Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Western European Security and Integration, Volume IV

145. Letter From the Special Assistant to the Ambassador in France (Robinson) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning (Bowie)¹

Paris, 27 December 1955.

Dear Mr. Bowie: It seems that the march of events since the atomic meeting in Geneva is forcing the U.S. into making basic atomic policy decisions which may be drastically different from those under which we have hitherto been operating. At the time that Mr. Acheson was Secretary,² it was departmental working policy that atomic energy coin should only be paid out in cases of atomic energy benefit, the corollary being that the U.S. ought never to attempt to use the atom in any way to foster or force non-atomic political results. I believe now that this policy should be seriously rescrutinized, for it is clear that the U.S. possesses at this moment a political weapon in atomic energy, the value of which is currently at its maximum. It is too soon to prophesy how quickly this coin will deteriorate in value, but it is quite certain that if it is to be used as a basis for solving certain problems immediately facing us, the basic decisions will surely have to be taken very quickly. It goes without saying that in seeking what might be called extra curricular political benefits by such means that we must be extremely careful to safeguard basic U.S. interests in the atomic field itself.

As I told you last Saturday, it seems clear that the present “atoms for peace” plan, great and helpful as it is, is not well designed to answer the atomic needs of Western Europe. Since I have been back from the U.S. for several months, I cannot hope to include in this letter suggestions on the problems now being raised which would in all cases be practical solutions to the internal problems which these same questions raise at home. It is necessary to content oneself then with presenting suggestions which could help to satisfy the purely European needs and leave to you the evaluation of such suggestions and the manner in which they must be handled with our colleagues in the Department and the Commission.

As a result of the President’s Penn State speech, it is clear that the U.S. has promised atomic power aid to the world as a whole, in some undefined manner.³ The question arises therefore as to what form this aid should take in Western Europe and whether or not this aid should be a mere donation or whether we should not in fact extract non-atomic political benefits to the U.S. as a price for its transfer. I am strongly of the opinion that aid in the power field should be transferred only at a price, and would now like to discuss the political problems and decisions which such a policy would entail.

The first point which emerges of course is the fact that whatever policy is chosen must of necessity solve the security problem raised by the production of plutonium or uranium 233 in foreign power reactors. We must be realistic about this point; it is clear that a fifth country, namely France, will be in possession of substantial plutonium stocks very shortly. In point of fact such stocks will begin to accrue to France in quantity sufficient for weapons manufacture during the year 1957; her first production reactor will go into operation next week. If we do not, in the Immediate future, come to some understanding with France regarding the disposition of this plutonium for peacetime uses, we may assuredly expect that the French military and rightist groups will demand access to at least part of these stocks for weapons use.

Furthermore, in spite of the WEU accords, the presence of atomic weapons in the hands of France is bound to raise problems vis-à-vis the Germans which would result in placing great if not fatal strains on the present tenuous relationship. We therefore came face to face immediately with the basic problem, that is the Franco-German relationship. But before discussing this point in further detail I should like to interrupt the train of thought in order to discuss a more general problem first.

As you know, in feeling around over the past six months to find a solution to some of these problems, the U.S. has embarked simultaneously on two parallel courses of action. It seems that the time has now come when we should examine these courses in order to fit them together as part of a whole, and in an effort to see what the U.S. itself can gain. These courses of action have been (a) attempts at forming an international atomic agency, (b) an interim solution aimed primarily at saving time, which has led us along the path of the various bilateral agreements. It would seem that the first of these had become so important a part of our policy that it could not be abandoned at this point. This is perhaps just as well, inasmuch as the Agency is worldwide in its action and thus will have reasons for its existence independent of any auxiliary action which we may think necessary in Europe or elsewhere. We must be continuously aware of the fact that differences in technical capabilities between countries and areas could well impose upon us the necessity of several types of atomic action, with such action probably varying from area to area. We cannot expect that a solution valid in Asia or even in South America will be valid in Europe. I believe that the Agency will be of most use to the underdeveloped countries of the world and should be so designed. This is of course equivalent to saying that the Agency cannot be expected to have access to classified material.

As I would see the Agency, it should be a place where the major powers can pool knowledge through the uses of libraries and training centers, pool a certain amount of fissionable material which would become available to anyone needing it, and above all provide a place of ownership or of redistribution for the plutonium or other fissionable materials produced in reactors coming under its jurisdiction. This will of course involve a decision on the part of the U.S. Government not to demand for itself plutonium produced from fertile materials furnished by American sources. In fact the international distribution of the plutonium burden, which in time is bound to become a world problem anyhow, is in itself sufficient reason for continuing with our present Agency plans.

