Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, China, Volume II

98. Telegram From the Representative at the United Nations (Lodge) to the Department of State¹

New York, February 8, 1955—1 p.m.

453. For the Secretary from Lodge. Re off-shore islands. In accordance with my discussions with you² I called on SYG Hammarskjold this morning. I said that we believed that the SC should not come to a standstill and that something should be done this week, if possible, to keep the momentum going. On other hand, UK and some of our friends appeared to feel that nothing more shld be done in the UN and we did not wish to embarrass them. We had concluded, therefore, that a mtg simply to hear a report by the SYG as to his official correspondence with the ChiComs wld meet the present situation. Such a report, in our opinion, shld be brief and pro forma.

Hammarskjold replied immediately that of course he cld do that, but there was the other problem of Chou’s personal message to him (see mytel 447, February 6)³ which had to be handled in some way outside the UN. I said at once that this was something concerning which the US had no comment to make and that, if he undertook it, it would be on his own responsibility. Hammarskjold replied that of course the US shld not get involved in the question; that it was his own responsibility but something had to be done to keep the ball rolling and throw it back to Chou. Unless the US objected, he said, he would go ahead and reply. In the absence of an objection from the US he wld do so, but of course he wld not do anything to embarrass US if he knew this was the case. His reply to Chou wld be to clear up the ambiguity as to Chou’s attitude toward other UN channels than the SC.

As for my suggestion for a report by him to the Council, he felt that if there were a SC meeting at which he reported only the official communications already circulated, and had made no personal reply to Chou’s personal message, Chou could well ask what had happened concerning his personal message. He said that he, Hammarskjold, cld go along completely with the line I had suggested if he made some reply to Chou’s personal message to him. He felt he must throw the ball back and he was sure that Chou had, in any case, informed Moscow of his message to Hammarskjold. If my plan were to be followed there must be a sign of life from him on the personal message. The minimum, in his opinion, wld be to tell Chou simply that he had received his message. But, Hammarskjold said, the US would be entirely outside the matter and wld not be involved. What he must be sure of was that the US wld not be embarrassed.

I asked Hammarskjold if it was clear that if he made his report to the SC, he wld not mention his personal correspondence with Chou. He replied that he wld not, and that in fact apart from the US, the only one who had been informed by him of Chou’s personal message had been Dixon (UK).

I then asked him how he would frame his report. He said first of all there was no need for a formal report and he wld say simply that he had transmitted the invitation of the Council to the ChiComs in accordance with the formula used by Munro as Pres and that he had received Chou’s formal reply. Nothing more.

I also raised the question of Hammarskjold’s letter to me of February 3 (see mytel 449, February 7).⁴ Reading from a letter I had prepared to reply to Hammarskjold⁵ I said that we did not consider that the Pres of the Council had made any summation; that he merely requested the SYG to convey the invitation, taking into account the views expressed by reps as to the desirability of the ChiComs accepting. Not only did we believe that Munro had not made a summation, but we had had numerous consultations to avoid a summation. I also pointed out that we believed there was no action by the Council which required or authorized him to send a message of the character of his secundo.⁶ Hammarskjold said that that was another matter, as far as the present problem was concerned. His interpretation of his role differed from ours. Of course he did not speak for the US or for the Council; but that was a rather “formal” story and we shld forget about it.

I told Hammarskjold that as far as his reply to Chou was concerned our position was that we had no comment to make on his proposed reply; that if he sent it he did so on his own responsibility; and that we thought it exceeded his authority. He again said that his interpretation of his authority differed from ours but that what he did would not involve us—it wld be as if another govt had taken action which we might not like but to which, of course, we would not be a party.

On the basis of the foregoing, it seems clear to me (1) that Hammarskjold will make a pro forma report to the SC, if such a course is agreed with the UK, France and NZ, but that he will also privately make his proposed reply to Chou unless we go further than we have done and formally object to his doing so. I wld appreciate instructions on this point.⁷

In addition, it seems to me that a mtg to hear so limited a report from the SYG will at least require some speeches from members regretting Chou’s rejection of the invitation and expressing the intention to consider the matter further at a later date.

Pending further instructions I have telephoned Munro and filled him in on our view concerning a mtg to hear a report from the SYG and possibly a few speeches along the above lines. He said that this was consistent with his personal view but he was not sure of the NZ Govt’s attitude. He planned to talk to UK Ambassador Makins in Wash and call me back later this morning.

I also telephoned Dixon outlining our proposal. I said that we understood Eden’s problem with the Commonwealth PriMins, that we did not wish to embarrass him, and that on the contrary, we wanted to accommodate him as much as possible as to timing and tone, but that we did not want to by-pass the UN. It was for these reasons that we thought the kind of mtg suggested would be desirable. Dixon said that all of the Commonwealth PriMins and Eden agreed that no further mtg shld be held. Our suggestion might, however, be a second position. He asked if “I wld forgive him if he simply took note, for the time being, of my suggestion”. We agreed to meet in his office at 3:00 this afternoon.

Lodge

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/2–855. Secret; Niact; Limited Distribution. Received at 2:35 p.m.
2. Three telephone conversations between Lodge and Dulles on this subject on February 7 are recorded in notes by Phyllis Bernau. (Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Telephone Conversations)
3. Document 95.
4. The reference telegram reported that Lodge received a letter of February 3 from Hammarskjöld replying to a letter of the same date from Lodge. Lodge’s letter, reported in telegram 433 from New York, February 3 (cited in footnote 10, Document 92), restated U.S. objections to Hammarskjöld’s February 2 messages to Chou En-lai. Hammarskjöld’s February 3 letter cited the record of the January 31 Security Council meetings and stated that both messages were within his authority. (Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/2–555)
5. Not found in Department of State files.
6. The reference is to Hammarskjöld’s personal message to Chou.
7. Telegram 412 to New York, February 8, instructed Lodge to interpose no further objection, since his statement to Hammarskjöld had made the U.S. position abundantly clear. (Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/2–855)