Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Western European Security and Integration, Volume IV

216. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, February 4, 1957, 11 a.m.¹

Washington, February 4, 1957, 11 a.m.

SUBJECT

• EURATOM “Wise Men”

PARTICIPANTS

• The Secretary
• Senator George
• EUR—Mr. Elbrick
• S/P—Mr. Bowie
• Ambassador Butterworth
• S/AE—Mr. Smith
• RA—Mr. Timmons
• S/AE—Mr. Schaetzel
• RA—Mr. Cleveland
• Mr. Armand
• Mr. Etzel
• Mr. Giordani
• Mr. Kohnstamm

The Secretary opened the meeting by expressing his satisfaction at the visit of the “Wise Men” and at the evidence of progress in the project to establish common Western European use of atomic power. He recalled the interest which the President and he, and the Congress as well, had consistently taken in all developments to create greater unity in Europe. Only in this way, in their opinion, could Europe develop its full potentialities. The world and Europe could not afford the continuance of the divisions which the experience of the last thirty years had demonstrated were intolerable. For this reason the United States had strongly supported the European Coal and Steel Community and rejoiced that as this new source of power—the atom—developed, it was being approached on an European rather than on a purely national basis.

The Secretary remarked in conclusion that although the bulk of the talks which the “Wise Men” would have in Washington would be of a technical nature, he was fully aware of the political significance of their visit and their work, and that he would be happy to hear what they had to say concerning their plans and concerning what we could do to help.

Mr. Armand replied for the “Wise Men”, noting that as they had no chairman he owed this honor to the chance of the alphabet. Noting that he and his colleagues did not represent individual countries but had been designated to speak for the Six countries collectively, he thanked the Secretary for the invitation to visit the United States, which had been of great support to them in their efforts.

The problem with which the “Wise Men” were intended to deal, Mr. Armand continued, was as follows: Europe achieved its industrial strength and greatness at a moment when coal was the principal source of energy; Europe was thus, as it were, “born rich” in energy, and acquired the habits of a rich area. Later, however, both as a result of “adventures” and of the rise of oil as a source of energy, Europe became less and less rich and finally, following the last World War, became an importer of energy. Now something like one quarter of the Six countries’ energy supply comes from outside of the area, mostly from the Middle East.

The consequences of this increasing poverty in energy resources has been increasingly realized over the past few years by economists and experts, but not by the general public. The Suez crisis and its aftermath, however, has brought home the problem and “sensitized” public opinion to it. The problem, in the view of the political leaders, is twofold: First, the standard of living of any industrial country tends to be proportional to its energy consumption. Therefore, if new energy sources are not available in Europe, the results can only be a ceiling on the standard of living, which could have most serious consequences in the internal political situation of all the major western European countries. Second, if Europe should become almost totally dependent (to something like 40 percent of its energy requirements by 1957) on the Middle East, and hence at the mercy of rulers of individual Middle Eastern countries, there was a serious external political danger which needed no elaboration.

The problem, then, was how Europe could get out of this impasse. The possible increase of coal production was very limited, and while Europe would continue to import coal from the United States, there was a limit to how much further dependence could be placed on such imports. As concerns oil, even with the possible results which may be expected from new prospecting in Europe and also in the Sahara (where there were political problems too), the possibilities were definitely limited. As a result, Europe’s import requirements for energy were estimated (in millions of tons of coal equivalent) at a hundred million tons for 1960 and three hundred million (or 40 percent of Europe’s total energy requirements) for 1975. The balance of payment consequences of energy imports on this scale were almost inconceivable.

In this situation, atomic energy must be used to compensate for the lack of other energy sources. The Europeans realize that atomic energy is an unknown, but the “Wise Men” believe that they can establish a production program for atomic energy which can cause imports of energy from outside of Europe to begin leveling off in 1962 at a level of approximately 150 million tons of coal equivalent. They had succeeded, Mr. Armand believed, in making this problem understood during their trip around Europe. This common understanding of the problem in Europe was the first prerequisite for a real program. The other was the establishment of effective cooperation between the United States and Europe in this field. This cooperation should be a two-way street; the United states could be of great assistance to a large European program in terms of fuel and information, but in counterpart Europe had decided to equip itself as a real partner by mobilizing its intellectual forces.

In summary, Mr. Armand said, nuclear energy is necessary for progress; but Europe is behind in its development. If, with the help of the United States, Europe can catch up this lag, Europe will fructify and within ten years will be able to be a real partner. The program is ambitious, but if such a program is not carried out, Europe will rapidly become an underdeveloped territory.

Mr. Giordani and Mr. Etzel agreed entirely with Mr. Armand’s presentation.

In reply, the Secretary said their presentation fell on sympathetic ears. He was particularly struck by the reference to the ambitious nature of the program, which demonstrated the way in which nations can now satisfy their ambitions. Formerly, such ambitions were satisfied by dominating others, but that epoch is ended. A new vista is now opening, in which ambitions can be satisfied through constructive channels such as the one of which the “Wise Men” spoke. The Secretary recalled that the Japanese had tried too long to satisfy their ambitions by dominating others, and that at the end of the war people wondered how a nation of 80 million could live confined to a few islands; however, Japan has prospered during the last years through her own development. The vision which the “Wise Men” have brought was of profound political significance as demonstrating how nations could be great without measuring greatness in terms of control over others.

The Secretary continued that he was also struck by the proposition that while initially they might get help from the United States (and he hoped they would), the Europeans in the context of a program such as the “Wise Men” had described, could eventually return this help with interest. Europe’s scientific minds were unequaled, and her high power costs gave her the economic incentive; thus was created a basis for cooperation quite apart from the great interest which the United States took in seeing Europe, so long the cradle of Western civilization, survive and grow stronger.

Mr. Armand said that to associate peoples you need both fear and hope, and both of these elements are present in Europe today. There is fear of the consequences of an energy shortage and of the events in the Middle East, and hope of success if Europe and the United States can cooperate in this field. Faced with this common danger and with the common hope, Europe can succeed. The Secretary replied that he hoped they would.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 840.1901/2–457. Confidential. Drafted by Cleveland on February 8. The EURATOM “Wise Men” were in the United States for an official 12-day visit, February 3–14, at the invitation of the Secretary of State and the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission. For text of the Department of the Department of State press release announcing their visit, see Department of State Bulletin, February 18, 1957, p. 250.