Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Western European Security and Integration, Volume IV

249. Verbatim Minutes of the Western European Chiefs of Mission Conference, Paris, May 6, 1957¹

Paris, May 6, 1957

The following is verbatim text of the opening session of the Chiefs of Mission Conference, May 6, 1957, at 10:00 a.m.

Ambassador Houghton: Mr. Secretary and distinguished guests. I believe it says in the Bible that the first will be last and the last will be first, and this is ample evidence that the Ambassador will be first to talk. I assure you it will be very brief as we have a full agenda. What I do wish to say is that it is a great pleasure for me to welcome you all to Paris. All of us here in the Embassy hope that you will call on us if there is anything that we can do to make your stay here pleasant and we are hopeful, of course, that this meeting will be both rewarding and enjoyable.

We have the great honor of Secretary Dulles honoring us at the opening meeting. Without further ado, Mr. Secretary, I shall turn the meeting over to you.

Secretary of State Dulles: I am very happy indeed that this meeting coincided with the NATO Meeting so that I might be able to be here.² It is the first time in the last four years, I think, that I have attended any such meeting. Perhaps these meetings have not been held as frequently as it might be desirable. I hope that if this meeting proves useful there can be more of them. I will talk for a few minutes, if I may, and if you have some questions. If we don’t finish the questions this morning, I will try to come back for a while this afternoon.

First of all, I want to refer to the foreign policy speech which I made on April 22 a couple of weeks ago.³ I know that you all have a great deal of reading matter and are in the main kept busy by the particular problems of the day, but I do want to suggest that when occasionally speeches of that kind are made that you try to find the time to study them if you can rather carefully, because they are very carefully studied at home before they are made and deserve, I think, considerable study by our ambassadors as indicating the basic principles on which we try to operate our foreign policy. A speech like this, I suppose, goes through about 15 drafts. The speech had been gone over by the President in one of its early drafts and then he went over the next to final draft again. Every word in it was carefully weighed and there is, I think, more in it than is apparent in casual reading. I mention this not because I am the primary author of this speech and am trying to develop a captive audience but, I think, from the standpoint of basic philosophy these things are occasionally useful.

There is one passage in the speech which I could perhaps elaborate on a little bit because for reasons of policy we did not elaborate quite as fully as we might have. That is the section which deals with the principle of the United Nations Charter and our Suez Policy.⁴ We passed over somewhat lightly that section of the speech because we did not want to stir up certain differences which we hope will as quickly as possible be buried in the future cooperation. But there are some references there which perhaps can stand a little elaboration.

We said that our decision at that time was a hard decision, particularly the language which President Eisenhower chose to express that thought and, of course, he referred to his own communications with Prime Minister Eden and Prime Minister Mollet which made it emphatically clear in advance that the United States would not cooperate in the use of force, and he believed and he expressed very clearly the reason why he believed it would be a disastrous course for the British and the French to follow.⁵ Then the next sentence goes on and I suppose it was not a popular decision. I originally elaborated on that a little bit. What I meant to say was this: it is rarely popular to show loyalty to a principle. A loyalty which deserves greater popularity is to its country and a loyalty to a principle is a kind of vague abstraction and does not attract the same type of loyalty which expresses itself in terms more to figures or to particular countries.

But I believe that a nation which has the world wide responsibilities of the United States cannot discharge them adequately unless it tries to be loyal to certain principles and not express its policies in terms of likes or dislikes of certain countries. Now it is certainly not popular in the United States to adopt a policy which at the same time antagonizes the friends of Britain, the friends of France and the friends of Israel. Certainly, that was one of the hardest decisions that was ever made by a head of a government, to make that kind of decision. But it is basic in our Charter commitment and in our treaty commitments, our alliances, to make the first article of our treaties starting with NATO provide that none of the members will use force except in case of self-defense or in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter. Now when you have an alliance and you base it on that principle, it seems just as important if only for the standpoint of the dependability of the alliances that Article 1 of the alliance shall be lived up to, and if that one is not lived up to how are you going to depend on other members living up to the other articles of the treaty?

Then we have a problem outside of Europe which preoccupies us and where we have to invoke the same principles. For a long time and still today President Syngman Rhee has wanted to correct what he regards as a terrible injustice committed on the Koreans by Communist forces and we have had to exert the strongest kind of pressure on him not to invoke force. And he isn’t even bound by the United Nations Charter in that respect.

We have similar problems with Chiang Kai-shek on Taiwan. We cannot have one principle for Europe and another for Asia. I am quite sure that the countries of Europe would be aghast if we should encourage the use of force.

The only principle we can hold them back with is the same principle expressed in the United Nations Charter, and in Article 1 of the North Atlantic Treaty. That illustrates what I mean when a country with world wide responsibilities has the necessity of being loyal to principles even though that is not nearly as attractive popularly as being popular and loyal to personal and international friendships.

When I was in Australia last month,⁶ I think it was, I was talking to Menzies ⁷ about this question of loyalty. I was reminded of how we do recognize our standards of loyalty within our family. The first loyalty is the husband to the wife and wife to husband, and that is recognized by law as a husband and a wife cannot testify against each other. And I said to Menzies, you are so intimate and a part of the British family, so to speak, and I can understand your sticking along with the British. But, I said, a nation like the United States with a world wide responsibility has got to put its principles ahead of any one or more nations.

Now there is also a question I want to refer to here which I would like to elaborate a little bit more on and that is our attitude toward the United Nations. There is quite a general feeling I think in Western Europe that the United Nations has proved a failure and that it operates against the countries of Western Europe, and that the less success there is for the United Nations so much the better for the world or at least the countries of Western Europe. We do not share that view at all. We recognize the infirmities of the United Nations. Indeed, we have tried to correct those infirmities at an early stage and we were unable to get any support from our Western European friends at that time. It was a question of voting on the United Nations Assembly, a matter on which I expressed myself before I was Secretary of State. And we hope that we might develop some way or system of voting in the Assembly. We tried to get a new charter but we were blocked by a solid front who did not want to remedy. We were not in favor of bringing all these blocs of countries, sort of a package-deal, in as new members in the United Nations a couple of years ago. Each country ought to be appraised on its merits. And all the new countries ought not to be brought in before they had demonstrated that they had the ability to live up to the provisions of the Charter, and certainly the Soviet Bloc countries have not demonstrated that. Again enlarged membership is something about which they now complain but they were backing it and we were opposing, and we went along not only out of desire not to oppose but because they were all in favor of it.

Macmillan when he was in Bermuda talked about the desirability of using regional organizations more as a substitute to a certain extent for the United Nations.⁸ I said that is in accord with the Charter and I believe that it should be done.

I recall when we had a little trouble with Guatemala it was the British in the Security Council which opposed our dealing with that matter in the OAS and who insisted that that should have been done through the United Nations, and I said to the greatest extent possible the disputes between members of regional alliances ought to be settled there. That is what the Charter says, to try to settle disputes according to regional procedures.

