251. Western European Chiefs of Mission Conference, Paris, May 6–8, 1957: Summary Conclusions and Recommendations1

I. NATO: Military and Political Aspects.

A.
National Attitudes Toward NATO Strategy and Defense Requirements; and
B.
Non-military Aspects of NATO, Including Particularly Development of Political Consultation.
1.
NATO is and remains under present circumstances the indispensable basis of U.S. policy in Western Europe. In spite of the difficulties that NATO has experienced, faith in NATO remains high on the part of the Western European member countries, who feel that collective defense is the only possible defense.
2.
It is felt that from the political point of view, NATO strategy is well adapted to the requirements of the situation. It places primary emphasis upon deterring aggression. It is vital that one of the fundamental political bases of the Alliance—that in event of aggression the territory of all the members will be defended—be maintained. An adequate shield of ground, air and sea forces, including an American contribution, with flexible capability, in necessary. Anything less than an adequate shield would have grave effects on NATO unity.
3.
The member countries of NATO have a need for the clearest and most convincing exposition possible of the NATO strategic concept and the nature of the forces required to implement this concept, in order to strengthen domestic support for NATO and the military expenditures entailed in meeting NATO goals. Considerable confusion has arisen from recent discussion of nuclear defense versus conventional defense needs. The studies on those subjects that SACEUR has put in hand at the request of the North Atlantic Council should be extremely helpful.
4.
A German contribution to NATO remains vital. In this connection, it was noted that the neutralization of Germany in connection with reunification, or otherwise, might be fatal to the Alliance, not only because NATO could not produce sufficient shield forces without a German contribution but also because German territory is itself essential to the conduct of NATO strategy. Having in mind the bearing which the forthcoming election2 will have on the future attitude [Page 601] of Germany towards NATO, it is important that Western European countries exercise extreme care in their pronouncements affecting Germany.
5.
The steady increase in political consultation in the North Atlantic Council was welcomed as a major contribution to cohesion in the Alliance and, in particular, as an important means of gaining understanding of and support for U.S. policies. Increased consultation can be used as a means of giving support to friendly governments. It was recognized that further efforts are required to develop procedures whereby member countries can increase the scope, depth and timeliness of political consultation in NATO.

IIA. National Attitudes Toward United States Foreign Policy With Regard to East-West Relations.

1.
Reactions of the Western European countries represented at the Conference to United States policies with regard to East-West relations fall, in general, under three broad headings: (1) reaction to overall United States attitudes, (2) reaction to cultural and other exchanges and (3) reactions to East-West trade problems.
2.
It was the consensus of the meeting that there is fundamental support and sympathy for overall United States attitudes in regard to the Soviet threat to the extent that it is generally believed that they will be effective in opposing the expansion of Soviet Communism. This feeling has been generally sharpened and focused by the recent events in Hungary which once more put into perspective the true nature of Soviet Communism.
3.
Events in Hungary also dampened previous enthusiasms for cultural and other exchanges, although there remains cautious interest in the subject of cultural exchanges, particularly with the satellites, in certain of the countries of Western Europe. It was the sense of the Conference that the countries of Western Europe should be encouraged to be selective in their cultural exchanges with the satellites. Less showy exchanges are more advantageous to the West, and particularly student exchanges provided that the students are carefully selected.
4.
There is, however, an almost universal lack of sympathy in Western Europe for United States policies regarding East-West trade controls with a correspondingly widespread interest in the possibilities of trade with the Eastern European bloc and with Communist China. With the possible exception of Spain, there is an overwhelming desire to suppress the China trade control differential3 and a [Page 602] feeling that United States policies in this regard tend to continue to be too rigid. Interest in increased trade with China does not yet, however, go so far at the present time as to dispose the countries of Western Europe to pay the political price for this supposed benefit currently being demanded by the Chinese Communists.

IIB. National Attitudes Toward United States Foreign Policy With Regard to the Immediate interests of the Country Concerned.

