57. Telegram From the Political Adviser to the Chief of the United States Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Nolting) to the Department of State1
Polto 787. General Norstad and members his staff today gave thorough and impressive briefing to NAC at SHAPE headquarters on Allied Command Europe Minimum Force Requirements Study 1958–63.2 Stated volume I of study would be transmitted to delegations this evening; volume II, which contains more sensitive data, will be made available to NATO Def Ministers and International Staff. Following is attempt give highlights briefing and description general reaction of Perm Reps and International Staff.3 Will not attempt give figures or precise information contained in charts, as SACEUR specifically requested that no notes be taken of sensitive numerical data and attempt to summarize would be misleading. In general, we consider briefing extremely well done and effective. Several other delegations expressed similar reaction.
Norstad led off with account historical background of study, beginning with Political Directive,4 MC–14/2 and MC–48/2,5 and questions raised by WEU and by individual NATO countries. Said SACEUR’s 1958–63 requirements study contained background for answers to all questions addressed to him, although some questions not specifically answered in terms. In these cases, he would be glad to make specific answers if requested. Said WEU and individual country question all seemed to boil down to one, that is, do we need conventional forces in this nuclear age? To this his answer was unequivocally yes. He went on to describe SACEUR’s mission in terms existing NATO doctrine; then described Soviet threat, indicating main changes were in introduction atomic capability into Soviet forces and increasing strength submarine fleet.
Norstad then bore down on importance of shield forces, stressing relationship between shield and “conventional forces”. He described aspects of shield as (a) consisting of all services; (b) having a dual capability; and (c) being deployed in forward area. Functions of shield he described as (a) to defend peoples and territories; (b) to complete the deterrent; and (c) to provide “essential alternative” to employment of ultimate capability. This last point Norstad elaborated at considerable length, stressing that it was up to governments [Page 171] concerned to decide whether they wished to avoid situation in which, if NATO line were breached without use of force (which might be result of too thin a shield), they would have to make hard decision of being first to use force in order restore position. He stressed point that, if NATO has only token shield forces, NATO invites local action, and further, NATO would have to depend principally on massive retaliation. He stated frankly that he dwelt on these political questions because he wished it understood that SACEUR military study is based in part on interpretation of Political Directive and it was up to Council to tell him if he was wrong on these fundamental assumptions.
Norstad then spoke of importance of early warning of attack through intelligence sources, which he said had been somewhat improved since last November. Stressed SHAPE’s complete dependence on national sources of intelligence.
Progress of early warning radar and communications system was described as satisfactory, but alert system still has gaps which should be closed. On air defense, Norstad said that study reveals air defense system with limited aims, i.e., defense of key points, which is necessitated by staggering cost of blanket air defense.
On national service, he said study does not support conclusion reached in 1952 on uniform training and length of service, but indicates desirability more flexibility, although generally longer training is indicated because of more complex weapons. Dwelt at some length on concept of collective balance of forces, stating that very little progress had been made on this concept to date, but that now with new weapons NATO can make progress in this direction and thereby greatly conserve its resources.
SACEUR then turned briefing over to other SHAPE officers who, working from charts, described conclusions of study by services. Also gave interesting picture new logistic requirements developed on concepts nuclear war.
Air Marshal Constantine (United Kingdom) summarized, stating aim of study was to find minimum force requirements to carry out SACEUR mission through 1963 and to plan that this study represented his best military judgment of what the Alliance should have, tempered by acute awareness of limits on resources. It was up to governments, of course, to make the decisions implied by the study.