And we, of course, have long advocated the development of NATO in that respect more along the lines of the Organization of American States with more adequate machinery for dealing with disputes so that they will be dealt with in that context instead of being more or less automatically brought to the United Nations.

Now we still, despite the difficulties of the United Nations, have faith in the United Nations and I do not believe that there is in fact a “pat” vote against the countries of Western Europe. Certainly, there was no pat vote on the Hungarian issue. We got almost an overwhelming vote except for the Soviet Bloc.⁹

On the two issues of Cyprus and Algeria, which perhaps afforded a good test of that, it was possible to end up this last assembly with resolutions which were unanimously adopted and accepted by the colonial powers and so-called Afro-Asian bloc. And while it is somewhat anomalous to have simply one vote for a nation, I feel there is still a judgment exercised. There is no automatic voting by regional blocs.

The Italians suggested that the NATO countries have a caucus in the UN. I suggested that that ought to be approached with the greatest possible caution because if the Western European countries organize a bloc, it will become even more difficult to influence the views of some of the new members.

And on the question of what I said on April 22, it has been charged that it is not a foreign policy merely to dump something in the United Nations. Of course I recognize the fact that we have never done that. The United States has never followed that policy. As far as the Suez matter is concerned, the resolution to cease fire¹⁰ was a resolution based on U.S. policy, drafted by us on the airplane going up—it was a U.S. policy. To use the United Nations and its Charter as a means of effectuating a policy is not an abdication by any means of foreign policy. I have taken perhaps some time to discuss this matter but it does reflect an area where there is a sharp divergence between the views of the Western European countries and the United States and perhaps deserves more attention.

Now I will go on to the NATO meeting at Bonn. It was a good meeting and in many respects the best meeting we have had in recent times. I have personally attended every such meeting for the last four and a half years and there was a total of about 13 ministerial meetings, I think. And I think we came nearer to having a really informal exchange of views of important matters than there has been before. As one Minister put it, in the past there has been a tendency to bringing pre-digested speeches which were directed at each other. Even the matter of Cyprus for the first time was talked about. It was sort of an unwritten law that nobody would mention Cyprus, that nobody mentions the word. This time there was an exchange of views between the Greeks and the Turks and the British and we got to work without the roof being blown off.

The most interesting aspect of the meeting, I think, from our standpoint was the view expressed there on the question of limitation of armaments. There seemed to be a sentiment which, as far as we could judge, was shared by the Western European countries other than the Federal Republic that we should go very slowly about any limitation of nuclear weapons. And we should not accept any limitation of nuclear weapons unless it was 100% fool-proof, and in any event not do it until we could be certain at the same time there would be a corresponding limitation of conventional weapons. Now it seems to be assumed in some quarters that it is easier to limit conventional weapons than it is nuclear weapons. I doubt very much if that is the case. I think it is the other way around. The striking of a balance in respect to conventional weapons is a more difficult and complicated proceeding. As demonstrated by the years following the first world war, there were allies who really had a good deal of confidence with each other, worked in good faith and intensity for several years to work out and measure and equate conventional armaments, and that effort proved unavailing.

The simple tendency today is to talk of manpower. That is the most meaningless thing to talk about. You take people and have them trained, take them out, and you might at one time have two and one-half million men under arms but you may have seven or eight or ten million standing by thoroughly trained and ready; if they have the arms to pick up, they can at once convert an army of two and one-half million to an army of ten million. As was recognized when we drew the limitations, when we drew up the Brussels Treaty, the only limitation is of weapons rather than men. When it says the Germans shall not have more than 12 divisions, the implication is that the arms for more divisions shall be denied. So it is recognized that if you don’t have arms for 12 divisions it doesn’t do much good to have more men trained for military service. So the emphasis is on the armaments and not on the men.

When you try to get this question of manpower and arms figured down, it is an almost impossible task and I do not feel optimistic about the ability to arrive at an acceptable agreement about conventional weapons. Perhaps something could be arrived at governing where and how they could be stationed. But it is an immensely difficult thing.

When you get into the field of nuclear weapons, at least we have the fact that only three nations have these weapons, and while it is true that present scientific data does not enable you to account for and therefore control all of the fissionable material which has been produced in the past, it is more possible to control the means for the delivery of that material in weapons form, in terms of missiles, in terms of long range bombers and in terms of submarines. Those things cannot be concealed as would be possible in the case of conventional weapons. It would be possible to have a considerable control over the new use at least of fissionable material for weapons and possible for a much more complete control of delivery of those at a distance.

I emphasize “at a distance” as being a principal factor because we do not think the Soviets would start an atomic war unless they felt there was a good possibility of knocking out the United States to a considerable extent in the first phase of such an attack. I do not think the Soviets would start an atomic war against its neighbors which left the United States undamaged and its military potential undiminished. It is extremely unlikely they would do that.

I pointed out there at the meeting that, of course, we are dealing with a risk, and it is not possible to find a course totally free of risk. The question of the effect of atomic war on populations is not a question of millions but of tens of millions. Life on the northern half of the globe would be totally extinct. When you think of that you can’t contemplate the continued existence of that threat as other than a risk. And to say you will not tackle the problem unless you can solve all related problems at the same time seems to me an error of judgment, and as I said there the thing that seems for us to do is try to control what is controllable and not try to control everything when everything cannot be controlled.

I suspect that although they didn’t admit it in concrete terms, the Western Europeans rather like the protection afforded by the nuclear power of the United States partly because in conventional armaments the greatest dependence of Western Europe for security against the USSR would automatically be on the West Germans, both because of their geographic position and because of their potential.

So it looks as though there would be some opportunity for agreement and although for the moment the disarmament talks do not show prospects of settling all the differences between us, to the extent they exist, they have a practical importance.

We talked in Bonn about political cooperation, of course, and indeed our meeting exhibited the greater political aspects which we think are possible and desirable within the NATO Council. We hope perhaps that when Mr. Spaak assumes the post of Secretary General¹¹ he may be entrusted with the responsibility of looking into the Cyprus matter which really cries out for a solution at the present time. It is an extremely disruptive element. I think the UK is now in a mood where it would accept any solution which the Greeks and the Turks would take. And the decision is now primarily between the Greeks and the Turks. I think somebody will have to lay the law down and say this is it and put pressure on it.

The Greeks indicated to me that they were disposed to let Spaak study this matter, although they were anxious that he should study it privately until he should be able to satisfy himself that he could find some solution. My guess is that Spaak given his temperament would be rather disposed to get into this problem. Perhaps it is just as well to have someone like him get into it.

