Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Western European Security and Integration, Volume IV

168. Memorandum of a Conversation, Paris, April 28, 1956¹

Paris, April 28, 1956

PRESENT

• Mr. Jean Monnet
• Lewis L. Strauss, Chairman, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission
• Howard A. Robinson

During a previous conversation, at the residence, between M. Maurice Faure and Admiral Strauss, at which M. Monnet was present, the Chairman had indicated, in reply to a direct question by M. Faure, that the U.S. would probably make more atomic materials and information available to European nations through Euratom than it would, in the near future, make available bilaterally.² Subsequent to this conversation, Admiral Strauss indicated informally to M. Monnet that the AEC would shortly be in a position to announce further details concerning conditions and regulations under which the U.S. Government could undertake the release of the 20,000 kg. of enriched uranium recently announced by President Eisenhower. The Chairman added that it was his usual practice to make such announcements while Congress was in session in order that the Congress might be properly informed beforehand. He intended to follow this practice again in the announcement under consideration. This meant that the statement would probably have to be made before the middle of June inasmuch as Congress would probably adjourn early, due to the forthcoming election.

In this same connection Admiral Strauss indicated to M. Monnet privately that in case Euratom was actually formed it was the United States’ intention to allocate certain amounts of material to it. Admiral Strauss wondered whether such an announcement concerning Euratom should not be made as part of his statement on U–235 release, and asked for M. Monnet’s private opinion on the matter. M. Monnet asked for time to consider the matter and a meeting was arranged for April 28.

1. The question was reopened at the beginning of the April 28th meeting. In replying M. Monnet stated that in his personal opinion it would be difficult for public opinion at this time to understand why the U.S. would allocate materials to Euratom before the latter had been formed. He was afraid that the public might conclude that pressure was being brought to bear on Europe by the United States in order to cause Euratom’s coming into being. Since Euratom’s formation was primarily a matter for Europeans to decide by themselves, M. Monnet advised the Chairman to await a later date before making the announcement. M. Monnet was fully cognizant of the desirability of informing the Congress, but he felt that any announcement should follow the raising of the question by the Euratom powers rather than precede it. It was possible that Euratom could raise such questions after the May 29th Ministerial meeting but one really should wait for the outcome of that meeting before reaching a conclusion.

2. M. Monnet discussed briefly the difficulties inherent for Euratom in the weapons problem. The Chairman agreed that any decision on weapons necessarily raises difficult problems for every country.

3. M. Monnet raised the question of ownership versus leasing of fissionable materials and the bearing which this had on the current Euratom negotiations. He expressed the view that material should be sold to Euratom by the United States for subsequent leasing to the various users. He also remarked that it was very important that inspection and control requirements, which would undoubtedly be required by U.S. law, should be exercised by Euratom itself. M. Monnet went on to explain that allotment of material by Euratom itself would be made not to countries but to individual public and private users. In case of infringement or diversion by any such groups, recourse would be had to the international court set up as part of the Euratom organizational framework. Decisions of this court were obligatory on national courts.

With regard to the problem of ownership, the Chairman remarked that the matter would have to be considered in the light of U.S. policy toward U.S. industry. It would, of course, be impossible to consider putting European industry in any preferred position over U.S. industry. With regard to the court handling of infringements or diversions, the court set up would seem like a satisfactory solution.

4. In closing, the Chairman raised the question as to whether the formation of Euratom might not in fact mean the socialization of the atomic industry in Europe. M. Monnet replied that such would not be the case. Euratom cannot in any sense affect either the property rights or laws existing in several countries, nor can it influence the relation between public and private enterprises in the States. Euratom had in fact two purposes which were far removed from ideas of socialization; Euratom’s primary objectives were (1) to stimulate and ensure European atomic development on a sufficiently broad base to allow furnishing such needs of the area as could not be done nationally and, (2) to furnish a satisfactory mechanism whereby fissionable material would be subjected to the necessary security controls.

1. Source: Department of State, Atomic Energy Files: Lot 57 D 688, Euratom—Regional. Secret. Presumably drafted by Robinson.
2. No record of this conversation has been found in Department of State files.