59. Telegram From the Ambassador in the Republic of China (Rankin) to the Department of State1
496. President Chiang had brief telegram re offshore islands from Minister Yeh in Washington which causing him much concern. He is replying to Yeh but asked me to send his views direct to Department by most urgent means.
Chiang had understood that immediately after passage of resolution by Senate, statements would be issued simultaneously by US and his government. Latter would announce withdrawal from Tachens for strategic reasons and redeployment of forces now there. US statement would announce intention to help in defense of Kinmen and Matsu, making our position clear to all concerned and offsetting, in part at least, unfortunate psychological effect of Tachen evacuation. Now President learns US statement, if any, making no specific reference to Kinmen and Matsu.
He regards this new development as most dangerous particularly in light of recent statements by Eden and Molotov as well as impending cease-fire discussions. President is convinced Soviet purpose is to sabotage new mutual security pact while that of British is to sabotage any extension of US support for offshore islands. He assumes Soviets are putting pressure on British and latter are pressuring us along these lines. Chiang is highly appreciative of President’s actions in present case and of overwhelming approval by Congress. He fears any delay or indications of hesitancy at this time would spoil strong effect of our recent actions and perhaps encourage immediate Communist attack on islands. President regards next two or three days as of greatest importance in this respect, after which cease-fire discussions will generate atmosphere of appeasement benefitting only the Communists.
I promised send telegram immediately but expressed hope President’s fears not justified. Said I had no information re text of proposed US statement but thought it possible our intentions toward Kinmen and Matsu might be made clear without mentioning them by name; also this might have advantage of not implying all other islands being written off.
Comment: Chiang seemed more nervous this evening than I remember seeing him before. He appeared to think US about to let him down on Kinmen and Matsu, presumably at British behest, without [Page 167] realizing implications in terms of immediate military situation and psychological effect here and elsewhere.2
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/1–2955. Secret; Niact. Received at 12:29 p.m. Repeated to USUN for Lodge by the Department as telegram 382 to New York, January 29. (Ibid.)↩
- A summary record of the conversation was sent to the Department as an enclosure to despatch 384 from Taipei, February 3. (Ibid., 793.00/2–355)↩