I talked at considerable length at the Council meeting about developments in the Middle East, and perhaps that might be of interest to you. I can speak even a little more frankly here than I did at the NATO Council. The United States had abstained from having any positive policy in that area of its own because it had accepted that that is an area where the UK had the primary role. We have not been filled with admiration with the way the British have played that role in recent years. It seems to us to have been characteristic of a nation which, realizing that it was weak, felt it had to act as though it was strong, and its actions, for instance, in seizing the Buraimi Oasis, the step taken to try to force Jordan into the Baghdad Pact,¹² have had an impact on the area which made the situation worse rather than better. When the abortive Suez action pretty much brought the British influence in the area for the time being to a rather low level, we felt that the United States should have a more definite positive policy for the area and that view was reflected in the Middle East resolution which followed the Suez crisis and which after some debate in Congress was finally adopted.¹³ We believe that the very considerable Soviet Communist influence which has gotten a hold in Syria and Egypt can be combatted through other Arab states and that it should not be allowed to break out in the disguise of extreme Arab nationalism which Nasser has put forward in his speeches. It seemed to us that King Saud was a natural rival for Nasser in this role of Arab leadership and the head in a sense of the Moslem religion, having the custody of the holy places of Islam, and that the new orientation of the Arab world might be found through King Saud who himself is anti-Communist. That view is reflected by the invitation to King Saud to come to Washington to visit President Eisenhower and that visit was a very considerable success.¹⁴ We know, not just by what King Saud said to us but by what he said to others, that President Eisenhower made a very great personal impression on him and that to a considerable extent what he learned on this visit has revealed the hand of communism in a good many of the activities which were being conducted under the guise of Nasser’s Arab nationalism.

The situation in Jordan developed in an extremely acute way because there was a well organized plot conducted primarily under Communist influence, by utilizing Egyptian and Syrian agents, to overthrow King Hussein and take over Jordan.¹⁵ If that had occurred probably the tide of that movement would have swept on and would have dethroned King Hussein whose entourage has been deeply infiltrated by agents. Probably the whole Arab world would have fallen under the domination of the Soviet Union working through the disguise of extreme form of nationalism as reflected by Nasser and Syria. And King Hussein showed very extraordinary and almost unexpected qualities at this juncture. He is a young man, barely 22 years old. He perceived the nature of the plot and told us of his plans for dealing with it on the assumption that he could get certain amount of help and support from the United States. … He wanted to be sure that if there was overt Soviet intervention we would meet it, …

We ourselves did not have the slightest idea that the Soviet Union was prepared to move overtly in the area. The fact of the matter was that King Hussein felt that there was a danger and it was necessary to reassure him that we would be prepared to cope with that danger.

Where Israel was concerned we had exchange of views with that government.¹⁶ The Alsop story that we sent the Sixth Fleet, as Alsop said, against Israel, is not so.¹⁷ Israel quite sympathises with the general policy which we are assuming here and has cooperated, and there was never a question of our using a display of force to frighten Israel.

King Hussein then was reinforced by getting that response together with some indication on our part of readiness to give him financial assistance. … Loyalty of armies depends to some extent on pay, and it helps out in that respect.

The result has been that instead of the Communist Egyptian and Syrian element gaining a complete victory in Jordan there has been a complete set back and a drawing together of other Arab countries because in the course of this King Saud has recognized that Iraq was a more dependable friend than Egypt or Syria, and there is improvement in the relations between King Saud and Lebanon and Iraq and Jordan, so that there is a considerable isolation at the moment of Egypt and Syria. And the North African Arab countries also are aligned more closely in the anti-Egyptian element.

The United States, as you know, indicated in an early stage that we would be prepared to identify ourselves with the military committee of the Baghdad Pact and that invitation will probably come forward at the meeting which is scheduled to be held in Karachi at the end of this month, I think, and we will be represented at that meeting.¹⁸

. . . . . . .

I referred in my speech on the 22nd of last month to the fact that war often looks as though it offers a short cut but it actually gets you into more trouble. We don’t believe in the efficacy of trying to solve these problems by the idea of cutting the Gordian Knot. I doubt it works these days. We can, as I say, redeem a situation which was pretty far gone last December and certainly we have been fortunate, I think. I don’t know that we have had more than an interim success, and of course, the great credit goes not to the United States but it goes to King Hussein. You can’t have a good policy without good people. But this king took a tremendous risk, risk of his own life, and I believe that people like that are to be found in this country and with good sound policies we can gradually develop an Arab sentiment which is more friendly to the West and which is not responsive to the Soviet Union. The latter would be an immediate disaster for Western Europe because we cannot—there is no way in the world in which you can at the present time make Europe comfortably independent of oil in the Middle East and the transit facilities of the Middle East Canal and the pipelines.

I would like to say one other thing on this point. We do believe that alternatives to the Suez and the pipelines through Syria should be developed as rapidly as possible. We do not think that the Egyptian declaration on the Suez Canal is a very valuable document¹⁹ and, indeed, we don’t think that any document which Egypt would produce would be very dependable. And there is no way that I know of to make the Suez a dependable waterway unless it goes back to the original where it was run by the British and the French. And I think the time is past when it can be done. It was the suggestion of the British that they withdraw from the base, because they couldn’t afford to stay on.

I was out there four years ago and at that time talked to the British General.²⁰ They had 80,000 people on his military establishment. They brought more from Cyprus to protect the 80,000. They were beginning at that time to move out. Well, they decided then and I think rightly that you can’t successfully operate that way any more and therefore I don’t think anybody contemplates going back to that status. Therefore, you have got to accept the fact that passage through the Suez is not going to be dependable for the Western European countries, and that there is no form of words which you can devise which is going to make it really dependable. I think it will probably be useful under reasonable conditions at this time to concentrate on developing alternatives. Already it has been demonstrated without Suez and with the pipeline cut off that Europe survived through the efforts of the U.S. shipping more oil. It was costly in terms of oil and terms of dollars. It can be done through perhaps new pipelines, new and bigger tankers going around the Cape, new sources of supplies which can be developed. I think within a few years, the Arab world will be more dependent on Europe as a market than Europe will be dependent on Middle East sources of oil so that the upper hand may have passed away from people like Nasser.

I am always impressed by the importance of cooperation between the nations in the area. We have problems such as one which came up under active discussion in Bonn, the so-called Four Power Working Group.²¹ That is an important working group and we should all try to cooperate with it, to stimulate more interest in constantly playing up the inhumanity and so forth of the division of Germany. The United States always tries to do that. President Eisenhower and I in our speeches always try to bring that up, the cruelty and injustice of the division of Germany. This working group is, of course, made up of the three Western countries which have the special responsibility for the reunification of Germany, and the Federal Republic itself.

The reunification of Germany cannot be dealt with adequately without dealing with European security and disarmament. The Italians are concerned there may develop a political standing group in NATO. Martino talked to me a great deal about that.²² First thing on landing he came to see me and I made a prearranged statement at the meeting which I cleared with the countries involved indicating there was no such purpose on our mind. I talked with Adenauer ²³ on that, in an interesting three hour meeting with him on Saturday, and I said let’s think of ways to bring the Italians in on this. I don’t think he was very keen on it but I think it is important we do so occasionally. I think that illustrates that many times there are cooperative ways to help out the general picture. I think if there is cooperation here in this respect, Ambassador Zellerbach and Ambassador Bruce, maybe you will have some ideas on how to make this thing on the one hand practical, to bring countries in from time to time so that they don’t feel left out.