Since any such agency which includes the Russians will undoubtedly be in for a good deal of rough sailing, it seems clear that we must have other strings to our bow; one way of accomplishing this is to maintain the right to enter into agreements with countries or groups of countries when it is to our advantage to do so and whatever the position of the Agency on the matter might be.

The problem in Europe is really not whether we should enter into multilateral agreements as such, but rather a question as to what sort of multilateral agreements will yield the greatest benefits to the United States. There are in existence three multinational groups which would be available for such political purposes. First, NATO itself; second a grouping under the OEEC and third, the approach through the Community of Six. I believe that whatever approach we use could and should be designed to tighten the already existing bonds between ourselves and the European area. It is for this reason that I have suggested in the first part of this letter that we embark on a policy of using the atom for political purposes.

It is clear from well understood lines of reasoning that a powerful pro-American European economic unit is very desirable from the American point of view; it seems equally clear as a result of the EDC failure that one must look to the United States to provide some additional bonding incentive which will insure the holding together of such a European unit. It appears that atomic energy might well be such an incentive, not so much because of the immediate economic benefits, which will start out by being small, but rather because the emotionalism surrounding atomic energy at the moment might serve as an answer to the negative emotionalism left as an aftermath of the EDC. On the other hand, while we would hope that Euratom would pass the a six-parliament test, we cannot ignore the danger that it might not. It does not seem possible that the U.S. would ever wish to provide an international agency consisting of 80 some odd nations, with classified information or with some of the other more attractive bits of atomic trading material such as substantial amounts of enriched material, but it does not seem entirely impossible that a basic decision could be made to provide such things to selected countries or to selected groups of countries.

I do not wish to appear to recommend at this time just how the particular group forming such a unit should be selected. It would seem desirable to build around the group of NATO powers as such as well as to help certain of the neutral countries such as Sweden, Switzerland and Austria. The extent to which Euratom will in fact have supranational powers is itself going to be extremely controversial and this point may be expected to raise opposition from certain groups.

Since the Coal and Steel Community has already given us the concept of the Community of Six, however, and since any effort to enlarge this grouping and still achieve supranationality would lead to enormous difficulties, I believe it worthwhile analyzing in some detail the practical problems which would face us and the benefits which would accrue to us if we were temporarily to consider some special action with regard to the Community countries by themselves. This is not really equivalent to abandoning the more desirable NATO grouping inasmuch as the Monnet resolution⁴ makes provision for the adherence of additional members; furthermore, starting with the Community has the great advantage of encompassing the Franco-German problem from the beginning.

In other words, while I believe a larger grouping would be highly desirable, from a practical point of view if we only secure the continued adherence of Germany to the Western world, I believe we will have accomplished a very great deal indeed. I need only point out to you the enormous power left in the hands of the Soviets vis-à-vis Germany, first by the occupation of East Germany and second by Russian control over the Oder-Neisse line. The time is going to come when the United States and Europe combined are going to have to exercise the greatest possible attraction to enable the Germans to overcome Soviet blandishments stemming from these two Soviet trump cards.

As you know from your conversations with Monnet, he is currently planning a meeting of his International Committee for January 17 and 18, at which time he hopes to have the Committee accept the resolution which you have seen. The last paragraph of this resolution recommends to the parliaments of the six countries that a treaty embodying the point set forth in the resolution be submitted to the parliaments by April 30, 1956. Monnet seems very hopeful that the Committee will act to pass the resolution and that the resulting political effect in Europe will be very great. It seems highly unlikely that the April 30 deadline will be met, but in any event any part we play in this maneuver must be worked out and played in the time between the passing of the resolution and the subsequent parliamentary action.

I would like to draw your attention to the fact that the Monnet resolution goes far beyond the conclusions of the original Brussels report in at least three ways. First, the resolution clearly is designed to bind Euratom toward working in the field of peaceful atomic uses only. This point, while inherent in the original Brussels report, is in no place so clearly spelled out. Second, the resolution definitely puts Euratom under the Coal and Steel Community Assembly and thus much more clearly emphasizes the supranational aspect of Euratom. Third, the resolution binds the committee to work definitely for a common European market, at least in the field of atomic energy. The original report, while recommending this same attack, seems not to be quite so forceful. Furthermore we must always keep in mind that the Brussels report only suggests that 15% of the various national atomic budgets be turned over to Euratom. It seems clear, therefore, that publication of the Monnet resolution will force into the open a good deal of opposition which may, at the moment, be in hiding. We are clearly going to be in a much better position to assess the practical possibilities of Euratom after the resolution has appeared.

