Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Western European Security and Integration, Volume IV

37. Memorandum From the Secretary of State to the President¹

Washington, October 1, 1956.

SUBJECT

• United States Position on Review of NATO Strategy and Force Levels

I.

Following his conversation with you prior to departure for Europe, Senator George told the Foreign Ministers of Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg that the Administration would not withdraw any forces from Germany; that there might conceivably be some streamlining reducing the number of men in a division, but no overall reductions or withdrawals.² You will recall that prior to my departure for London on September 17,³ I reported this to you and asked whether this called for any corrective action.⁴ You thought not and confirmed that what Senator George had said was in accordance with your views. As you requested, I informed the Secretary of Defense accordingly.

When Senator George saw Chancellor Adenauer in Bonn on September 28, he said he wished to give the Chancellor the complete assurance of the President that there is no intention of withdrawing or reducing our forces so long as their presence is agreeable to the Germans and to the rest of the NATO group.⁵

Pressures in the North Atlantic Council for the immediate commencement of a review of political guidance to the NATO military authorities have now become irresistible, and our failure so far to present the United States position has generated much doubt and confusion as to U.S. intentions and purposes. There has been a serious deterioration in the situation, which, if uncorrected, can have a serious adverse effect on the whole NATO structure.

It is therefore proposed that the United States position be stated promptly in the North Atlantic Council. Prior thereto, we are obligated to present our views to the British, who have proposed a major reduction in NATO conventional forces.

II.

Our presentation to the Council and to the British would be based on the following:

1. The NATO military mission now includes the defense of the NATO area against all types of aggression, including any local attack, by a satellite force for example. The maintenance of an effective shield for these purposes must include sufficient conventional ground forces to avoid inflexibility.

2. Accordingly, we find unacceptable any proposal which implies the adoption of a NATO strategy of total reliance on nuclear retaliation.

3. Despite reports to the contrary, the United States has no present plan for withdrawing divisions from Europe. In the light of developments in matériel and techniques, a streamlining of forces appears desirable and will permit economies in manpower without weakening NATO’s defensive strength.

4. The United States will continue to carry out its undertakings of October 1954 to “continue to maintain in Europe, including Germany, such units of its armed forces as may be necessary and appropriate to contribute its fair share of the forces needed for the joint defense of the North Atlantic area while a threat to that area exists, and will continue to deploy such forces in accordance with agreed North Atlantic strategy for the defense of this area.”⁶

What constitutes a “fair sharing” of burdens among the members of NATO is not static. The burden on the United States of maintaining the nuclear deterrent, of assuring the defense of the North American portion of the North Atlantic Treaty area, and of maintaining naval forces to keep the sea lanes open, is steadily and rapidly increasing with the growing complexity and cost of these programs.

Accordingly, it seems only fair that the European nations should increasingly assume a greater share of responsibility for the ready forces required on the Continent to provide the shield which NATO strategy envisages.

5. We recognize the desirability of adjusting European thinking as rapidly as possible to the application of the “fair share” concept, but we would exercise discretion in the timing and nature of our presentation so as to avoid collapsing NATO as a result of any misconception of our purpose.

6. We would, however, urge a prompt restudy of the political and military situation by the NATO Permanent Representative with a view to assuring the fullest possible understanding by all NATO members of the current need and justification for the continued defense effort.

7. We believe that this review should be conducted by the Permanent Representatives, calling upon the NATO military authorities for advice as required. On the basis of the Permanent Representatives’ study, political guidance to the NATO military authorities should be agreed at the Ministerial Meeting in December.

8. In the course of the review, consideration should be given to urging the NATO military authorities to accelerate the adjustment of their plans to take account of modern weapons and techniques so as to reduce manpower and matériel requirements to the extent consistent with security.

9. Secrecy with respect to the conduct of the review is politically imperative until final conclusions are reached.

10. Under the current treaty limitations, we could not agree to the UK–French proposal regarding the role of NATO or its members in event of hostilities solely outside the NATO area.

III.

If you approve this course, we would immediately inform the British Ambassador on the basis of the foregoing and advise the UK of our intention to speak in the North Atlantic Council along the above lines at an early date. We would also inform the UK of our hope that they would accept our views, but that we feel it necessary to proceed promptly in the Council in any event. Shortly thereafter, the United States would make a statement in the North Atlantic Council on the basis of the foregoing.

John Foster Dulles

1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers. Top Secret; Personal and Private. Dulles sent a draft of this memorandum to the President as an enclosure to a letter of October 1. He had previously sent a copy of the memorandum to Wilson in a letter of September 13 and received Wilson’s comments in a letter of September 25. (Department of State, Central Files, 740.5/9–1356 and 740.5/9–2556, respectively) Wilson also sent his comments to the President in a memorandum entitled, “United States Position on the Review of NATO Strategy and Force Levels” a copy of which is attached to Wilson’s September 25 letter to Dulles. Wilson’s argument to both the Secretary of State and the President was that Dulles’ memorandum did not adequately reflect the position the Department of Defense felt it must take in planning for the succeeding 3 years. Wilson recommended a sizable reduction of both U.S. combat and support forces in Europe and preparation of plans for further reduction of combat divisions in Germany.

   The draft of the memorandum was discussed at the White House on October 2 and the memorandum of that conference with the President is printed infra. The memorandum as revised at the meeting and approved by the President on October 2 is printed here.

2. Senator George was in Europe from September 5 to October 16, 1956, discussing Alliance concerns with leaders in London, Paris, Bonn, and Rome. No record of George’s August 29 conversation with the President was found in Department of State files or the Eisenhower Library. While in Paris, George attended the NAC meetings and met with Pearson, Lange, and Martino, September 11–22, to discuss the answers which the member governments sent in reply to the Committee of Three’s questionnaire about ways to increase nonmilitary cooperation. Reports on his discussions are in the Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, and Department of State, Central Files, 740.5.
3. Dulles was in London, September 17–21, 1956, to attend the Second Suez Canal Conference.
4. Dulles’ September 17 memorandum of a conversation with the President that day is scheduled for publication in a forthcoming Foreign Relations volume.
5. A summary of this conversation in telegram 1233 from Bonn, September 28, is scheduled for publication in a forthcoming Foreign Relations volume.
6. For text of the Final Act of the London Nine- and Four-Power Conferences, September 28–October 3, 1954, see Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. v, Part 2, p. 1345.