99. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State Washington, February 9, 1955, 2:58 p.m.1
SUBJECT
- Off-Shore Islands
PARTICIPANTS
- The Secretary
- Sir Roger Makins, British Ambassador
- Mr. MacArthur, C
- Mr. McConaughy, CA
The British Ambassador opened by saying he wished to talk about various matters related to the Formosa situation. He said the Soviet proposal for a ten-power conference to consider the situation in the area of Formosa and the off-shore islands had most regrettably leaked in New Delhi. The UK Government considered this leak unfortunate, and Sir Anthony Eden had accordingly felt obliged to get an immediate reply off to Molotov. The Ambassador believed the Secretary would find the reply satisfactory, and gave the Secretary a copy. (Enclosure No. 1.)2 He said Sir Anthony’s objective was to keep the diplomatic exchange with the Soviets going while at the same time pointing out that the Soviet proposal was unsatisfactory. Sir Roger said the UK did not intend to comment to the press on the Soviet proposal, and wished to keep secret the fact that Eden has sent a reply. The Secretary read Eden’s message without comment.
The Ambassador then said he had reported to London the Secretary’s recent statement of the U.S. position as to the off-shore islands. He has now received the views of the UK Government which he had been instructed to give us orally. Presumably, the statement of the U.S. position and the views of the UK Government had been considered by the Commonwealth Prime Ministers now meeting in London. The Ambassador thought it could probably be assumed that the British views represented a consensus of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers. Since the stated views of the UK Government were carefully framed, the Ambassador thought it desirable to give us the exact wording. Accordingly, he handed the Secretary an “oral communication” (Enclosure No. 2). The communication noted that while the evacuation of the Tachen Islands appeared to be proceeding satisfactorily, the position in regard to the off-shore islands still gave cause for concern. It was noted that the U.S. considered that it had gone as far as it could for the time being “to tidy up the situation”. But if hostilities should occur over Quemoy or Matsu the great weight of opinion in the UK, and probably other free countries, would not support U.S. intervention in the off-shore islands, which were regarded as a part of China. The longer the situation was left vague, the greater the danger of incidents. The UK Government was [Page 245] being pressed to define more clearly its attitude as to the off-shore islands. The Government was trying to avoid this for the time being, but could not continue the evasion indefinitely, especially since the off-shore islands are generally admitted to be in a category different from that of Formosa and the Pescadores.
The Secretary said that the defense of Quemoy and Matsu had to be considered in relation to the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores. If HMG could give assurance regarding the security of Formosa and the Pescadores, the UK view as to the off-shore islands would be entitled to greater weight. However the Chinese Communists say emphatically that they intend to take Formosa. They do not make any distinction between the off-shore islands and Formosa, and openly declare that the attacks against the off-shore islands are part of the campaign to take Formosa. The U.S. Government is bound to give some credence to the Chinese Communists’ own threatening words. Under the Mutual Defense Treaty and the Joint Resolution we must consider the relationship of the off-shore islands to the defense of Formosa. If there were assurances entitled to credence that the Chinese Communists no longer have designs on Formosa and the Pescadores, that would of course alter our attitude regarding the offshore islands, for the islands would not then be unquestionably related to the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores. We cannot take a different view of the off-shore islands so long as it seems that an attack on the off-shore islands would be a stepping stone or a prelude to an attack on Formosa. The Chinese Communists could ease the situation if they would give dependable assurances that they do not intend to attack Formosa and the Pescadores. The U.S. position as to the off-shore islands could then be reexamined. Under present circumstances, we must assume that the Chinese Communists mean what they say.
The British Ambassador said the Secretary had made his position very clear. The Ambassador understood, and he thought Sir Anthony Eden and the Commonwealth Prime Ministers understood. The British Government was trying to find a position on which it and the Commonwealth countries could give full support to the U.S. If the U.S. should get involved with the Chinese Communists, the Commonwealth countries wanted a clear issue on which they could stand. The Prime Ministers did not believe that they could get sufficient support in their countries, if the issue were merely the off-shore islands.
The Secretary said he knew it was not an easy problem for the UK. He expressed deep appreciation for the sympathetic understanding which Eden had shown. He was aware that HMG had gone to considerable lengths to support the U.S. position.
[Page 246]The Ambassador concurred, saying that Eden had “risked his neck”, politically speaking.