Monnet has pressed me in the strongest possible terms to ask the Department not to conclude any further power reactor agreements during the coming spring months. He is particularly anxious that the U.S. not enter into an agreement with France at this point, nor with Germany. I have pointed out to him that the German Cabinet has decided in the last few weeks to approach the American Government for a bilateral agreement on research reactors and have told him two things. First, the U.S., because of the President’s own statements, could not refuse a research bilateral to Germany at this time should the latter actually request it, and second, that I would be very much afraid of the effect on French public opinion if a research bilateral were signed in the near future with Germany and not with France. I have told him that the French Government has refused, as of this moment, to request from us a normal research bilateral, in spite of the fact that they could certainly use the material thus provided for a part of their contemplated program. Monnet sees the point of this and will discuss the problem with Armand within the next few days in order to see whether it would not be possible to get France also to apply for a research bilateral.

In the original draft of this letter I had suggested that the Department put off initiating a research bilateral with Germany until after January 17 because of the effect here in Paris and the possible effect on the French members of Monnet’s Committee. Events have, however, moved too quickly and the press has already carried notices concerning the forthcoming U.S.-German negotiations. The crypto-Communists daily Libération on December 23 headlined its report “German-American Blackmail puts French Atomic Industry in Peril.” The whole article will be found in Embassy Despatch 1236⁵ for your further consideration.

Monnet is of course fully cognizant of the many difficulties ahead in his attempts to have Euratom formed. He analyzes the difficulties as first, those due to the German industrialists, of which we are all so very aware; second, those due to the “French technicians” including the military who desire to maintain uranium ore accruing to France from the metropolitan area or from the colonies, for a French weapons endeavor. (It is thus clear that there are powerful persons in France who will be opposed to the Euratom project and this is one indication as to who, in addition to the opponents of supranationality, will be in opposition and of the point around which they will be rallying.)

Monnet’s third listed difficulty in the way of Euratom’s formation is the American and British bilateral with Belgium, and this point is one on which we must reach a policy decision in the near future. Monnet believes it will be impossible to form a group in which one member of the Community will have access to information or material which other members of the Community do not possess. I believe that this is a valid point. According to Monnet, Spaak has promised him that Belgium will be willing to release this restricted information to Euratom if the latter be founded and if the U.S. will agree. If this should be true, (and I believe that the U.S. should check this point privately with Spaak) the first decision which we have to make if whether the U.S. is ready and able to extend a most favored national clause to the restricted atomic data in Belgium’s possession, at least insofar as the other members of the Community are concerned. Our relations with Belgium in the field are of course fundamental.

I agree with Mr. Monnet in that I do not believe that Euratom can be founded unless we are in a position to answer this question substantially in the affirmative.

In my discussions with Monnet, I have pointed out that there seemed to me to be other difficulties which will have to be surmounted in the attempt to form Euratom. The first of these he also agrees will be a serious additional obstacle. This is the question which would arise if one of the other NATO powers, let us say Norway or Denmark, should ask to join Euratom subsequent to its formation. One of the main reasons, at least from the European viewpoint, for the formation of Euratom is that such action would set a European unit on the path toward becoming eventually independent of the U.S., at least so far as atomic power is concerned. One of the most jealously guarded prerogative of this independence would be the right to accept other free countries into Euratom without an American veto. We thus have the most favored nation dilemma again in a second and more difficult form. Would the U.S. agree to allow other countries in Western Europe to adhere to Euratom if such new countries would agree to the necessary security provisions which would already have been setup and agreed to by us? To me this seem a much more difficult question to answer affirmatively than the first and I can only recommend that when the study is made of the first question, that some attempt also be made to find a satisfactory formula for the second. If we use the NATO formula in the sense that we would consent to the adherence of other nations of the NATO group without further question on our part, then we will still not have provided for the three neutrals, Sweden, Switzerland and Austria. It may well be that this is one of the prices of being neutral; at any rate I have not been able to think the problem through in any way as to yield a solution which would not at the same time raise most difficult problems requiring special Congressional action.

If the Monnet resolution is passed in its present form, and is eventually accepted by the several parliaments (and this is a very big if indeed), it would mean that the powers entering Euratom would have renounced, as a unit, the right to manufacture atomic weapons. It is Monnet’s intention, although it is not spelled out in his resolution (and again many ifs are involved), the French plutonium would be part of the assets which France would bring to the new organization. The U.S. then would have transplanted to Euratom the problems inherent in French, or for that matter, European possession of weapons and the problem of the disposition of the plutonium or uranium 233 produced in the continental power program. Since this area will in time be undoubtedly the greatest source of such materials, effective control is essential. The extent to which Euratom would be in a position to exercise control remains to be seen, but it is hard to conceive of the U.S. being in a position to do so indefinitely by itself. The decision as to which type of control (U.S. or Euratom) should be tried is a basic one for the United States. While we will have to offer encouragement at all stages, we cannot very well take the decision until the Euratom treaty is finalized, and, remembering the fate of the EDC, it should certainly not take effect unless and until the Euratom treaty does.

