107. Telegram From the Secretary of State to the Embassy in Germany1

12. Bonn tel 38892 and D–2661.3 Dept gratified at views expressed by Ophuels on necessity further pursuing European integration. [Page 308] Particularly welcome his recognition need for Europe continue advance beyond cooperation arrangements to Federal institutions, with necessary transfer of sovereign power. Without giving impression U.S. initiative or pressure, Dept wishes encourage and support Germans and other Europeans advocating such views. In general, U.S. prepared indicate approval sound European initiatives toward this type integration when such proposals at sufficiently concrete stage and timing appropriate in relation their acceptance in Europe. (Dept’s thinking on relation cooperative organizations and supranational institutions contained Deptel 3849 to Rome May 30.4)

Re Ophuels’ comments on atomic energy, U.S. looks sympathetically on European initiative for exploring possibilities expanding integration into field peaceful uses atomic energy. For time being, therefore, do not wish encourage Germans to request bilateral agreement with U.S. on peaceful uses although U.S. prepared proceed on basis June 10 invitation if they desire.

Re suggested integration total European energy requirements, not clear what intended by reference to allocation of supply by percentages among several power sources. U.S. would wish discourage arrangement which froze relationship among various sources of energy and seriously limited competition among them.5

  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 840.00/6–1555. Confidential. Drafted by Boochever and approved by Barnett. Repeated for information to Paris, Brussels, The Hague, Rome, London, and Luxembourg; passed to USRO and the CSC Mission.
  2. Telegram 3889, June 14, reads in part as follows:

    “In discussion with Embassy officer at Foreign Office today of current status and prospects European integration in light Messina Conference, Ophuels made following comments:

    “Federal Government including Chancellor have reaffirmed within Government politically urgent necessity of further pursuing practical integration. This necessity arises from two considerations: unless Western European nations integrate further in present period relative prosperity, existing bonds on basis steps already taken could not survive economic depression if one came; also unless Germany integrated with West more closely, growing nationalism could make Federal Republic increasingly susceptible Soviet blandishments especially re neutralization. Way to minimize both these dangers is to achieve soon further close integration from which none of European nations could easily break away; last chance to do so lies in next year. Positive indications US interest in integration needed to maintain momentum. OEEC type relationship would not be tight or strong enough to survive two dangers mentioned.”

    Max Ophuels, Director of the Office of International and Supranational Affairs in the German Foreign Office, emphasized that integration in the field of atomic energy would give an important impulse to the whole integration concept. (Ibid., 850.33/6–1455)

  3. Despatch 2661, June 15, summarized the Federal Republic of Germany’s views on Western European integration. It reads in part as follows:

    “Officials of the Federal Republic Foreign Ministry concerned with European integration say that the Federal Government is firm in its determination to pursue integration as a matter of policy. Concern about the dangers of economic depression and of Soviet appeals to German nationalism are said to underlie this determination. Restraints on progress toward integration are attributed largely to the French, although some internal resistance in the West German Government is acknowledged. While a general supranational approach is considered ideal, the sector approach is accepted as practically attainable, especially with regard to transportation and energy, including atomic energy. This last is in fact seen as most quickly attainable and most susceptible of supranational arrangement, and there is much interest in extent to which the United States might assist.” (Ibid., 840.00/6–1555)

  4. Document 95.
  5. In Colux 1 from Luxembourg, July 7, Eisenberg reported that he conveyed to Mayer and Spierenberg the U.S. views on European atomic energy integration as outlined in telegram 12 to Bonn. Mayer stated that the U.S. position on this issue would be decisive for the success or breakdown of negotiations on integration in the atomic energy field. He also suggested that Spaak should be informed at once about the U.S. views on this issue “and expressed hope no new bilateral atomic energy agreements would be signed by US with any of the six countries during Brussels negotiations.” (Department of State, Central Files, 840.00/7–755)

    In telegram 26 from Brussels, July 8, Ambassador Frederick M. Alger, Jr., offered in part the following views:

    “I have taken no steps to convey to Spaak substance of Department telegram 12 to Bonn and do not think that I should do so until our own thinking has been clarified. I am convinced that Spaak is personally willing to discuss with us any arrangements vis-à-vis French which would be necessary in connection with genuine integration in atomic energy field but Belgians are definitely wary of French moves which have so far appeared to them as means of obtaining Belgian uranium rather than real concern for European integration. It is my understanding that Spaak conveyed idea to French at Messina that Belgian position did not preclude consideration of the question of Belgian uranium in relation to atomic energy pool.” (Ibid., 840.1901/7–855)