Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Western European Security and Integration, Volume IV

162. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, March 1, 1956, 4:15 p.m.¹

Washington, March 1, 1956, 4:15 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

• The Secretary
• Minister Martino
• Ambassador Brosio
• C. Burke Elbrick

Minister Martino said he did not want to take much of the Secretary’s time but that there were a few matters he felt he should take up while in Washington. He handed the Secretary a memorandum expressing the Italian Government’s interest in the industrial use of nuclear energy and in the establishment of a power reactor.² Martino said that President Gronchi had talked to Admiral Strauss about this during his visit and the latter had said he would make appropriate recommendations. The Italian Government had now decided it would like to commence negotiation regarding establishment of a power reactor. The Secretary said he was sure we were disposed to enter into such negotiations. He said it was our desire, in making bilateral arrangements, not to interfere in any way with the creation of EURATOM and he was glad to note that the Italian memorandum took this into account.

Martino said that Italy considers EURATOM to be an extremely important development towards which the Italian Government will continue to work, and he repeated what President Gronchi had already said in his conversations in Washington to the effect that EURATOM can only be established with the support of the United States Government. The Secretary said he was sure that EURATOM could count on help from more than one country. He pointed out that the operation of power reactors requires careful supervision and he felt that EURATOM would provide a more effective control than could be expected from individual countries. He believed that on a power basis the cost of the establishment and operation of a power reactor would be very high and that it would be better for the European countries to pursue this development collectively, rather than individually.

Martino said that when Prime Minister Eden was in Washington he understood that he and President Eisenhower had discussed European integration. He was aware that the United Kingdom opposed the common market, a matter which had just been discussed at the OEEC Ministerial meeting in Paris. He said that the Messina recommendations had a political as well as an economic goal and that the Italian Government was more interested in seeing a political unity brought about in Europe. He asked whether the Secretary could tell him what had transpired during the Eden–Eisenhower discussions. The Secretary said that the two had reached no agreement. The United States favors the establishment of a common market and the United Kingdom does not, basing its reasoning on the alleged fact that the French would insist on high tariff walls and would not participate in a common market under any other conditions. We in the United States do not expect that the common market would result in such a high tariff policy and we feel it would eventually lead to political integration. The Eden–Eisenhower conversation cannot be said to have resulted in a change of position on either side. It is difficult to estimate just how far the United Kingdom was prepared to go, but it is our definite impression that while it had adopted a neutral attitude toward EURATOM, it will continue to oppose the establishment of a common market. Martino asked whether, in the event the common market is established in the face of British opposition, the British would retire from the Western European Union. The Secretary said that he could not answer the question but he felt the British would not take any such action. In any event, he hoped the European nations involved would go forward with their plans. President Gronchi had mentioned several times his interest in moving forward in this field and doing something dynamic which would stimulate the interest of the peoples of the Western countries. The best way to accomplish this, in the Secretary’s opinion, was through European integration. Such a development would create a great center of political and economic power which would stir the imagination of all peoples and create a great new force in the world. A real supranational authority can accomplish great things.

Martino said that the great difficulty in bringing about this development lay in the political situation in France. Pineau had said that the French would not wish to push the idea of a common market until after EURATOM were established, since he felt it would be easier to obtain parliamentary approval of the latter. Italy, on the other hand, wants the two to go ahead in parallel, always with political integration as the ultimate goal. Recently Prime Minister Segni and Martino had talked to Adenauer on this subject and the latter had been very firm in his support, even to the point of suggesting that the five nations “go it alone” without France if necessary. While the five countries are fully determined to maintain the momentum thus far achieved, Martino felt that it would be extremely difficult to omit France from any planning for European integration. The Secretary said that if the French were convinced that the five countries might proceed without France, it might well influence them to go along.

[Here follows discussion of matters unrelated to European integration.]

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 840.1901/3–156. Confidential. Drafted by Elbrick. Foreign Minister Martino was accompanying Italian President Giovanni Gronchi, who arrived in the United States on February 27 for an official 17-day visit. On February 29, Gronchi spoke with Secretary of State Dulles and expressed the view that U.S. support was crucial for the movement toward European integration. A memorandum of that conversation, along with extensive documentation on the Gronchi visit, is scheduled for publication in a forthcoming Foreign Relations volume.
2. Not found in Department of State files.