Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Western European Security and Integration, Volume IV

118. Telegram From the Secretary of State to the Embassy in France¹

Washington, September 1, 1955—6:30 p.m.

842. Ref: Brussels 172² and 24.³ Concerned at possible implications renewed British pressure for OEEC representations on Steering Group. Agree OEEC experience should be used in Brussels work. Also desirable that interests OEEC and third countries generally be taken into account in formulating specific provisions of integration measures, if decision undertake such measures forthcoming. Competence and experience of OEEC however already available to Brussels committee; e.g. Armand, leader in OEEC energy work is President of Brussels Nuclear Energy Commission and OEEC observer is present this group. British view that formal OEEC representation on Steering Committee needed to reduce duplication not persuasive.

Our understanding is that Steering Committee is political body attempting reach agreement on extension CSC concept—i.e. further merger of governmental powers in federal institutions. In U.S. view essential value and significance Messina–Brussels meetings will be measured by their success in advancing agreement of this type and not by activity as competitive forum for type cooperative action already effectively provided by OEEC. We see no need for another and smaller OEEC. Appropriate therefore representation on Steering Committee should be from national governments responsibly and directly involved in Community of Six and from CSC itself, whose exercise of governmental powers would be directly affected. OEEC representative could not be associated in major decisions on extension present scope of Community. On contrary, given sufficient voice in Steering Committee could retard or complicate extension of integration along CSC lines. In considering British proposal desirable that Brussels participants should have these pitfalls in mind. FYI British move for OEEC representation may reflect distaste for further CSC-type integration in which they unwilling participate. End FYI.

Department’s general position on relationship OEEC and CSC described in Deptel 3849 to Rome May 30⁴ repeated CSC Country Missions, London, USRO. In short we regard CSC and OEEC as inherently different and not essentially conflicting. If supranational Community of Six extended to embrace additional sectors U.S. would regard this as important relaunching of European integration. OEEC meanwhile can carry on extremely useful work through cooperation of wider group governments acting on national instruction and should continue provide promising framework for further development cooperative arrangements, even in fields where integration amongst fewer countries sought or already achieved. Questions jurisdiction and relations bound to arise, but two institutions considered here as complementary and not mutually exclusive.

Believe strong U.S. interest in European integration warrants U.S. making known to CSC governments and UK, U.S. reaction to British proposal along lines outlined above. Request Spaak be informed.⁵

Dulles

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 840.1901/8–1855. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Boochever and Barnett and approved by C. Burke Elbrick. Also sent to London, Rome, The Hague, Bonn, and Brussels, Luxembourg, and the CSC Mission in Luxembourg. Paris was instructed to pass the telegram to USRO for information.
2. In telegram 172, August 18, the Embassy reported that it had been informed by the British Chargé in Belgium that, on instructions from London, he was going to approach the Belgian Foreign Office that day “to emphasize British interest in having OEEC tied in more closely with work of Inter-Governmental Committee on European integration, particularly in field of nuclear energy.” The Chargé also indicated that similar British approaches were being made at the capitals of the other CSC countries. (Ibid.)

3. Reference is presumably to telegram 214 from Brussels, August 30. That telegram reads as follows:

   “British Chargé tells us Spaak has informed him that within framework of authority he exercises as chairman intergovernmental committee he is inviting OEEC representative participate in steering committee meetings on same basis as CSC High Authority representative.” (Ibid., 840.1901/8–3055)

4. Document 95.
5. The various replies to this telegram, none printed, are in Department of State, Central Files, 840.00 and 840.1901. Polto 294 from Paris, September 2, pointed out that USRO believed, on the basis of its knowledge of OEEC’s attitude, that “representation OEEC as full member Steering Committee will promote US interest in preventing smaller OEEC among six. … We further believe highly unfortunate consequences for US in OEEC if it should become known that US instrumental in insisting OEEC representation on Steering Committee be limited observer status.” USRO suggested that the real problem was the British attitude and that it would be useful to have discussions with the British on the respective roles of the OEEC and the ECSC in an attempt to “sell” U.S. policy as expressed in telegram 842. The Department replied to Polto 294 in Topol 223, also of September 2. That telegram reads as follows: “Since US not member of CSC or participant in Steering Committee, Dept’s 842 was not intended as instruction to make protest but was and is intended to authorize ‘making known’ US views on matter which Spaak and Steering Committee may be in process deciding. Our views based on available information related to OEEC membership as politically responsible participant on Steering Committee, and not staff relationships that might desirably be established with OEEC Secretariat. Agree Polto 294 London consultations with UK desirable in attempt sell our policy Deptel Paris 842.” (Ibid., 840.00/9–255)