1.
It was evident from the discussions among the Chiefs of Mission present at the Conference that the fundamental bases of the Western Alliance and of the Western community of interest remain firm and sound. Where it is evident that United States policies serve to further the welfare and interests of the Western community as a whole, there is, generally speaking, support and sympathy for those policies. This is particularly true in the case of the smaller countries, such as the Netherlands, who, however, do not hesitate to criticize sharply the manner in which those policies are carried out should they feel inclined to do so. United States policies are inevitably viewed from the perspective of the particular national interests of each country and the reactions of these countries are conditioned to a large extent by their own vital concerns. Austria, for example, while basically in sympathy with United States objectives, is affected by its exposed and vulnerable position and its status of neutrality and thus from time to time is inhibited from espousing openly United States courses of action which might be embarrassing to it. The reactions of Germany, as another example, are conditioned among other things by the great desire for German reunification.
2.
Although the bases of the Western community of interest remain sound, there are points of friction where United States policies have been in conflict with what are regarded to be the vital national interests of individual countries. The policy of the United States in regard to the Suez crisis has left deep and sensitive scars in France and in the United Kingdom. There is widespread dissatisfaction in Western Europe with what is regarded as United States relative inaction in the Hungarian crisis, although no very specific alternatives were suggested by the critics. A certain resentment was reported as existing in a number of countries that the United States treats its friends worse than it treats its enemies. There is some criticism of United States policies in varying degrees in every country of Western Europe depending upon the impact of those policies on specific national interests. Some representatives reported that there was criticism of American foreign economic policy, particularly in connection [Page 603] with resort to the escape clause.4 There is considerable reservation on the part of a number of Western European countries concerning United States policies insofar as they appear to be based upon a reliance on the United Nations which many believe to be weighted against their interests. Most of these points of friction are not, however, considered to be acute and appear to be susceptible to amelioration with time, understanding, and patience. It was the consensus of the Conference that many points of friction can be avoided or diminished by a concerted and continued effort on the part of the United States to carry out a policy of prior consultation with its allies, wherever possible or of keeping them informed of the grounds for American actions which affect their individual interests.

III. National Attitudes Toward Soviet Foreign Policy and Relations With the USSR, Including Estimates of Role of Local Communist Party.

1.
It was the consensus of the meeting that all countries of Western Europe are now displaying a firm attitude towards Soviet foreign policy. In the case of such countries as Spain and the Netherlands, this firmness has been constant, the Spanish regarding their civil war as a war against the Reds, and the Dutch having been concerned over what they considered to be past British and French softness and fear of possible American softness towards the Soviet Union. Everywhere, firmness has been increased by the impact of the Hungarian revolution. Soviet penetration of the Middle East induced a further stiffening of the British and French attitudes. In Italy, if a Gronchi-dominated government is formed, there may be some relaxation in its strong pro-Western orientation. Neutral Switzerland interprets its neutrality in a manner permitting flourishing relations with West Germany, but no relations with East Germany. Swiss neutrality, which bears no resemblance to neutralism, is combined with a sense of identity with the West.
2.
On the question of cultural exchanges with the East, it was pointed out that while the Austrian government was split on the issue of exchanges with the Soviet Union, it favored exchanges with the satellites, particularly with Poland and Yugoslavia. Embassy Vienna is inclined to favor these exchanges with the satellites since the Austrians know the countries and would be unlikely to be impressed by what they saw, as they might be in the Soviet Union. Moreover, it is believed there is a role Austria could play. The French, who cut off cultural exchanges after the Hungarian Revolution, [Page 604] are resuming them, but on a restricted and controlled basis. They also are interested primarily in encouraging such relations with the satellites, where they feel the historical role of French culture gives them a special advantage. The Dutch, on the other hand, have had very few cultural exchanges, and the Swiss have cut down sharply, largely because individual organizations that are invited to the Soviet Union have simply refused the invitations. It was pointed that the Secretary had indicated that the Department’s policy is to resume a modest program of exchanges with the Soviet Union, but to concentrate largely on the satellites. It is understood, however, that other countries, such as Austria, may be in a different situation. Embassy Moscow warned that the type of exchange favored by the Soviets, spectacular mass exchanges, are of greater advantage to the Soviet Union than to us, since they tend to make people think there is an identity of views between the U.S. and the USSR. On the other hand, smaller, less spectacular exchanges are of benefit to both countries.
3.
The Communist parties of Austria, Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal and Switzerland were described as small and with virtually no influence. The British Communist Party, while small in itself, has probably infiltrated through trade unions into industry to a greater extent than is generally admitted but the British tend to believe they can control the situation in their own way, without sacrificing civil liberties. While there is limited clandestine Communist activity in Spain, it is probably of little significance, and in general anarchism fits the Spanish temperament better. Italy has the largest Communist Party outside the Iron Curtain. There seems to have been a recent reduction in party strength, however, and there has been a definite weakening of Communist control over the labor movement. The Party remains Stalinist, but less so than the French Party. The French Communist Party is one of the largest and most powerful CPs. It has been in gradual decline since the war, but remains important. Hungary represented a serious blow to it, but affected the Party’s fringes more than its central core. It has lost many of the leftist intellectuals who gave it its aura of respectability, but its apparatus has not been affected. It remains thoroughly Stalinist and most loyal to the Soviet Union. Its working class support has been shaken by the Hungarian Revolution, but we can probably expect the Party to recoup by concentration on day-to-day economic issues which affect the French worker much more directly than do events in Hungary.