The Secretary said he was not unmindful of the risks Eden had incurred. He hoped something could be worked out but he felt that the U.S. Government had gone as far as it could in the absence of a response from the other side. There did not seem to be much hope in the present attitude of Chinese Communist authorities. Any assumption that the Chinese Communists might now follow a more moderate course would fly in the face of threatening Chinese Communist words and deeds of the most formidable character.
The Secretary remarked that if the Chinese Communists should resort to military action, the U.S. could not again be expected to afford them a “privileged sanctuary”. It was not likely that U.S. forces would again be bound by a line such as the Yalu River line of the Korean hostilities.
The Secretary said he would prefer to leave the foregoing statement of the U.S. position oral and informal, if that was satisfactory to the Ambassador.
The Ambassador said that the statement was perfectly clear and he was quite willing to have it left oral. The British statement was really an oral communication.
The British Ambassador said that as to the next steps on the New Zealand item in the Security Council, he understood that an agreement on procedure had been reached in New York between Lodge, Dixon and Munro.3 This was satisfactory to the UK and he need not bother the Secretary with this point.
The Secretary said he understood that an interim meeting of the Security Council was contemplated.
The Ambassador confirmed this. He remarked that the British Government shared the concern of the U.S. Government at the unauthorized correspondence which Secretary General Hammarskjold was exchanging with Chou En-lai.
The Secretary said that he considered this exchange of correspondence extremely dangerous. We were in a serious affair. The situation was not improved by people meddling in it on their own responsibility. There was a real danger that Hammarskjold’s efforts might be misunderstood in Peiping. Every word must be weighed in a delicate situation such as now prevails, and every word needs to come from an authorized source. Hammarskjold seems to think he has a standing function as an arbitrator between the two sides in UN [Page 247] matters. This is a new concept, which should not be encouraged. The Secretary expressed gratification that the British Government shares the U.S. view on this.
Sir Roger said the British regarded the role Hammarskjold has assumed as “outside his competence”.
The Secretary said that Hammarskjold’s intervention with the Chinese Communists was very different from that which the UK had undertaken. The UK representations were highly responsible, and had been made with our knowledge and acquiescence. Hammarskjold’s efforts were in sharp contrast.
The Ambassador said that, apart from the question of competence, his Government felt that Hammarskjold’s efforts inevitably would “cross some wires”.
The Secretary said that he had invited Canadian Foreign Minister Pearson to have lunch with him privately and informally in Washington on Sunday.4 He thought it would be useful to get his first hand impressions as a result of the London meeting.
The Ambassador thought this was an excellent idea. He said he had suggested to London four days ago that Pearson should stop off here on his way back to Ottawa from London.
The Secretary asked that Eden be informed that he (the Secretary) is aware of the fact that Eden too has his troubles in handling Far Eastern issues. He wanted the Foreign Secretary to know that he is deeply appreciative of the efforts he is making and is not unmindful of the complications he is incurring.
The Secretary expressed regret that Sir Anthony would have to cut short his approaching Far Eastern trip.5 He felt it would be a good thing if Eden could carry out his schedule of visits as he could exercise very useful influences in certain places. The Secretary mentioned that he was planning to spend a few hours in Rangoon and also make brief visits to the Associated States and Manila.
The Ambassador agreed that the change in Eden’s plans was regrettable. It was, however, unavoidable for several reasons including the reluctance of Eden’s colleagues in the Cabinet to a prolonged absence.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.5/2–955. Top Secret. Drafted by McConaughy. The time of the meeting is from Dulles’ appointment diary. (Princeton University Library, Dulles Papers)↩
- The enclosures are not attached to the source text but are in Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/2–955. The British reply to Molotov was summarized in a Foreign Office statement of February 12, printed in Documents on International Affairs, 1955, pp. 454–455.↩
- Telegram 462 from New York, February 9, reported that Dixon, Munro, Hoppenot, and Lodge had agreed that a Security Council meeting should be held on February 14 to take note of the PRC rejection of the Council’s invitation. (Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/2–955)↩
- February 13. The meeting apparently did not take place. Dulles and Pearson had lunch in New York on February 16; see Document 115.↩
- Both Eden and Dulles were to attend a meeting of the Council established under the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, to be held in Bangkok, February 23–25.↩