Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, China, Volume II

60. Telegram From the Ambassador in the Republic of China (Rankin) to the Department of State¹

Taipei, January 30, 1955—5 p.m.

497. Department’s 416,² Taipei’s 496.³ President Chiang informed me after luncheon today his government would not request assistance in withdrawing from Tachens until US position re Kinmen and Matsu clarified. Failure to insist on this would betray China. Another telegram from Foreign Minister Yeh apparently confirmed Chiang’s suspicions (Taipei’s 496) that US had gone back on firm understanding reached prior to President’s message to Congress. Essential points of agreement as described to me orally were:

1. After approval of resolution by Congress, two governments would issue simultaneous and complementary statements on offshore islands.

2. Above statements would provide for US assistance in evacuation of Tachens.

3. At same time, it would be made clear US was extending protection to Kinmen and Matsu.

Chiang now understands only statement US proposes to issue is that made by President Eisenhower when he signed resolution. Meanwhile, Yeh has forwarded draft of proposed Chinese statement referring to China’s “negotiating” with the defense of unspecified islands.

President Chiang then told me solemnly that cause for Free China based upon principle which more important than success or failure. During conversation he emphasized words (as translated by Madame Chiang and Acting Foreign Minister Shen,⁴ only others present) such as honor, probity, equity, sincerity. He said Tachen and forces there might be lost, that Formosa where he and his people were prepared to die might also be lost, but that if China’s honor were preserved for posterity it would be worthwhile. He had never gone back on his word to United States and never would. He assumed United States to be guided by like principles.

Chiang went on to say he presumed US regarded present developments in this area as important, that we were aware of extent of China’s warlike preparations and of our responsibilities in tipping scales for war or peace. Any sign of indecision or weakness on our part would make war more certain and responsibility for precipitating would be ours. He assumed also that in relation with his government US realized it was not dealing with children.

President asked me to report his remarks fully to Department.⁵

I have informed Admirals Stump and Pride of foregoing and all other recent developments of significance. Comment was that Navy is ready to carry out operation as planned on receipt of orders.

Comment: I hope additional US statement, coordinated with Chinese, can bridge this difficult situation.

Rankin

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 293.9322/1–3055. Top Secret; Niact. Received at 6 a.m. Repeated to USUN for Lodge by the Department as telegram 384 to New York, January 30. (Ibid.)
2. Telegram 416 to Taipei, January 29, informed Rankin that the formal Chinese request for U.S. assistance in the evacuation of the Tachens was to be given to him in writing and should be transmitted immediately to the Department. (Ibid., 293.9322/1–2955)
3. Supra.
4. Shen Chang-huan, Political Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs.
5. In addition to this telegram, a record of the conversation was sent to the Department as an enclosure to despatch 384 from Taipei, February 3. (Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/2–355)