20. Telegram From the United States Delegation at the North Atlantic Council Ministerial Meeting to the Department of State 1

Polto 2019. 1. First session NATO Ministerial meeting opened 10:15 a.m. May 4 with short remarks by Chairman (Gudmundsson, Iceland).2 Suggested Council work must be sketched in sufficiently broad lines to satisfy expectations which this meeting has aroused. Whatever decided should show way clearly to future policies of action which can be taken either within NATO or elsewhere to achieve our aims. Public opinion in NATO countries feels something ought to be done meet new Soviet challenge. Concern that ties which bind us must be strengthened and that NATO countries act in closest cooperation not merely military but also political and economic spheres. Hoped this meeting would enable FonMins establish clearly our aims. Press in NATO countries has built up this meeting so that peoples are expecting decisions as momentous as those reached at Lisbon NATO meeting.3 This poses problem with respect to communiqué. Asked how Ministers wish handle drafting communiqué. Would they wish entrust task to group of Ministers? Pineau opposed suggestion on ground would be difficult for other Ministers criticize work done by several of their colleagues. Prefer drafting group made up of PermReps or officials. Spaak, saying it easier for him criticize fellow Ministers than officials, suggested that decision re handling of communique 1 be postponed until discussion had evolved to some extent. Chairman suggested and Council agreed that after item II(b) [Page 58] of agenda, Council turn to items III(a) and (b), and then return to Item II(c).

2. After Ismay had briefly presented item I of agenda, Chairman called attention Working Group report on Soviet policy and other reference documents,4 and asked Lloyd open discussion on agenda item II(a). Lloyd reported on BulganinKhrushchev visit along lines known to Department. He added that Brit have overall impression visit may mark beginning improvement Soviet relations with rest world. Lloyd does not think Soviets want war, nor to risk a war. He feels Soviets wish be accepted as respectable member family of nations. Russians still thinking of “steamroller” tactics. However, not military but technical, economic, surplus arms, etc. Lloyd went on to speculate what is happening inside Soviet Union itself. Middle class emerging and private property permitted. Can Soviet state contain pressures generated by this kind evolution? Objective of Communist domination of world remains same, though tactics changed. New tactics are massive penetration economic, technical, cultural of rest world. Russia has appeal to under-developed and uncommitted countries. Was under-developed herself. Need for NATO greater than ever. Must be ready change our tactics. Must retain military strength and nuclear deterrent, but must review pattern our forces. Must revise and preserve political aspect alliance. Find ways and means of competing with new political and economic threat. Co-existence challenge must be met on worldwide basis. Not much time to decide on action we must set in train. Russians have been moving with their new policy for better part of year. Must hold fast to basic concept NATO alliance. Attack on one is attack on all. Our continued unity will be our strength.

3. Koprulu said peaceful co-existence is Stalinist conception. Return to Leninism means nothing. Previously Stalin had called for peaceful co-existence when Soviets needed peace on their frontiers in order to cope with internal problems. This maneuver had been purely tactical, strategy had remained the same, that of Lenin, world domination. Today parallel situation, Soviets need peace, are resorting to same maneuver. Must draw attention our peoples that Soviet professions of peace not corroborated by facts. If we fail to do this risk compromise our security. If we allow public opinion believe there is chance Soviets sincere, we playing with fire. Khrushchev says imperialism continues exist, and that causes of war always present. Cannot forget aim of Communism always remains same. Agreement [Page 59] in Council on analysis of Soviet political trends not sufficient; must strive to draw from these exchanges of views principles of common action. Convinced NATO countries can do more in gradually developing closer cooperation. Soviet policy in long run founded on exploitation of weaknesses of free world. Since Geneva, Soviets seem prefer bilateral contacts with NATO countries. Therefore we must strive establish as close political coordination as possible.

4. Hansen added details regarding his recent visit Soviet Union.5 Khrushchev had said NATO came into existence under influence war psychosis caused to some extent by Soviet policies, and it understandable, according to Khrushchev, that Denmark “jumped into jaws US.” Khrushchev frank in saying Soviets aiming at dissolution NATO. As long as West does not lose sight real motives behind Soviet readiness to be “on speaking terms” with West, Hansen felt East–West contacts could be continued and that scales might be turned in favor West.