One final word on the home situation. We are in the throes of a very strong economy wave on the part of Congress. The House treated the State Department budget very badly and I made a very strong plea before the Senate Committee for the reinstatement of some of the sums that were cut out,²⁴ but it was done the day I left Washington. I did not feel that the atmosphere was very friendly—it was friendly to me personally, but not friendly to our increased budget. And if we don’t get some increase, I think we will have to take some cuts. Our needs are increasing; the whole African continent is opening up. If we can’t get additional money for some countries, it will have to come out of some other countries. We are also engaged in planning the mutual security legislation. In fact, we are working very actively on that. As soon as I get back there is a meeting with both leaderships at the White House. The President is planning to send up a message and after that make a radio and television speech to the American public.²⁵ And there are citizens’ groups which we hope will support this, but these things will have particularly hard sledding this year. It is impossible to predict the outcome. But all of us will have to pay particular attention to having a smaller amount of money accomplishing a greater amount of work. It is possible to economize if you spend more time on the problems of economy. The trouble is we have so many more important problems than trying to save a few cents here and there. I told Congress I spent a lot of time striking out unnecessary words in telegrams to cut down, and I don’t know if that is the best way a Secretary of State should spend his time saving money on that. I say it is an expensive way of economizing. But I am afraid we will all have to tighten our belts.

Questions, if you have any? (11:05 a.m.)

Q. Can you tell us anything, Mr. Secretary, about the recent publicity on a revival of the so-called Eden plan for an inspected demilitarized zone on either side of the present German demarcation line?²⁶

A. Stassen, when he came back to Washington, told me that there were some elements in Britain that weren’t too keen about having Germany reunified, and it makes it a rather dangerous campaign from our standpoint. But I would say we do not favor any plan which takes as its premise the present division of Germany, nor do we favor a plan which particularly would manifest itself by displacing American forces from Germany. The Soviets can go back gradually and we can’t. It is all or nothing with us. For both of those reasons we are not sympathetic toward it.

Q. I would say, Mr. Secretary, that the Gaitskell Plan for neutralizing Germany would result in just what you say.²⁷ If the American forces left Germany they would probably go all the way back to the United States. It is a fact which Gaitskell has not pointed out.

A. The Soviets are carrying on a most intensive letter-writing campaign. I don’t think it is known yet because it is a rather long letter, but a new letter was brought in when I was talking with Adenauer.²⁸ They must really have engaged a letter-writing service, I think, to turn out letters as fast as that.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you speak of the possibility of danger of communist domination through Syria and Egypt, of the Middle East area. What form would that take, communist domination of the masses, or of Arab nationalism?

A. I think for a considerable time at least the communist character of the movement would have to be masked because I think there is a religious background there which leads the Moslems not to want to be dominated by anything which would show very openly. I will say, however, that the Communists have come out pretty openly in some respects in Syria and I am not sure that we can count only on religion as a safeguard. We must take also in the fact of the Palestinian refugees and Israel. The refugee camps are infiltrated by much Communist propaganda.

Q. I merely wanted to comment apropos the Soviet notes. They have made great progress in atomic bomb tests and it is a rather serious matter.

A. One thing of interest to you, I might comment on, is the strong concern that Adenauer showed that the British tried to block Euratom at some point, and he feels that at least some elements are trying to do it. Sometimes the British Ambassador in Paris tries to play his hand alone. I said to Adenauer, and I did say to Mollet when he was in Washington,²⁹ that in my opinion if this Common Market treaty³⁰ does not get ratified, it will be great discouragement on the part of the American people for any future for Europe. Here you have enough people and resources so that they can be a real force in the world. They shouldn’t be intimidated by the Soviet Union if they depend on us for support. We have been bolstering them up for 50 years. Just because they choose to preserve the luxury of independence it keeps them weak. Now hope has been transferred to the Common Market. If that collapses there will be a great feeling against Europe in the United States. And I don’t know what the future would be. I can’t exaggerate the importance in carrying it through—the question of these two treaties.³¹

Q. You mentioned, Mr. Secretary, that the countries of Europe are very grateful to us and lean on us for nuclear strength.

A. I don’t think I used the word gratitude.

Q. But they are glad we have it.

A. Yes.

Q. But, at the same time, it seems that it is very important for these countries, politically, to seem to be moving towards independent development and ownership of nuclear strength. Was that discussed in Bonn under the Fourth Country question?

A. Yes. There was a certain contradiction I would think, in that they say that unless there is a definite movement to eliminate atomic weapons for everybody they want them too. At the same time, they don’t want these movements on general elimination of nuclear weapons to proceed unless it can be done in a foolproof way and unless it can be done at the same time by a reduction of conventional weapons, which would be extremely difficult to negotiate. They say that the answer is that they want to produce nuclear weapons themselves. I don’t think they are so keen about it, but from a political standpoint they have got to have something to show their people, and the only reason they can show their people they are not going into this game is because it is being called off. From a military standpoint they will be concerned with the prospect of nuclear disarmament. I do think that there is an inconsistency there.

Q. Our observation is that as far as the United Kingdom is concerned, anyway, I think the Russians may be in the market for a new letter-writing service. They are not making an impression as far as the government is concerned.

Mr. Ronhovde, Netherlands: In connection with the canal, I gather from the statement that you made that the countries have pretty well agreed to accept the situation as it is and try to perhaps work out something over a longer period of time.

A. I think so. The situation is this. We were part of the select company, otherwise composed of the Soviet Union and India and Syria, which was given an advance copy of the Egyptian memorandum,³² and we were invited to make comments upon it. We did so and we made perfectly clear that we were not negotiating on behalf of any other country. We did make certain suggestions which we thought might make it more acceptable. At that point the United Kingdom said that they felt with the canal opening up there would be such pressure, economic pressure, to use it that they did not want the talks to be continued any longer but wanted the talks brought to an end. They recommended that whatever we announced be accepted on a de facto, provisional basis. We said to them, do you want to try to organize a boycott of the Canal until you get something better? If you want that, we will go along. They said no. We can’t stand it from an economic standpoint, and we will have to take the best we can get. So, to meet the British position, we just continued our talks in Cairo with the Egyptians to produce this declaration, called the Council meeting,³³ said precisely what the British had asked us to say and what we thought the British would also say, that though this was unsatisfactory, inadequate, it would be accepted on a de facto basis. Well, then, after the meeting had been called and we had made our statement, the British, under strong political pressure at home, felt they could not go along, and we were to some extent left exposed as though we were the nation wanting to use the Canal under Nasser’s terms. In the interest of trying to be cooperative and helpful we don’t get many thanks for it. Then the British wanted to try and defer this thing a little bit longer, largely because they were caught on the sterling exchange aspect of this matter. They are afraid sterling is not acceptable. The actual rule is not so important as the prestige factor which is involved, and they were having a meeting yesterday in Basle with representatives of Egypt in an effort to get the Egyptians to accept sterling. I don’t know what happened. Does anyone know what happened?

