Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Western European Security and Integration, Volume IV

181. Memorandum of a Conversation, Paris, July 14, 1956¹

Paris, July 14, 1956

PARTICIPANTS

• Jean Monnet—European Political Action Committee
• Max Kohnstamm—Secretary to Mr. Monnet
• Robert W. Barnett—Counselor for Economic Affairs, Embassy

SUBJECT

• European integration

I dined with M. Monnet and Mr. Kohnstamm this evening and obtained from them their comment upon the significance of the French Assembly debate and vote on EURATOM and the Common Market,²

M. Monnet expressed the view that the debate and vote had given an enormous boost to the prospects for drafting significant six country treaties on EURATOM and the common market. He mentioned, in particular, the speeches of M. Mollet and M. Armand. The Mollet speech, he felt, would give to the French Delegation at Brussels a negotiating flexibility permitting advances substantially beyond the concepts contained in the Spaak Report. The Armand speech was a tour de force of illumination and clarification. From it many deputies got their first real understanding of the elements of promise and danger involved in developing an atomic art. M. Monnet summed up by saying that France should no longer be regarded as constituting the real block to atomic integration.

The real problem, M. Monnet declared, was now to be found in Germany. And, the heart of that problem lay in the political and industrial interests arguing among themselves on the issue of ownership of nuclear materials. If the United States wished, at this stage, to make a contribution to resolution, constructively, of this controversy, it should find an appropriate occasion for making the simple declaration to the Germans that—whether in a EURATOM bilateral or a national bilateral—the United States would require that title to U.S. provided nuclear materials would be taken and held by an authority comparable to our AEC, competent and capable of performing on that undertaking. M. Monnet said that he was not suggesting that the United States should say more. The Germans should, themselves, weigh the relative advantages of joining or not joining EURATOM. But the Germans should not be left in doubt as to United States unwillingness to enter into bilateral arrangements which would permit the German Government to turn over title to nuclear material to private industrial interests.

M. Monnet said that he believed that the interest of the OEEC in atomic energy matters had not, in any way, increased difficulties lying in the path of Six Country atomic integration. The British had, perhaps, tried to confuse issues in the OEEC context, but this would have happened whether or not the OEEC discussions were going forward. Mr. Monnet did, however, question the wisdom of the speed and extent of the U.S. bilateral program. He understood fully the logic of saying that, for example, the U.S.–Netherlands bilateral did not conflict with future U.S.–EURATOM bilateral arrangements because the U.S. could do more with the latter than the former. This was, M. Monnet suggested, “French logic”, because nothing at all could be done with EURATOM until it existed. The conclusion of the bilaterals raised profound doubts in many influential quarters as to whether it was necessary to bring EURATOM into existence.

Without elaboration, M. Monnet said that the French atomic military program is a myth. There is, therefore, no substantial reason why, at least for the foreseeable period, any French interests will be injured by creation of a EURATOM devoted to peaceful purposes. M. Monnet went on to say that, taking the very long view, he was convinced that there was certain to be a U.S.–U.S.S.R. Atomic Agreement, and that it might be in a EURATOM that a prototype for its terms might well be found.³

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 840.1901/7–1856. Confidential. Drafted by Barnett. Transmitted to the Department in despatch 42 from Paris, July 18. In a covering note, Barnett stated that particular attention should be drawn to Monnet’s suggestion “that the United States Government should not leave the Germans in doubt ‘as to United States willingness to enter into bilateral arrangements which would permit the German Government to turn over title to nuclear material to private industrial interests’.”
2. On July 11, the French National Assembly voted 332 to 181 (with 70 abstentions) for cooperation on EURATOM with the other five ECSC nations.
3. A Ministerial Council meeting of the OEEC was held in Paris, July 17–19. The Council, among other matters, approved the Report of the Special Committee for Nuclear Energy, which had been set up in June 1955, and established Working Groups to cooperate with the Brussels Intergovernmental Committee with regard to joint action by OEEC member countries in the field of nuclear energy and on the proposed free trade area in Europe. The text of the OEEC resolution concerning liaison with the Intergovernmental Committee is printed in Royal Institute of International Affairs, Documents on International Affairs, 1956, p. 699.