had mentioned it to no one else. In fact, it had not yet been carefully considered in our own Government. The Secretary said he did not know whether it was wise or not, but he thought it was worth considering.

Herr von Brentano said that this was a new proposal on which he was not prepared to comment. In general, he thought it was useful to have contacts between the organization and to exchange information. Some of the areas involved overlap. He thought the idea of observers was perhaps a good one.

Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles

The Secretary said he should perhaps say something about the question of supplying IRBMs to other NATO countries. As he had said in his conversation with Herr von Brentano at his home, long-range bombers will be the most effective means of delivery until 1960. The United States has marked superiority over the Soviets in this field. Our missile program will be making good progress in 1960. We could accelerate it somewhat. If this were done, it would be more for psychological than for military reasons. By extreme effort, we could accelerate it to a point where the missiles would be in production in a little over a year. This would be extremely costly, however, and whether it would be worthwhile to spend the necessary money to accelerate to that degree had not yet been decided.

The Secretary said that these missiles involve two aspects. One is the production of the missile itself and the other is the creation of an ability to use it, which involves both establishing necessary installations and training people in its use. The second matter is extremely expensive in itself.

The Secretary said he thought we should be in a position to supply IRBMs to NATO. We already have arrangements with the United Kingdom, which were made at Bermuda. We could make arrangements with other countries if SACEUR thought it desirable and if the country wanted it. Both of these conditions were essential. As he had said, the preparations for receiving and being able to use an IRBM were complicated and expensive, running into the tens of millions of dollars. It is a process which takes about a year from the time at which sites are selected. In the case of the United Kingdom, the period of preparation had not been completed. In response to a question from the Secretary, General Guthrie said that while no date had been set in the United Kingdom, the preparations might be completed however by the end by 1958.

The Secretary said there were therefore four problems: (1) the military question of where to place such missiles; (2) the question of political willingness to receive them; (3) the question of financing the heavy costs involved; (4) the preparation of the actual site for the missile and the training of personnel. The Secretary said that a decision on the model to be selected had not been reached. While there had been a tendency to put the decision off, the missile would be ready by the date when the balance shifts.

As far as NATO was concerned, the Secretary said he did not think there should be an elaborate discussion of this subject. The United States could perhaps indicate its willingness to supply these weapons and draw attention to the problems involved in receiving them.

Herr von Brentano said he was not an expert on this subject, but he knew that great doubt had been expressed as to the desirability of establishing fixed sites for such weapons in Germany. He pointed out that the warning time in Germany is only six minutes. It might be preferable to have mobile launching points. Herr von Brentano said that this matter had already been discussed with General Norstad.

The Secretary said that it was a very complicated problem. Some people think that sites should be in mountainous terrain while others think it should be in flat country. He said he wished to mention the subject in view of the fact that there had been a great deal of discussion about it. He also wished to emphasize the problems involved in receiving these weapons.

Information to the Press

It was agreed that the press would be informed that an exchange of views had taken place on the forthcoming NATO meeting and that the discussion would probably be continued after dinner and perhaps on the following morning.⁵

1. Source: Department of State, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199. Secret. Drafted by Reinstein on December 3.
2. See the memorandum of conversation, supra.
3. See footnote 6, Document 59.
4. Reference is to the Charter of the Organization of American States, concluded at the Ninth International Conference of American States at Bogotá, Colombia, on March 30, 1948.
5. See the memorandum of conversation, infra.