IV. Prospects for European Unity and Cooperation.

1.
The concept of European integration is the most constructive idea to be developed in European political philosophy in the 20th [Page 605] Century and perhaps during an even longer period of time. It is in the U.S. interest not only that the two current projects, the Common Market and Euratom, be carried through, but—of far greater importance—that the momentum be maintained until a political and economic community has been developed in Europe which will enable that area to play the important role in world affairs for which it is so well equipped by its talents and resources. The attainment of this goal depends in large measures upon the British outlook. Without the United Kingdom as an active associate, there might be a reappearance of political rivalries among the major Continental participants—particularly between France and Germany—that have proved so disruptive in past European history.
2.
The political consensus within the Community of Six is that the Common Market and Euratom treaties will be ratified by all the signatories. The ratification process will get under way in all countries before the various national Parliaments recess for their summer vacations, and a number of observers predict that in some countries full approval will be obtained by July. However, it appears likely that the ratification process will not be completed in all countries until some time in the autumn.
3.
In discussing the ratification time table with responsible government officials in the six countries, U.S. representatives should informally urge as appropriate the desirability of early action. Formal negotiations on the terms of the contemplated U.S. association with Euratom cannot begin until the Euratom Treaty has been put into effect.
4.
The continued progress of the Six towards integration will constitute an important pole of attraction for other European countries. Denmark has already felt these influences, because of its dependence on CSC steel and its competiton with the Netherlands in the field of agriculture. Austria and Switzerland are faced with a special problem in this respect because of their neutral status. The Swiss are confident of their ability to work out arrangements with the European Community on a practical basis, similar in character to their arrangements with the ECSC.
5.
At the present time the policy of the United Kingdom towards European unity and cooperation is in a state of flux. One part of the U.K. Government, including Macmillan and Thorneycroft,5 appear genuinely interested in European integration and hope to work out British association with this movement through the Free Trade Area. Other parts, including the Foreign Office and the Treasury Officials, are not as clearly enthusiastic about such and association.
6.
The Grand Design seems to be a project launched by the Foreign Office in an effort to redress British prestige in Europe. It was not well though out, and by proposing an amalgamation of several parliamentary bodies of diverse powers and purposes, is open to serious questions.