Mr. Fraser Wilkins:³⁴ No reply has come in yet. We are expecting to get some word.

A. (cont.) and they indicated they wanted to get another meeting in the Security Council and rehash this to some extent. But they had this further meeting at which every other country but France said they saw no alternative but accepting these terms, and I think that will mean, of course, that it will be followed.

Ambassador Zellerbach, Italy: I would like to come back to this neutral buildup question. On this point, if the United States would withdraw from Germany we would withdraw all the way back to the United States. Is this a point which we can make in our discussions with government people of various countries to which we are accredited? It would be very useful. You know, in Italy right now, there is a development on the part of Gronchi as against the Foreign Office, which follows our policy right along and Gronchi is trying to lead it the other way, and this kind of argument would be very useful to me.

A. I think it can be used. One has to be always careful that it doesn’t sound like a threat. It isn’t a threat of course. It is a practical situation. There isn’t room to relocate these people and there is no money—you have the problems of barracks, facilities which are a very expensive operation. You can’t be just doing this every few miles and doing it all over again. There is also the fact—I don’t know if you want to use it or not—that we have very strong elements in the United States who want to get our troops out of Europe and want to rely only on a deterrent of nuclear weapons. We have the same elements in the United States that prevailed in the United Kingdom. So far, those elements have not prevailed in the United States but they are there. They feel the only way you can bring your defense budget down to reasonable size is to rely wholly upon these nuclear deterrents which you have to pay for anyway and to cut out these armed forces. And I feel very certain of the fact that if any such situation developed and there was dislodging of U.S. forces, they would go right back to the United States. You have got to be careful to expound it and not as I say use as a threat. That is a fact. I made a statement at the NATO meeting on U.S. forces there. It was somewhat inaccurately reported to the press. I made it at General Norstad’s request and on the President’s authority. The United States position remains the same as I had described it last December.³⁵ That was short-cut by the press which says I said there would be no reduction of U.S. forces in Europe. What I said was we had no present plans of reducing our units here. There is some streamlining. We are making an effort to cut down on members of support troops which were not of military value. Also our forces are here under a formula described at the time as a “fair-share” formula.³⁶ I don’t think the people of Europe should assume that when they cut down there is nobody in the United States, no where in the Congress or the Pentagon, anywhere else, who says if the Europeans cut down their contribution we do too.

Mr. Ronhovde, Netherlands: I want to say in Holland they could foresee no worse disaster to Western Europe than the withdrawal of forces from Western Germany. Because of that Gaitskell and his party are very seriously attacked.

A. I think you are right on that.

Ambassador Bonbright, Portugal: In talking about the budget’s increased emphasis on Africa, we have also the report on the Vice President’s trip.³⁷ I wonder if there was any special significance about all this which goes beyond the natural concern about an area which has, perhaps, been neglected in the past and which we are simply trying to get caught up with.

A. No, I don’t think anything more than that. There are, of course, European projects which go beyond that such as this thing called Eur-Africa and, of course, there are the colonies of members of Common Market being brought in which creates a problem. Some belated adjustment is in prospect of our diplomatic service and foreign aid program toward a continent which is moving forward very rapidly. And we do feel the need for greater effort. You know, the Congress has created the authorization of a new Assistant Secretary of State for Africa, which area will be lifted up in that respect.

Ambassador Bonbright: Our negotiation on the Azores base has been horribly slow. For once though the ball is on our side of the net, but I hope by the time I get back at the end of the week we will have more instructions on it.

The Secretary: I have a feeling that the people of Portugal would not want to give Goa up to Nehru.

Ambassador Bonbright: It’s the only weapon they have got and a very nice one. I would be very surprised if they would give it up.

Ambassador Lodge: Mr. Secretary, there is a growing feeling in Spain that the mutuality of interest is beginning to fade. They think they are doing more for us than we are doing for them. The press is full of propaganda, controlled by the government, comparing the aid received from us with the Marshall Plan aid. They are not acceptable by NATO, they are always under attack. They are hoping we would be able to push them in after Congress went into action. They have been trying to do what we asked them to do on the whole. And I believe it is quite vital that we provide the extra $25 million that we have recommended. We are engaged in large build-up on our bases. An additional 12,000 men have been requested which will mean about 25,000 more Americans including dependents. So I would just like to provide the hope that something could be done because I think the Spanish situation which has been going on rather nicely is getting into heavy seas at this point. They have also been scared by the atomic bomb and the new British defense posture has led them to discuss this with me. The question of missile sites in Spain also. They have been neutral in two world wars and they are worried about this without being in NATO. You probably know all that, Mr. Secretary.

The Secretary: Well, I wish myself we could get them into NATO but we seem to be in considerable difficulty. I wish they would develop better relations with the French. It would help quite a lot. With the French policy in North Africa they figure they have something to trade with, but it doesn’t seem to work very well.

Ambassador Lodge, Spain: I believe there’s fault on both sides.

Ambassador Willis, Norway: I have not been serving in a NATO country (Switzerland) and there is a large question on my mind. Have these various developments, British changes in the British defense progress, are those things leading to a review of the NATO force goals?

The Secretary: Yes. That is in the process. When this thing came up, they put a series of questions to SACEUR and he is working on the answers to them, and those will be coming up, George, (turning to Amb. Perkins), next December?

Ambassador Perkins, NATO: I think it will come up before that. The British would like to settle that in October but the final review will be in December.

The Secretary: But there is a new reevaluation going on. I doubt it will be as searching as some people hope it will be. It is hard to get absolute answers. You just can’t get them. As I was saying to the Chancellor on Saturday,³⁸ we have had to rely on the deterrent of massive retaliation. We did not have tactical nuclear weapons. The only thing we had was the big bang. Now we have in prospect tactical nuclear weapons. Now those we should not treat as little scratches on the surface, because even tactical nuclear weapons do a lot of damage but it is a totally different effect from an atomic bomb on the centers. You are in an area in which a rather new development is coming up so rapidly that it is not possible to tell in terms of absolutes in any of these matters, and we don’t really encourage the effort to make a very exhaustive view of this subject. Whether or not this British 5,000 man reserve force is going to be located in the continent or in England—I know that Norstad is very persistent and very hopeful that it should be located on the continent.

Ambassador Willis: Have we any information or indication as to whether the Russians are also introducing their army tactical defense weapons?

A. Our information is not perhaps very complete and dependable. We are pretty well satisfied that they nearly are as far advanced as we are. In other words, we think they are trying to develop it. They are moving in that direction. I think they have quite a ways to go before catching up with us.

I think that is all the time I have this morning.

(The Secretary left the conference room at 11:45 a.m.)

Afternoon Session

May 6, 3:00–5:45 p.m.

Ambassador Perkins: Mr. Secretary, I would like to ask a question a little outside of my area, that is, concerning the Arab refugees in the Middle East. Has any noticeable progress been made toward finding a means of handling this situation? Are there any new thoughts on this problem?

