Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, China, Volume II

96. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, February 7, 1955, 11:30 a.m.¹

Washington, February 7, 1955, 11:30 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

• The Secretary
• The Under Secretary
• Mr. Robertson
• Mr. Merchant
• Sir Roger Makins
• Sir Robert Scott

The British Ambassador called at his request on the Secretary at 11:30 this morning. He opened the conversation by stating that Sir Anthony Eden desired to communicate certain thoughts to the Secretary but wished to emphasize these have not been discussed collectively with the Commonwealth Prime Ministers. Sir Roger said that Sir Anthony did not believe it would be profitable at the moment to continue the discussion of substance in the Security Council. He recognizes, however, that some meeting in the near future will have to be held. He is also inclined to believe that the Soviet Union would agree to the wisdom of not pursuing the substance in the United Nations now. However, when the time comes for settling on some new procedure he believes it should be under the aegis of the U.N.

The British Ambassador continued that Sir Anthony’s principal concern now was the avoidance of any incident so serious as to involve us all. The important thing is to stop the fighting.

There are various proposals in the air. The one which Sir Anthony now favors is to continue diplomatic exchanges. He would appreciate any suggestions the Secretary might have regarding the form of the reply to the Molotov proposal.²

Eden does not consider the Soviet proposal to be acceptable but hopes that no doors will be slammed on the general idea. The immediate step he has in mind is to go back to the Soviets and say that he has noted Molotov’s remarks to Hearst and Kingsbury Smith on January 31³ when he said “hardly anyone would want to interfere” with the Tachen evacuation, and when he also spoke of their anxiety for a peaceful solution. He would then propose asking Molotov if he confirmed that this is the position of the Chinese Communist Government and say that he would pass on any information received to the U.S. and other interested governments.

Next the British Ambassador said that he was instructed to ask the Secretary as the basis for any such approach (but not to communicate to Moscow or Peiping) if the Secretary could give a confidential statement of longer term U.S. policy objectives. He referred to his letter to the Secretary of January 21⁴ in connection with which the Secretary had made an express reservation regarding the future of the off-shore islands. The British hope that eventually a line will be drawn down the Formosa Straits and that Peiping will abandon any idea of an attack on Formosa while Formosa abandons any idea of an attack on the Mainland. He hoped that the U.S. desired to reach a similar long-term position. He then added as his own inference that the British Government realizes it will take time to reach a peaceful atmosphere and solution. Various ideas were in the wind. One is the Molotov proposal. Another is utilizing Hammarskjold as a negotiating instrument. The third is direct talks between the Chinese Communists and the U.S. He recognized that in the immediate future agreement on any basis can probably not be reached.

In reply the Secretary said that on the first point regarding the United Nations there was the matter of the uncompleted action initiated by New Zealand. He inquired if the Ambassador implied a desire of the U.K. not to table at any time the agreed resolution.

Sir Roger replied that as he understood it it was the desire of London not to table it at the present time. When the Secretary pressed him as to London’s views on a later tabling, Sir Roger answered that he judged that the British Government had reached no hard view on this subject.

The Secretary then said that he did not believe events should necessarily prevent us from proceeding as agreed with the resolution. Chou En-lai’s reply⁵ had been no surprise to him. He could see advantages in bringing the fire a little closer to the feet of the Chinese Communists. We should not give the appearance of timidity in the face of Chou En-lai’s truculent rejection. He noted also that the Chinese Nationalists disliked the idea of the resolution nearly as much as the Communists. In any event, he did not want to decide today to abandon Oracle as he felt that there had been no basic change in the situation. It was true that there had been no agreement on tempo but there had been agreement on the resolution. He did not want to abandon the idea at this time.

The British Ambassador said he would convey this reaction to London. It seemed clear to him that London would not want the resolution tabled this week. They hoped that the Soviets might exercise a restraining influence on Peiping and to introduce the resolution now might well result in a Soviet veto.

The Secretary said that he had not had time to discuss at length the last week’s developments with his staff and all that he desired to say at this time was that he did not wish to abandon the plan for the resolution. He agreed, however, that we should not move hastily.

On the matter of the reply to Molotov, the Secretary said that he would like to give this matter more thought. He said he had earlier told Ambassador Munro that one thing was quite clear and that was that the U.S. was unwilling to accept any proposals, under the aegis of the U.N. or otherwise, which involved discussing matters affecting the Republic of China behind the back of the latter government. Any such procedure was completely ruled out.

