Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, China, Volume II

97. Memorandum From the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Bowie) to the Secretary of State¹

Washington, February 7, 1955.

SUBJECT

• Formosa Policy

1. The U.S. must reassess its position regarding the Formosa Straits in the light of the situation which now exists.

2. In their attitude toward the problem, the free nations in Europe and Asia distinguish sharply between Formosa and the offshore islands. In general, they support or acquiesce in our defense of Formosa. But they consider the offshore islands do not involve our security interests. They are satisfied that if they were in ChiCom hands we would not consider trying to take them in order to defend Formosa even if it were attacked. They feel that they are important only in terms of a ChiNat intention to attack the mainland and that the ChiComs cannot be expected to acquiesce in ChiNat retention of such strongholds in their harbors. Hence, they look on them as a futile hostage to fortune and the symbol of a rash and quixotic policy. Thus, they feel that our protection of those islands greatly enhances the risk of war and thereby endangers their own security. This fear will tend to strain the coalition and generate pressures to restrain us.

3. This attitude would put us in a difficult position if the ChiComs should attack Quemoy or the Matsus. A war arising over Quemoy would alienate our allies in Europe and much of Asia. The lack of allied support would handicap our conduct of even a limited war and might seriously impair our capabilities if hostilities spread. This situation is likely to tempt the ChiComs eventually to try to seize Quemoy.

4. The ChiCom rejection of the UN invitation indicates that it will probably be useless to try to settle the issue by agreement with them. They have clearly stated as their primary objectives: (a) retaking Formosa; and (b) replacing the ChiNats in the UN. In any negotiation they will surely not renounce these objectives or their efforts to brand the U.S. as the aggressor. If we are committed to defend Quemoy and Matsu, we play directly into the ChiCom hands. While continuing to assert their two primary goals, the ChiComs can focus on the offshore islands. Thus, they can divide us from our friends; confuse the real issues; and hope to create sufficient fear of a “useless” war to enhance the pressures for a new Geneva.

5. Molotov’s proposal fits in with this pattern. The ChiComs will continue to threaten and to harass the offshore islands and may even seek to take some of them. Amid rising tensions, they will seek a conference to abate them on their terms. Such a conference would be the worst possible context for a solution. The very fact that the ChiComs took part would brand any outcome as appeasement. Moreover, it would be hard to prevent such a conference from taking up other questions such as ChiCom membership in the UN, especially if the ChiComs made this the price of settlement. To frustrate the Communist design, however, it will not be enough merely to reject Molotov’s proposal. The U.S. must adopt some other course of action which will keep the free world with us.

6. In this situation, our policy should be directed to disengaging from the offshore islands in a way which will not damage our prestige or leave any doubts as to our will and ability to defend Formosa and the Pescadores. The free world and communist attitudes seem to me to give us the chance to do just this. U.S. withdrawal of protection from the offshore islands could be used to obtain general support for our position on Formosa. The ChiComs focus on Formosa and the UN seat tends to make the offshore islands a secondary matter.

7. The best forum for such a solution is the UN. In any case, the UN must not appear impotent in the face of the ChiCom challenge to its authority. I suggest the following program:

(a) The Security Council or, if necessary, the Assembly should adopt a resolution denouncing the use of force to alter the status of Formosa, the Pescadores and the Mainland, and branding in advance any use of force as aggression and a threat to the peace.

(b) With UN and allied support for our Formosa position, the U.S. should be prepared to abandon the offshore islands as no longer necessary to the defense of Formosa. For a period (say of three months) we should undertake to protect the offshore islands to enable the ChiNats to evacuate their forces if they wish, and we should state that we would react forcefully to any ChiCom military activity in the Straits affecting the status quo during this period.

8. In order to induce the ChiNats to withdraw we should stress:

(a) The importance to the ChiNats and to the U.S. of allied and UN support for the retention and defense of Formosa and the Pescadores.

(b) The importance of this action in maintaining U.S. public support for the ChiNat’s Military Defense Treaty and for U.S. policy relating to Formosa.

(c) The consequences for ChiNat morale of defeat at Quemoy or Matsu as compared to withdrawal.

(d) The effect of the ChiCom publicly focusing on Formosa and the UN seat in sharply reducing even the symbolic significance of the offshore islands.

(e) The negligible military significance of the offshore islands for the defense of Formosa or in the event of wider hostilities.

9. Under such a program, the Seventh Fleet would be maintained in the area of the offshore islands during the specified period so as to make clear our power and our willingness to use it in accordance with our own decisions. If we should conduct an evacuation of the ChiNats we should do so without concealment and without haste. If the ChiComs should attempt any military action in the Formosa Straits during this period, we should respond severely so as to leave a permanent impression.

In other words, our general posture should be that we were acting, with firmness and with strength, in accordance with our own interests as we had determined them.

10. By this course we would make it clear that, in disengaging from the offshore islands, we were not motivated by fear for the ChiComs, but by international support for our major objective in the Formosa Straits, the defense of Formosa. We would have demonstrated both our contempt for the ChiCom military power and our desire not to provoke “useless” conflict.

11. In my opinion, such a course would enhance the respect of the free nations for our judgment, our restraint, and our sense of partnership, without giving rise to doubts in either the free world or the Communist Bloc as to our resolution. If the ChiComs are determined to precipitate a military showdown with the U.S. in the Far East, we could then count on the support of our allies. While their actual help in the immediate area might be modest, the effect on our worldwide position and on the willingness of the USSR to support Communist China in pressing the showdown could be decisive. In short, a program of obtaining the free world’s support for our policy toward Formosa in exchange for abandoning the offshore islands would seem to me clearly to serve the U.S. security interest.

RRB

1. Source: Department of State, PPS Files: Lot 66 D 70, China. Top Secret. A notation on the source text indicates that it was returned by the Secretary’s office on March 7.