The Secretary: I don’t think any progress has been made in dealing with the refugees. The Arab Governments seem to feel that the only possible solution is to send them back into Israel. They don’t want to see them absorbed into their own land. If they accept them, it would appear that they had renounced their claim that the refugees have a right to go back into Israel. This is not very susceptible of solution at the moment. If the Israelis had stayed in the Gaza Strip, they would have had to take some of the refugees back, and that would have been useful as far as the refugee group was concerned. Now there is no absorption of the refugees by Israel.

Mr. Fraser Wilkins: The Israeli invasion of Egypt foreclosed any possibility of movement of refugees under the Johnston Plan,³⁹ under which we could have foreseen a possibility of resettling some of the refugees in the Jordan area or even beyond that, some repatriation to Israel itself.

Mr. Richard Davis,⁴⁰ USSR: In regard to the Soviet Middle East proposals,⁴¹ France and the U.S. seem to think we should turn them down and stop all correspondence. The U.K. seems to think we should not totally reject them. Is it likely that we will be having further talks with the Soviets on any aspect of the Middle East?

The Secretary: I don’t see any purpose to be served by that. It would be widely interpreted in the Arab world as acceptance of the Soviet position and give the Soviets an aura of respectability which they now lack—the lack of which is one of our principal assets in this area. If we tell the Arabs on the one hand that these people are infidels—atheistic and Godless—and then have dealings with them, we would hurt our main argument. When we were at London for the first Suez Conference, Mr. Shepilov, then Foreign Minister, made it quite clear to me they would be prepared to settle this Middle East business and the Suez problem on pretty satisfactory terms to the West if we would make it a joint Soviet-U.S. operation.⁴² If the Soviets could get the two of us together on the Middle East, that would achieve one of their great ambitions. This we reject. We can always make a good deal with the Russians on that basis. However, we will deal with this problem only on the basis of collaboration with our allies and our friends. Now, the Soviets are trying to play it the other way and get the British and French to talk with them and leave us out. The Soviet note to the U.K. says as much.⁴³ I doubt whether that is a profitable line for anyone to pursue. I don’t see any gain, only loss, in having official talks with the Soviets.

Ambassador Whitney, London: Did Selwyn Lloyd bring up this matter at the Bonn Conference?

The Secretary: No. There was no indication of U.K. desire to discuss the Soviet-Middle East situation at Bonn.

Ambassador Whitney: In the context of Anglo-American relations, I have had several talks with Selwyn Lloyd. There is tremendous pressure to talk. Lloyd has suggested that we could take up the Arab-Israeli problems in the UN framework. This is a place where I wonder if it could easily be brought up. Was this mentioned at the Bonn Conference?

The Secretary: I think it is being dealt with to some extent between Washington and London at the present time. I noticed no desire on the part of the British to have talks regarding the Russian-Middle East situation.

Mr. Richard Davis: There are reflections of this in Moscow.

The Secretary: Of course, there are always opportunities to talk informally at the Security Council meetings. I don’t think that would satisfy the Soviets. They want to be publicly accepted as one of the powers which must be taken into account in dealing with the Middle East. By way of background the main part of which you may recall, at the time when Hitler, Stalin and Japan were trying to divide up the world on a tripartite basis, they had pretty well agreed to a division. Who would be dominant in the Middle East was the only stumbling block. The Hitler paper pushed the Soviets further to the East and gave them the Indian Ocean zone, but Stalin insisted on the Persian Gulf area. That was one of the reasons, at least superficially, why the talks failed. Soviet ambitions in the Middle East are well known. At the first meeting of Foreign Ministers in London in 1945 with Secretary Byrnes, Molotov made clear his demand for a trusteeship of Tripolitania and the Greek Islands. They will not be satisfied just by back-stage talks at the Security Council.

The Secretary: Are there any other questions? I would be glad to answer as well as I can.

Ambassador Thompson, Austria: Could you give us an indication of what our line should be with respect to the satellite countries? The Austrian Foreign Office has asked whether we could give any indication as to what the Austrian position should be. For example, on the UN Report on Hungary,⁴⁴ what should be our attitude? We would not want them to renormalize their relations. What they really have in mind is that they hope we might use them in some way in our approach to the satellites.

The Secretary: Well, I don’t think of anything at the moment that would be profitable on that line. It is important to keep alive in our minds a degree of Soviet condemnation in regard to Hungary and East Germany. The Russian rulers are not impervious to open public ostracism. They are extremely anxious to be accepted. The only way to make them give in is if we keep hammering away. An example of this was the Austrian treaty. And in some other aspects they have given into world opinion; for example on Atoms for Peace and aerial inspection.⁴⁵ On aerial inspections the Soviets first rejected, then accepted it. I hope we’re not going to reject it now that the Soviets have accepted it. Now in the debate concerning aerial inspections, the question is not whether will it take place, but where will it take place.

We should not let relations with the Soviets become normalized to the point where we have to draw the veil over things of this sort.

Mr. Philip Sprouse, Belgium: What is the general policy regarding resumption of contacts which were broken off after the Hungarian affair? I have a feeling that the Belgians would be willing to continue these relations.

The Secretary: Our policy is not to exclude totally any such relations. We do feel that that relationship, if it is done skillfully, can do much to help advance the development of liberal elements and forces which the leaders would have to bend to. We are making definite progress along that line. You cannot have an industrial state without a good deal of education. You cannot have education without developing inquiring minds. There are reports that among the students in the USSR all sorts of illegal publications are being circulated. How strong the liberal movement is or when it will be effective, no one knows. I believe that to some extent these contacts, exchange of leaders, etc., all help to promote this movement. Therefore, we do not wish to exclude them entirely. We do not want them to achieve such a volume as to imply that we recognize them as moral equals. It is hard to know just where to strike the balance between the two factors. We are trying to follow an ad hoc basis where no rules are laid down. We have ended the total curtailment which went into force immediately after Hungary and are now on a limited basis. For the satellites other than Hungary, we are doing a little bit more. We hope to work out something on an economic arrangement with the Polish delegation now in Washington.⁴⁶ The Poles have shown a degree of independence. As there is a movement toward independence, we respond. However, their independence is not so spectacular as all that; it would take a powerful microscope to see it sometimes. As a general principle, to the extent these countries give evidence of greater independence, we will give them better treatment.

Ambassador Willis: Is there any prospect of our being able to take more Hungarian refugees?

The Secretary: I find it very hard to be optimistic about that. During the period when public emotion and sympathy was running high the Department of Justice was liberal in regard to the parole system. Now that Congress is back in session and emotions have calmed down, Justice does not find it possible to use this system to the same extent. It is the same with the Jews in Egypt. The committees which are responsible for working this out are not liberal.

Mr. C. Burke Elbrick, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs: I realize how difficult the Swiss problem is, but we see little chance of taking more of these refugees into the U.S.