I would like to add one further note at this point. The simplest solution for the U.S. in this dilemma, and one which I am sure will be discussed at home, is the possibility of declassifying reactor power data in order to get around the complications inherent in the transfer of such data to other countries. I cannot emphasize strongly enough that such action would appear to be a very grave mistake on our part. In the first place we are always going to be faced with a demand for something which is hidden behind our security screen or which the European countries suspect is hidden there. The problem therefore is one which will always be with us and one which it is far better to face squarely from the very beginning. Furthermore, if we consent only to the transfer of nonclassified data, we have doomed Euratom to extinction before it starts, for the real binding power in the organization, at least in the beginning, is going to be the right to receive something which no other country or group of countries can get, that is, information which is classified. The act of declassifying, therefore, seems to me to destroy any hope of finding a strong enough cement with which to get the organization started.

A further matter which must be kept in mind is the problem which is now under consideration by the Commission as a result of a British démarche to Gerry Smith. What is the U.S. attitude toward the building of a U–235 enrichment plant in Europe? The French claim to have spent $1,000,000 on research towards such a plant already. It has not been possible for us to check how far they might have succeeded but I am under the impression that progress has not been too satisfactory and the Brussels report intimates that design information for such a plant would be expected of us. Dr. Kenneth Davis, AEC Director of Reactor Development, appears to feel that such a path may well turn out to be uneconomical for the future. I believe that in return for assurances on our part of the availability of a satisfactory amount of enriched material over the next five year period the Europeans might be convinced that the construction of such a plant could be put off for that period, provided we promised to discuss the matter with them again before the end of the period. By some such maneuver we could hope to limit the transferal of restricted data to that involving reactor construction and could hope to get around the difficulty presented by restricted data in the gaseous diffusion field.

In conclusion then, what I am essentially proposing seems to be the following:

1. That the United States proceed with negotiations for an international atomic energy agency but at the same time keep a free hand so that we may use the atom as a political lever unhampered by Russian interference.

2. In return for an adequate control system to be established over fissionable material, the U.S. consider offering to a Western Europe grouping access to much of the same information which American industry already has access to. This is equivalent to saying that some restricted data in the confidential category be made available to certain multilateral groups. It is desirable in the case of Europe that this grouping contain as many countries as possible. The Community of Six grouping, however, offers certain possible advantages, such as a measure of supranationality. It would seem desirable therefore to start with this group and attempt to bring other nations into it.

3. We will also have to do what we can to moderate British opposition. Consideration might be given to offering similar information to other Commonwealth nations although I gather that their basic objection is to Euratom itself.

4. Immediately following the January 17 meeting of the Monnet Committee, announce a temporary moratorium on the further negotiation of bilateral power agreements and make clear why we are doing so. Refusal to conclude a bilateral agreement, research or otherwise, will inevitably have some adverse effect on Franco-American relations. I believe, however, that the whole problem should be considered in the broadest and deepest sense. Among the most difficult questions to be considered is whether U.S., Euratom or some other form of control will be most effective in Western Europe over the long term. This involves two factors which cannot yet be assessed with any degree of realism: (1) what power Euratom will finally have, and (2) what the chances are of its actually coming into being.

Sincerely yours,

Howard A. Robinson

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 840.1901/12–2755. Top Secret. In a letter of December 23 to Assistant Secretary Merchant, Theodore C. Achilles, Minister at the Embassy in Paris, indicated that he was in general agreement with the views presented in this letter. “I would hate to see us go up another EDC garden path. Merely doing so would be bad enough, but it would be far worse if it involved detriment to our basic interests in the atomic field. I do not know enough about the subject to know whether it would or not, but we should certainly take an awfully close look.” (Ibid., 840.1901/12–2355)
2. Dean Acheson was Secretary of State from 1949 to 1953.
3. For text of Eisenhower’s commencement address at Pennsylvania State University, delivered on June 11, 1955, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1955 (Washington, 1956).
4. Reference is to a resolution drafted by Monnet and intended for submission to the parliaments of the six ECSC countries for guiding action to the respective Foreign Ministers on the question of European atomic energy integration. The text of the Monnet resolution was transmitted to the Department in telegram 3225 from Paris, January 17. (Department of State, Central Files, 840.1901/1–1756)
5. Dated December 27, not printed. (Ibid., 641.62A97/12–2755)