Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Western European Security and Integration, Volume IV

247. Telegram From the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Aldrich) to the Secretary of State²

London, September 27, 1955—6 p.m.

1234. From Elbrick. Two-day conference Northern European Chiefs of Mission held here³ produced imaginative constructive exchange of views highly beneficial to all concerned. Principal conclusions follow:

1. Soviet policies, notably Porkkala cession, have made deep impression on public opinion all Scandinavian countries which uncritically welcomes apparent lessening of war danger. Press and governmental leaders generally still skeptical of Soviet intentions and there is still no evidence they intend to support decreased scale of defense programs. … Combination of Geneva atmosphere, Soviet political and cultural offensive, economic pressures and reports of defense cuts in US and UK may eventually lead to irresistible pressures to reduce defense expenditures. Group felt best psychological counter in north to present Soviet campaign is to plug line real test Soviet intentions yet to come on important questions such as German reunification.

2. Public emphasis on basic Western strategy of main reliance on deterrent effect of nuclear weapons and capacity to deliver them makes domestic justification by these govts of their marginal military contributions increasingly difficult.

3. Pressures on Social Democratic govts to increase social-welfare expenditures are ever present and persuasive justification for maintenance of present level of ground forces and defense expenditures is required.

. . . . . . .

6. Norway has key position in relation to Iceland and Denmark, and latter are influenced by Norwegian advice or example. Any actions tending to weaken Norwegian support for NATO … would have adverse repercussions going beyond Norway.

7. Continued US defense aid and OSP are required in Norway on sufficient scale to prevent loss of defense production base so laboriously built up with substantial US investment. Despite Denmark’s economic capacity to make larger defense expenditures, it should also be considered for defense aid on political grounds.

8. Development of non-military aspects of NATO, admittedly difficult, genuinely desired in Norway and Denmark and would contribute to offsetting adverse trends noted above.

9. UK has same objectives as US in Scandinavian area and we should work closely with UK representatives in area to achieve them.

10. Concern in Scandinavian countries over apparent protectionist trend in US trade policies led to recommendation by group that authoritative expositions of US policies and of actions which are in line with announced liberal trade policies would be useful in countering effects of recent isolated cases of apparent “back pedaling”. Advance notice and explanation all such actions essential if missions and USIA are to exploit effectively and rebut criticism.

11. USIA should step up cultural activities with first-class US talent. USIA representation allowances are very low and make it impossible for its representatives to do their job effectively. Means should be found to continue Fulbright programs to Sweden and Denmark.

12. Application of fifty-fifty shipping clause to such programs as those under Title I of PL 480⁴ works to serious detriment of immediate objectives of programs and of broader US interests in area.

Aldrich

2. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 120.1441/9–2755. Confidential.
3. Held September 26–27, 1955, in London.
4. For text of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, enacted July 10, 1954, which provided for the disposal of U.S. agricultural surpluses abroad, see 68 Stat. 454.