Ambassador Willis: There are now two refugees per 1,000 Swiss people.

Mr. Elbrick: The Yugoslavs have a similar problem. I don’t see any chance of increasing the number to be admitted to the U.S. by legislation.

Mr. Andrew Berding, Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs: We could take 3,000 more up to July 1.

Mr. Elbrick: This was a last effort during this fiscal year. The Swiss and Yugoslav problems are difficult ones. They are not covered by the parole procedures. They are in third countries. The parole system has not applied to Hungarian refugees other than in Austria.

Mr. Julius Holmes:⁴⁷ Regarding Algeria, was any light thrown on this problem in your talk with Mollet?

The Secretary: There was no light, just gloom. Mollet sees no prospect of holding elections. While some local elections might be held, Mollet is not sure that even these elections would give them a responsible group of leaders. The vision of elections has pretty well faded into the background. The picture he showed today was one of complete discouragement. The French are trying to organize the country on the basis of local communities and villages. It might be possible to hold some local elections, but there is no possibility of these elections producing any leadership.

Mr. Elbrick: Elections for the French Assembly depend on bringing about a cease fire. Right now, there are no real leaders with whom to negotiate to bring about such a cease fire.

The Secretary: For example, when the French ask the local “leaders” to demonstrate their authority in some way, they would suggest that authority be shown by 24 hours during which time no one is killed. Instead the local “leaders” will kill twice as many people during the 24 hours to prove their authority.

Ambassador Bruce, Germany: I don’t like to plunge you into the morass of Germany again. Russian experts here believe that the Soviet Government will not seriously consider reunification of Germany until after some sort of negotiations between Eastern Germany and the Federal Republic. Are there any conceivable circumstances under which we could recognize the Government of East Germany without the consent of West Germany?

The Secretary: I can see no circumstances which would lead us to recognize East Germany, unless that was desired by the Federal Republic, and it would take a great deal of persuading on the part of the Federal Republic. We don’t recognize the People’s Republics of Vietnam and Korea, and would be extremely reluctant to do so in East Germany. As far as I can now foresee, the future of East Germany is pretty well linked up with the satellite question. Of course, the Soviets might be willing to accept the reunification of Germany if it took place under circumstances which would give Communist elements in East Germany a good chance eventually to take over the whole of Germany. I do not think they will accept any reunification which did not have that as a considerable prospect. Furthermore, I do not think they would accept reunification until they arrive at the conclusion that their entire satellite policy is wrong—that they are willing to be surrounded by countries which have a considerable measure of independence and operate on a friendly basis, such as Finland. The impact of any degree of sovereignty in East Germany would multiply problems in other satellites, particularly Poland.

Therefore, I think East Germany is really a part of the entire satellite problem, assuming, of course, that the West Germans are not willing to take reunification on terms whereby the Communists could take over the whole business. The situation in Laos where you also have two provinces, which it was promised would be restored to the Government of Laos and to those controlling the provisions of the armistice agreement.⁴⁸ But, in fact, the Communists are not allowing this to happen, unless they can set up conditions which could give them an important place in the central government where they could take it over, such as the Ministry of the Interior, etc. The Government of Laos is not as strong and vigorous as the Federal Republic and is tending to base reunification on those terms. So far they have refused to do so. The situation in Laos is very similar to the political situation in Germany.

Ambassador Whitney: One thing we hear often in England today is that, no matter what happens with respect to the Suez Canal and the regime, the story will really be told when the first Israeli ship does not go through the canal. If it does not go through, could you discuss with us what our possible action would be at that time?

The Secretary: I think it can be assumed with a high degree of probability that no Israeli ship will go through for the time being.

Ambassador Whitney: Will one try to?

The Secretary: It will try to. I have suggested to them that they not push that issue quickly because we did not want it to arise during the crisis in Jordan. I think that within the next few weeks an Israeli flag ship will try to get through the canal. I don’t think it will get through the canal, and that will raise a very serious problem. The procedure which would be appropriate would be to try to take the matter to the World Court. But, the procedures for getting it to the World Court are not at all clear. The UN Security Council or the General Assembly could request an advisory opinion from the World Court; but the question would be vetoed by the Soviet Union in the Security Council, and it would be difficult to get a two-thirds vote. I do not think that Egypt will consent to its going there as a contested case. I am not entirely sure that Israel is very keen about its going there. Israel is more concerned about transiting the Straits of Tiran than they are the Canal. Egypt would probably base their refusal on the provisions of the 1888 Treaty, Article 10, which says that the provision in the preceding articles which give the right of transit to all countries would be without prejudice to the right of Egypt to maintain public order. The Egyptian case would be that in the interest of maintaining public order, you cannot have an Israeli ship going through the Canal at the present time, since emotions of the people would run so high on the banks of the Canal that the situation would be entirely uncontrollable. That is a very plausible argument. They do not have to face up to the question of the principle of whether Israel has the right to go through; they can say that in the interests of maintaining public order, they are delaying or suspending the right of a particular ship to go through. That sounds very plausible.

I am not sure that the Israelis would want to take such a case to the World Court because it is not clear what the decision might be. It would depend upon how strong a factual case the Egyptians can develop. I think that we are likely to be confronted for the time being with the likelihood that Israeli ships will not go through the Canal.

The question of passage of Israeli cargoes through the Canal is a little different since it is more difficult to prevent passage. I would have said a few days ago that the Egyptians would have let them go through. In view of the Jordan developments, I am not so sure they would. We should remember that the Israelis attach far more importance to access through the Tiran Straits and the Gulf of Aqaba than through the Suez Canal. In the Ben Gurion notes to Eisenhower ⁴⁹ in connection with the Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, Ben Gurion specified two points on which the Israeli wanted some sort of satisfaction: one was the right to go through the Straits of Tiran and the other related to the Gaza Strip. He did not mention the rights of Israeli to go through the Suez Canal. That was a rather conspicuous omission.

(The Secretary departed at 3:50 p.m.)

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 120.1440/5–857. Secret. Drafting officer is not identified.
2. See footnote 4, supra .
3. For text of Secretary Dulles’ speech before the Associated Press at New York City, April 22, 1957, see Department of State Bulletin, May 6, 1957, pp. 715–719.

4. Secretary Dulles said:

   “Our dedication to the principles of the United Nations Charter was severely tested by the recent Middle East crisis. We were then faced with a distressing and unprecedented conflict of loyalties. Historic ties would have led us to acquiesce in the forcible action that was begun. But this would have involved disloyalty to the United Nations undertaking that all members renounce the use of force except in defense against armed attack. That same pledge is also embodied in all our treaties of alliance. We decided to be loyal to that commitment.

   “This was a hard decision, although to those directly affected it was not an unexpected decision. It was not, I suppose, a popular decision. Yet it was imperative if the world was not to go as it went when the League Convenant was disregarded.

