55. Message From the Secretary of State to Chancellor Adenauer1
I have received your message regarding the proposed reduction in British forces on the continent.2 I wholly share your concern regarding these proposals, particularly with regard to the possibility that they might be followed by actions in other countries. As you [Page 166] know, I discussed this matter with Foreign Minister von Brentano when he was in Washington two weeks ago.3 I pointed out to him that we must recognize that the British are under a serious economic and financial strain and that we had reluctantly and after much effort come to the conclusion that a reduction in British forces on the continent was unavoidable. It seemed to me that we should try to make the reduction as gradual as possible and as consistent as possible with the military views of SACEUR.
As you know, SACEUR has made certain recommendations with regard to the British proposals which he considers, if adopted, would go a long way toward mitigating the effects from a military viewpoint, provided that other countries maintain their force goals. I believe that, if it were publicly known that the British had generally met SACEUR’s views, this would do a great deal to avoid the psychological and political effects of the proposal which have concerned us all.
I feel that, after we have done all we can, we must make the utmost effort to avoid an open break over this matter, which I feel would have the most grave effects on the alliance. I doubt very seriously that the British would be able to agree to a postponement by a full year of their plans, as you have proposed. It seems to me that we must also consider what the effect would be of announcing a review of our over-all NATO defense position in the light of the British proposal. If the public gained the impression that the UK proposals raised issues of such seriousness, we might well have set in motion the very forces which we have been anxious in all of our considerations of the British proposals to avoid.
My own view is that we should reach an agreement now on the best position which we can get the British to accept. This I think will enable us best to preserve our unity. I hope that you will give these thoughts your most earnest consideration in connection with the instructions given to your representatives in London.4
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 740.5/3–1757. Top Secret. Transmitted in telegram 2539 to Bonn, March 17, with the instruction that it be delivered to Adenauer. Bonn was also instructed to add orally that the United States had unsuccessfully attempted “at the highest level” to postpone the British action.↩
- Reference is to a message from Adenauer to Dulles delivered to Murphy by Pauls of the German Embassy in Washington on March 15 in which the Chancellor again expressed his deep concern about the British plan to reduce forces in Germany. (Ibid., Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, German Officials with Dulles/Herter 1953–57) On February 12, Krekeler told Dulles he had been asked by Adenauer to find out what the U.S. position was regarding the proposed reduction of British forces in Germany and specifically whether the U.S. Government had agreed or disagreed with the proposals. (Memorandum of conversation by Reinstein, February 12, scheduled for publication in a forthcoming Foreign Relations volume.)↩
- Von Brentano visited Washington, March 3–7, for talks with U.S. officials on topics of mutual concern.↩
- On March 27, Krekeler delivered Adenauer’s reply. The Chancellor thanked Dulles for his letter indicating that the results of the WEU Council meeting in London, March 15–18, demonstrated to all participants the need to “keep their unity and solidarity alive.” Adenauer expressed the hope that further discussions in NATO would occur “in the same spirit and will lead to fruitful decisions.” (Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, German Officials with Dulles/Herter 1953–57)↩