On the matter of our long-term policy objectives the Secretary said this was obviously a large subject. We hoped, as probably the UK does, that ultimately there will come about sufficient independence between Peiping and Moscow as to create the beginning of a balance of power relationship. As a result the U.S. would not have to be so fully involved in the Far East as it now is. With Japan weakened by the last war and the two Communist powers closely allied, it was necessary for the U.S. to put its power into the scales. Meanwhile, he felt the return of Japanese power would come slowly.

Sir Roger interjected that he had not been thinking in quite such long terms.

The Secretary then said that, pending developments on the Mainland ending the imbalance of Asian power as it now exists, the U.S. feels that the only acceptable solution to it is a close association with the present non-communist countries. This has been achieved through various treaties. The value of any of them, however, is dependent on the continuation of an anti- or non-communist government in their countries. If such governments are subverted then treaties have little residual value and there would be a corresponding shift in the position in the Pacific. Our primary interest is the offshore island chain. The treaty with Formosa does not cover, as treaty area, the islands immediately off the Mainland. Our interest in them is not in their intrinsic value but in their psychological value and in their relation to the defense of Formosa.

The Secretary continued that we had gone as far as we can in tidying up the situation without collapsing the morale of the Republic of China, the maintenance of which is a large factor. If it were to collapse, a lot of things would break quickly. The result would be serious in Japan, the Philippines, and possibly through South East Asia.

Our actions have included limiting the area covered by the treaty to Formosa and the Pescadores; the exchange of notes with Chiang Kai-shek; and the evacuation of the Tachen Islands. These have combined to put a strain on the Republic of China equal to what it can bear for the time being. Any action looking like further retreat would be insupportable. He noted also that even our action in the U.N. had been repugnant to the Nationalists, and he said that he felt we had about exhausted our ability to do anything further at the present time. It was up to others to make some contribution.

The Secretary then said he thought we should seriously consider whether Peiping really wanted peace. (Sir Roger said that the British also are considering this problem.) The Secretary noted that it took us a long time to really believe what Hitler had plainly said and written concerning his intentions.

On the other hand, if Peiping really has a peaceful purpose, the off-shore islands lose much of their importance. The Nationalists now appreciate that the only way they can return to the Mainland would be as a result of a change in the internal situation on the Mainland and not on their ability to fight their way back. If the Korean War broke out again, then the Nationalists would have a role to play but only under conditions of general war would that role be one of invaders of the Mainland. If the risk of general war and the threat of a Communist attack on Formosa declines, then the value of the off-shore islands recedes.

Sir Roger thanked the Secretary for a very clear answer to his question.

At this point Sir Robert said he thought the Communists were serious about their intention to destroy the Chiang Kai-shek regime but not about an invasion of Formosa. He thought that if the Nationalists stay on the off-shore islands and the Communists can inflict defeats on them, the result will be weakening of Chiang Kai-shek’s prestige and position on Formosa. The possible risk of a Communist take-over on Formosa from within was then briefly discussed.

The Secretary promised again to give Sir Roger within a few days any further thoughts he had regarding the reply to Molotov and the matter of action in the U.N. He expressed the hope that the Commonwealth Prime Ministers would not formalize any position. Sir Roger said he did not expect this to occur.

The Secretary then asked the Ambassador’s opinion as to whether Hammarskjold by his personal activities was actually being helpful or in fact crossing the wires. Sir Roger disclaimed any opinion on the matter. The Secretary expressed himself as feeling that when dealing with Communists and Orientals it was important to keep the channels clear. He doubted that Hammarskjold’s volunteer operations on a free-wheeling basis were contributing much. If he were to play any role in the matter, he felt he would have to operate under instructions.

The Under Secretary commented that prior to the despatch of Hammarskjold’s long personal letter to Chou En-lai Ambassador Lodge had expressed the firm objection of the U.S. to the letter and had expressed the view that we felt that he was exceeding his authority as Secretary General.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/2–755. Top Secret. Drafted by Merchant.
2. See footnote 2, Document 86.
3. Molotov’s remarks in an interview on January 29 with publisher William Randolph Hearst, Jr., and Kingsbury Smith were released to the press by the Soviet Government on January 30 and reported in the New York Times on January 31, 1955.
4. See footnote 3, Document 27.
5. See Document 77.