5. Lange said Soviet leaders may be groping for way out of complete isolation and may have sincere desire lessen tension. If so, completely negative West attitude might strengthen elements in Russia seeking return hard Stalinist policies. Taking some risks might strengthen hands those seeking modify Stalinist policies. Lange discouraged over Soviet attitude toward disarmament, but Russians should be tried out on other questions, such as trade. Expanded trade contacts with Bloc might encourage Russians relax grip on satellites.

6. Secretary spoke next. Summary his remarks being transmitted in separate message.6

7. Martino feared history shows collegium may be followed by other dictatorship. Raised question whether closer East-West contacts good for states with strong Communist parties. Italy has so far said no cooperation without solution real problems, e.g., Germany. To offer cooperation now would give appearance we have abandoned hope solution those problems.

8. Spaak referred recent evidence lack coordination policies among NATO countries, and conflicts between them. Re new Soviet tactics, not adopted just to impress US. Soviet leaders have been forced to take some steps because of internal pressures. However, there could be internal changes in Soviet Union but no changes in Soviet foreign policy, whose aims are disappearance NATO, refusal settle great problems of world, prevent European integration, hope of Communist triumph throughout world not by force but because of decline of West. We must “relaunch” Atlantic pact and at this meeting reaffirm our Alliance and solidarity. Should recall why NATO [Page 60] created the necessity of pooling our efforts. NATO not just military alliance. Also political alliance, formed to defend certain ideas. This defense must also be common. NATO still vital. Must spread our own ideas. Point out to Soviet leaders we first to fight Stalinism and we glad see they now approve policy we have long followed. There must be adaptation by NATO nations in common of Atlantic political policy. Be bold yet cautious. Willing establish contacts but exchanges must be reciprocal. Also should broaden trade relations. Should show Russians up on their position of refusing accept control of disarmament. All these would constitute adaptation in common of Atlantic policy. Spaak then turned to Articles 2 and 4 of NAT.7 Need find formula for political consultation. Coordination of policy good before Geneva but since then number difficulties have arisen. Criticism should be expressed Council before being made public, so that solution can be sought. Entrust organization of this consultation to PermReps who should have clear guidance. Re Article II, not easy give new content to this. For example, is it wise place aid to underdeveloped countries under NATO “hat”? This could work against us. Could we convince under-developed countries NATO economic aid to them given without military and political strings? He has serious doubts these scores and wishes know opinions his colleagues these questions. There has been enough propaganda re economic functions NATO; must now pass to actualities, if possible. Communiqué must reaffirm necessity Atlantic alliance. We must adapt ourselves to new situation, which gives new reason for reasserting our unity and solidarity.

9. Pineau said he believed Soviets must be interpreted not on basis their internal declaration (e.g. 20th Congress)8 but on our contacts with them. Differed with Martino on question contacts, which Pineau felt necessary. Important not to renounce our defense effort, but must take advantage what is happening in Soviet Union. NATO countries give impression we less peaceful than Soviets, who always talk of peace. This has aided growth Communism in some Western countries. We must begin speak more than Soviets of disarmament. Cultural and intellectual contacts with Soviets are important and West has nothing to lose, since Communist parties in West already propagandize for Soviets. West has no party inside Russia and must penetrate Soviets through technicians, students, etc., with our idea of liberty. If West remains on defensive, Soviets will have initiative.

  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 740.5/5–556. Secret. Drafted by Timmons. Transmitted in two sections and repeated to the other NATO capitals.
  2. The summary, C–R(56)20, and verbatim, C–VR(56)20, records of this session, both dated May 4, are ibid., Conference Files: Lot 62 D 181, CF 696 and CF 706.
  3. For documentation on the North Atlantic Council meeting in Lisbon, February 20–25, 1952, see Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. v, Part 1, pp. 107 ff.
  4. Copies of the 10-page Report by the Working Group on Trends of Soviet Policy, C–M(56)49, dated April 20; the 6-page report on Soviet Economic Penetration, C–M(56)52, dated April 24; and the 4-page report on the Soviet Sixth Five Year Plan, C–M(56)50, dated April 26, are in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 62 D 181, CF 694.
  5. Hansen made an official State visit to the Soviet Union, March 2–6, 1956.
  6. Polto 2018, infra .
  7. Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty encouraged development of the nonmilitary aspects of NATO. Article 4 obligated the Allies to consult if one of them was threatened.
  8. Reference is to Khrushchev’s secret speech of February 25, 1956, delivered at the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in Moscow, February 14–25, 1956.