V. The Colonial Question and the United Nations.

1.
The colonial question is a particularly important one. The colonial areas and former colonial areas of Africa and Asia have become a major battle-ground of the cold war. The economy of Europe is heavily dependent on commercial ties with the colonies and former colonies, and colonial problems frequently complicate the relations of the United States with its friends and allies in Western Europe.
2.
Major considerations which influence U.S. policy on colonial issues are: a) public opinion in the United States; b) the conclusion or judgment by the U.S. Government that the anti-colonial tide is irresistible; c) concern for the interests and sensitivities of our allies; and d) concern for the strength, well-being and long-range political orientation of the emerging, newly independent states. The recent rapid acceleration in the pace, timing, and schedule of movement toward independence, combined with the tendency to extremism on the part of the new states, has reached a point which we consider sometimes to be dangerous to the interests of our allies and to the future of the emerging states themselves.
3.
From the point of view of many of the countries of Western Europe, there was reported to be a widespread feeling that the United States tends to be too moralistic in its attitude toward colonial problems and toward the United Nations. There is anxiety and concern that the United States is inclined to be precipitous in supporting the aspirations for independence of newly emerging states before they are in a position to fulfill all their obligations, that we push too hard and expect too much of the emerging states, and that we are over-ready to accept as full and equal members of the United Nations states which have not yet demonstrated beyond all reasonable doubt their ability to govern themselves and to discharge their international responsibilities.
4.
In this connection, it was pointed out that several of the Western European colonial powers, such as Belgium and France, as well as the United Kingdom, are making heartening progress in preparing their African territories for eventual self-government and independence. A delicate problem lay in the task of encouraging these powers to stay ahead of the tide of nationalism without appearing in their eyes to be advocating the premature granting of independence to areas not yet ready for it.
5.
The recent admission to the United Nations of many newly emerged states as full and equal members has caused disquiet and alarm among many of the nations of Western Europe. This alarm has been intensified by what has appeared to them to be a tendency on the part of the United States, especially in recent months, to subordinate its independence of action in foreign policy to a world organization which we no longer control. To some of the countries of Western Europe, the U.S. has appeared to be abdicating the making of foreign policy to the UN when we have no firm policy of our own to cover the situation. They are fearful that we may be in the process of losing our freedom of action to an organization which no longer represents Western civilization and in which, in the absence of a system of weighted voting, small and inexperienced nations may decide grave issues the consequences of which they themselves do not have to bear.
6.
It was the feeling of the Conference that the United States should faithfully maintain its support of the United Nations. We and other countries should continue to use the United Nations for the settlement of disputes where such a procedure would serve a useful purpose. This reliance on the United Nations should not be exclusive; however, an emphasis should be placed on the possibilities of the use of regional organizations for the settlement of disputes wherever appropriate, a procedure envisaged by the United Nations Charter.
7.
In regard to the colonial question, it was the view of the Conference that the United States should not support the creation of independent states until it has become satisfied of their capacity for self-government. Nor should the U.S. support the candidacy for membership in the United Nations of a newly independent state until such a state has demonstrated its ability to fulfill beyond any reasonable doubt the requirements for membership in that organization.

(Note: Because of lack of time, the Summary Conclusions and Recommendations concerning Agenda Item V, The Colonial Question and the United Nations, were not formally cleared and approved by the Chiefs of Mission Conference.)

  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 120.1451/5–857. Secret. Transmitted to the Department of State in an unnumbered despatch from Paris, May 8.
  2. A general election took place in the Federal Republic of Germany on September 15.
  3. Reference is to the difference between trade controls as applied to the People’s Republic of China and as applied to the Soviet Union and its Eastern European satellites.
  4. Section 6 of the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951, popularly known as the “escape clause”, provided that whenever an imported product threatened to cause serious injury to domestic manufacturers, all tariff concessions on that product would be withdrawn. For text, see 65 Stat. 74.
  5. Peter Thorneycroft, British Chancellor of the Exchequer.