   “But, as we have seen, the charter prescribes not merely peaceful settlement but settlement in conformity with justice and international law.” (Ibid., p. 718)

5. For text of President Eisenhower’s address to the Nation, October 31, 1956, see ibid., November 12, 1956, pp. 743–745.
6. Secretary Dulles was in Canberra, Australia, to attend the SEATO Council meeting, March 10–13, 1957.
7. Robert G. Menzies, Australian Prime Minister.
8. British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan met with President Eisenhower at Bermuda, March 20–23, 1957. A memorandum of their discussion on the United Nations is scheduled for publication in a forthcoming Foreign Relations volume.
9. Reference is to the uprising in Hungary, October–November 1956 and related U.N. resolutions.
10. For text of Resolution 997 (ES–1) calling for a cease-fire in Egypt and the withdrawal of British, French, and Israeli forces, adopted by the first Emergency Session of the U.N. General Assembly on November 2, 1956, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1956 (Department of State Publication 6811, Washington: Government Printing Office, 1959), pp. 657–658.
11. Paul-Henri Spaak became Secretary General of NATO on May 16, 1957.
12. Reference is to the mission of British Field Marshal Sir Gerald Templer, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, to Jordan in December 1955.
13. House Joint Resolution 117 (71 Stat. 5), March 9, 1957, authorized the President to use U.S. Armed Forces to preserve the independence of Middle East nations if necessary (the “Eisenhower Doctrine”).
14. King Saud visited Washington, January 30–February 8, 1957.
15. Reference is to the April 1957 internal crisis in Jordan and the decision to send the U.S. Sixth Fleet to the Eastern Mediterranean on April 24.
16. A memorandum of Secretary Dulles’ conversation with Abba Eban, the Israeli Ambassador, on April 24, 1957, on the situation in Jordan, is scheduled for publication in a forthcoming Foreign Relations volume.
17. Reference is to an article by Joseph Alsop, “Action by U.S. Not Aimed at Syria, Russia, Alsop Reports” in the Washington Post, April 28, 1957, p. 1.
18. The United States announced on March 22, 1957, that it would join the Baghdad Pact Military Committee. The Council of Ministers of the Pact met in Karachi, June 3–6.
19. For text of the memorandum of the Egyptian Government on the principles governing the operation of the Suez Canal, delivered to foreign diplomatic missions at Cairo, March 17, 1957, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1957 (Department of State Publication 7101, Washington: Government Printing Office, 1961), pp. 954–955.
20. Regarding the Secretary’s conversation in Cairo with General Sir Brian H. Robertson, Commander-in-Chief of British Middle East Land Forces, May 13, 1953, see telegram 2421 from Cairo, Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. ix, Part 1, p. 25.
21. Reference is to the Working Group which considered the problem of German reunification in Washington, March 6–15, 1957.
22. A memorandum of conversation between Secretary Dulles and Italian Foreign Minister Gaetano Martino at Bonn, May 1, 1957, is scheduled for publication in a forthcoming Foreign Relations volume.
23. Reference is to a conversation between Konrad Adenauer, German Chancellor, and Secretary Dulles at Bonn on Saturday, May 4, 1957. A memorandum of conversation is scheduled for publication in a forthcoming Foreign Relations volume.
24. For text of Secretary Dulles’ statement before a subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Appropriations, April 30, 1957, see Department of State Bulletin, May 20, 1957, pp. 795–799.
25. For text of President Eisenhower’s Address to the Nation, May 21, 1957, and his message to Congress on the Mutual Security Program for 1958, see ibid., pp. 915–931.
26. Eden’s plan was proposed at the Geneva Heads of Government meeting, July 18, 1955.
27. A report of the speech of Hugh Gaitskell, leader of the British Labour Party, at the Free University of Berlin, March 18, 1957, in which he called for the establishment of a neutral zone in Europe, is in telegram 5060 from London, March 21. (Department of State, Central Files, 740.5/3–2157)
28. For text of the Soviet note to the Federal Republic of Germany, April 27, 1957, alleging that the Federal Republic was being turned into a NATO atomic base, see Documents on Germany, 1944–1985 (Department of State Publication 9446, Washington: Government Printing Office, 1985), p. 496. The Soviet Government had sent letters to Adenauer on February 5, 1957, to the Prime Ministers of Denmark and Norway on March 27, and to the British Prime Minister on April 20, 1957. See footnote 43 below.
29. Prime Minister Guy Mollet visited Washington, February 25–28, 1957.
30. For text of the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, signed at Rome, March 25, 1957, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1957, pp. 426–518.
31. Reference is to the Treaty of Rome (see footnote 30 above) and to the Treaty Establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, also signed at Rome, March 25, 1957. For text of the latter, see ibid., pp. 518–573.
32. See footnote 19 above.
33. Reference is to the 776th meeting of the U.N. Security Council, April 26, 1957, 10:30 a.m.
34. Director, Office of Near Eastern Affairs.
35. For documentation on the North Atlantic Council meeting in Paris, December 11–14, 1956, see Documents 40 ff.
36. In a statement of April 15, 1954, President Eisenhower pledged that the United States would continue to maintain in Europe “its fair share of the forces needed for the joint defense of the North Atlantic area”. For the full text of the statement, see American Foreign Policy, 1950–1955: Basic Documents, vol. I, pp. 1198–1200.
37. Reference is to Vice President Richard M. Nixon’s 22-day tour of Morocco, Ethiopia, the Sudan, Libya, Tunisia, Ghana, and Uganda, in March 1957.
38. See footnote 23 above.
39. Reference is to the proposals of Eric Johnston, personal representative of President Eisenhower to the Middle East, for the Jordan River water development.
40. Richard H. Davis, Minister-Counselor in the Soviet Union.
41. Reference is to a Note from the Soviet Foreign Ministry to the American Embassy in Moscow, April 19, 1957. For text, see United States Policy in the Middle East, September 1956–June 1957: Documents, pp. 81–85.
42. A memorandum of the conversation between Dimitri Shepilov and Secretary Dulles, August 18, 1956, which took place during the conference of 22 nations in London, August 16–23, 1956, is scheduled for publication in a forthcoming Foreign Relations volume.
43. For text of the letter from Bulganin to Macmillan, April 20, 1957, see Noble Frankland, ed., Documents on International Affairs (London: Oxford University Press, 1960), pp. 2–11.
44. The Special U.N. Committee on Hungary, which was established on January 10, 1957, by Resolution 1137 (XI), reported on June 20, 1957. Its conclusions are printed in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1957, pp. 680–685.
45. Documentation on President Eisenhower’s proposals, made before the U.N. General Assembly, December 8, 1953, for the sharing of atomic information, is in Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. ii, Part 2, pp. 845 ff.
46. Reference is to the agreements signed by the United States and Poland on June 7 and August 14, 1957, by which the United States agreed to provide Poland with $95 million in economic aid.
47. Special Assistant to the Secretary of State.
48. Reference is to provisions of the Geneva Agreement on Laos of July 1954; for documentation on the agreement, see Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, volume xvi, pp. 397 ff.
49. David Ben Gurion, Israeli Prime Minister.